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This work is based upon fieldwork carried out among i digenous Pehuenche people 
living in the Andes in Southern Chile. It is an ethnographic investigation of the relations 
between Pehuenche vision and healing practices in different local settings. The first part 
of this thesis focuses on Pehuenche vision from a cosmo-political angle. In order to set 
the scene for my overall argument, I explore the constitutive relation between mutual 
vision among real people (Ch. che) and the emergence of the Pehuenche person, which I 
call the ‘dynamic personal composition.’ With mutual vision between people being a 
precondition for the emergence of social relations, I examine the experience of particular 
witchcraft actions in which mutual vision is not possible. This leads to the 
conceptualization of ‘unilateral vision’ as a key phenomenon associated with the 
emergence of illnesses and the alteration of the shared plane of Pehuenche visibility. I 
also explore how mutual vision can be restored only through the assemblage of 
particular visual capacities known in the vernacular as ‘the gift of vision.’ In the second 
part of the thesis, I analyze the ways in which public health services respond to 
particular illnesses not detectable or treatable by medical technicians. In particular, I 
focus on the implications of ‘the visualization of traditional healers,’ inherent in the 
State’s approach to intercultural health. Through the examination of both particular 
intercultural health projects, as well as local expr ssions of discontent and animosity 
towards the State, this thesis seeks to create awareness about the ontological relevance of 
mutual vision in relations among real people. By pointing out the equivocal 
understandings of the visible and the invisible domains within intercultural relations, the 
analysis as a whole seeks to explain why Pehuenche vision must be understood through 
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Around fifty years ago, Jorge Luis Borges wrote a story about an ethnographer who, 
after having finished his fieldwork, decided to give up academia, leaving his 
ethnography unwritten: what the man had learned out in the field could not be expressed 
with academic language whatsoever. During his fieldwork, Borges’ ethnographer had 
actually discovered the secret of the people he lived with, however he believed that this 
was not nearly as important as the paths that led him to it. In my own story as 
ethnographer there is no secret to be told, since for the Pehuenche themselves the 
mysteries of life are huge and by definition not knowable in their entirety. Many times 
during these last four years I have found myself doubting whether or not I should write 
up my ethnography. Like a troublesome spiritual visitor, this hesitation appeared every 
time I came to realize the huge gap existing between th  world of academia and its 
language games, and the daily life of the Pehuenche people. If it were not for the caring 
insistence of friends and colleagues who encouraged me and convinced me that my story 
with the Pehuenche was worthwhile to be told, this dissertation would never have been 
written. 
This entire doctoral project was only possible thanks to the economic support of the 
Chilean Government, through its Beca Chile scholarship.  
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also not have been possible. In Pitril, I would like to offer special thanks to Narciso Vita 
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thanks to Maria Luisa Vita Gallina, Narciso Gallina Sepúlveda, Gloria Vita Vita, Jorge 
Gallina Llaulen, Fernando Llaulen Rapi, Lorenzo Llaulen Rapi, Fermín Vita Curriao, 
Eduardo Vita Gallina, Guillermo Llaulen Vita, Sandra Vita Vita, Luis Vita Vita, Carlita 
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Vita Cifuentes, Corina Llaulen Vita and Silvia Urrutia Vita. I am infinitely grateful to my 
host family in Pitril, who still evokes in me feelings of love and care. I give my thanks to 
every single member of that family for those unforgettable days and nights spent in 
Pitril.  
I am also immensely grateful to Nolfa Pavián Montre, since without her strength, 
support, and wisdom, this experience would not have made any sense.  
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Laura Porteño Maripil, Donata Pavián Montre, Corina P vián Almendras, José Milla 
Maripil, Jonathan Burgos Pavián, Francisco Quepil Naupa and Felipe Curriao Campos. 
All of the kimun -wisdom- Pehuenche people shared with me is invaluable, however as a 
sign of thanks I must mention here what has been for me a simple and true, but 
significant revelation. For the Pehuenche it is an ethical imperative to pay careful 
attention to the ways we speak, the words we use, and the tone of our utterances in order 
to avoid causing harm to other people with our speech. On many different occasions I 
was taught that rashly spoken words could actually punish both the speaker and others. 
Pewmagnen tubachi kudaw kümeke dugu piay ka welu dug layan. Language became a 
very prominent aspect of my research in fact, and I am especially grateful to Jaqueline 
Kaniwan and Jose Carihuentro Millaleo, Alicia Llaulen Gallina and Lien Carihuentro 
Llaulen for their help in teaching me Chedungun. 
Pilar Ramirez Enriquez helped me greatly and fostered this research on many levels. Our 
friendship now knows no borders. Furthermore, the whole team at the rural clinic in 
Ralco was always open and collaborative throughout my ethnography, especially Alvaro 
Basualto, Ricardo Hernandez, Mario Muñoz, Luisa Alegria Beltrán, and Juan Canio 
Larenas. To them I offer my sincere thanks. In Santa Bárbara, I am particulary thankful 
to Angélica Hermosilla Levi, Jose Catrileo Solar, Antonio Caro and Gonzalo Brito. 
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In Edinburgh, the unbeatable generosity, humility, and intellectual clarity of my 
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Without the freedom and confidence Stefan gave me, this thesis would have simply been 
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Gálvez, who boosted my confidence in my own work every time I needed it. Angela 
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Sarah Walker and Lucy Lowe deserve mention for their enthusiasm and their generosity 
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A few years ago in Amsterdam, I was lucky enough to have engaged in a long-term 
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‘Sometimes you have a headache in the back part of your brain, and that is because you 
think too much! Your brain works too hard and it gets tired easily. Your ‘neurono’ 
moves too much because you think too much. Even if there is nothing to be worried 
about, I cannot help you, those problems of the ‘neurono’ are not Pehuenche at all.’  
I will never forget these words an old Pehuenche healer said to me during the cold 
winter of 2009. After having seen my urine sample in her house in Callaqui, she told me 
bluntly that the health problem I was going through had to do with an excess of what she 
understood as a non-Pehuenche cognitive activity. She was right: during the very first 
days of my fieldwork I spent much time alone (which is very uncommon for the 
Pehuenche) thinking about how to get access to Pehuenche communities. I did not yet 
know anyone in Alto Bío Bío, so those first days in the field proved to be a difficult 
beginning. However, even if I had the opportunity to visit that healer again today, I am 
sure she would tell me the same thing. 
The vernacular distinction between ‘Pehuenche problems’ and ‘non-Pehuenche 
problems’ was ubiquitous throughout my fieldwork. Yet, my understanding of that 
distinction has changed radically now that I am at the end of this project. Today, and 
without having to put into question the whole anthropological endeavor, I must confess 
that the intellectual exercise of trying to understand the Pehuenche world - to write about 
it, to think about it and with it - would not be considered a genuine Pehuenche concern 
by that healer in Callaqui. I am afraid that for myPehuenche friends, this thesis cannot 
help being the result of an overdose of non-Pehuenche thinking. Nevertheless, I hope the 
pages that follow will be a contribution to not only what most of my friends in Alto Bío 
Bío used to call winka rakiduam, simply translated as ‘the thought of non-Pehuench 
people,’ but also to the wider realm of intercultural relations. 
The healer’s words express with simplicity one of the main concerns of this thesis, 
namely the radical difference between Pehuenche and no -Pehuenche worlds, and the 
ontological gap that can emerge between these worlds when they meet. The healer 
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considered my particular way of thinking of the world – as an individual thinker thinking 
of the world – to be non-Pehuenche. This indirectly points out the contradiction between 
one of the fundamental premises of modern Western philosophy and Pehuenche 
ontology. By the former, I am referring to the well known Cartesian distinction between 
res cogitans and res extensa: res cogitans understood as the mind or the ‘thinking thing,’ 
res extensa, ‘the extended thing,’ understood as external matter. For the Cartesian 
division of reality, anything that exists must be of one kind or the other, both categories 
being essentially contradictory and opposite properties. This does not occur in 
Pehuenche reality. My ethnographic experience among the Pehuenche indeed challenges 
this modern Cartesian premise in a very specific way - that is, by taking seriously 
Pehuenche conceptualizations of vision within the intra- and inter-cultural realm of 
health and illness.  
Hence, this thesis is an attempt to consider a world in which the distinction between res 
cogitans and res extensa does not make any sense. However, if one was forced to use 
this distinction in regards to Pehuenche ontology, it would be possible to state the 
following: whereas res cogitans, understood as the individual subjectivity of a thinker, 
exceeds the bounded, liberal modern subject as its un que loci of existence, res extensa, 
or the ‘extended thing,’ appears very often as being-a-subject. Thus, we can say that at 
the beginning of my fieldwork I was suffering from the Cartesian split, from an overdose 
of res cogitans or an excess of the individual activity of my own ‘neurono.’ The healer 
was therefore not able to help me, since my discomfort was inherent to amodern reality 
of independent and determined entities, resulting i the objectification of the 
object/subject dualism.1  
In the following pages I aim to expose Pehuenche ontol gies as being radically 
relational in a world configured by, to put it in a very reductive way, a multiplicity of res 
cogitans. The main question I intend to answer is ‘How can one think about vision in a 
world in which the subject is multiple and eyes are spread all around the Pehuenche res?’ 
                                                
1 For a deeper analysis of this dualism see Blattner 2007 and Thomas 2004. 
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My whole ethnography has inspired me to think of human vision as strongly relational, 
only emerging from the mutual encounter of real peopl  (Ch. che) in interaction. In a 
nutshell, there is more to Pehuenche vision than meets the individualistic, liberal eye. In 
this thesis, I seek to explain why this is so.  
 
1. Field site and methods 
This thesis is based on sixteen months of fieldwork carried out in areas surrounding the 
historically and geographically most significant river in Chile, the Bío Bío River. From 
October 2009 to January 2011, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the Alto Bío Bío 
district, in the province of Alto Bío Bío, which ispart of the 8th Chilean region, also 
called ‘Bío Bío.’  
In the Alto Bío Bío district, more than 80% of the population are Pehuenche, who, to 
simplify somewhat (see historical section below), can be considered Mapuche people 
residing in the mountains. The population of this dtrict is currently about seven 
thousand inhabitants and its area is 2124.5km2. According to sex distribution, 38.3% are 
women (2676 people) while men (4320 people) correspond to the 61.7% (Censo 2002). 
There are 1031 families in the area, with an average f mily size of 5.3 people. According 
to the Chilean National Socio-Economic Survey (Casen 2009), Alto Bío Bío is the 
poorest district in Chile. It also has the second-highest level of alcohol consumption in 
the nation (Encuesta de Calidad de Vida del Año 2006). The Chilean ‘Indigenous Law’ 
nº19.253, enacted during the first democratic governm nt after Pinochet’s dictatorship, 
defined Alto Bío Bío as an Area of Indigenous Development (ADI) in 1997; the borders 
of the latter coinciding with the newborn district area. 2 
 
                                                
2 In Article 26 of the Ley Indígena, the 19,253 ADIs are conceived as ‘territorial spaces in which the 
organisms of the state administration will focus their actions for the benefit of the harmonious 
development of the Indigenous communities.’  
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Figure 1. Map of the Bío Bío region, Bío Bío province and the district of Bío Bío  
The Alto Bío Bío district is situated at the eastern-most part of the province of Bío Bío, 
and was created at the beginning of 2004. The creation of this district was a result of the 
multidimensional problems the construction of dams along the Bío Bío River caused for 
Pehuenche people. The construction of these dams was led by ENDESA (National 
Energy Enterprise), the largest multinational electric company in Chile and a former 
state enterprise that was privatized during the military dictatorship (1989) and is 
currently owned by a Spanish-Italian corporation. Due to the national and international 
consensus about the need to protect Indigenous rights already strongly violated, some of 
the affected Pehuenche families and the Chilean State signed an agreement with the 
Commission for Human Rights of the OEA (Organization of American States) in 2003 
(Norero 2007). This agreement implied the creation of the new district. In those days, 
while the whole Pehuenche/Endesa controversy was prominent in both the national and 
international media, several academic and non-academic documents about the 
construction of the dams and its implications for Pehuenche people, were published 
(Nesti 1999; Molina 1998; Morales et al. 1998; Namuncura 1999). However, after the 
dams were built, there was very little interest on the part of scholars in understanding the 
daily life of Pehuenche people. My thesis can be situated in this scenario of 
forgetfulness. 
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Within this district, there are 13 Indigenous communities situated along the Queuco and 
Bío Bío rivers. Along the Bío Bío are located the following communities: El Avellano, 
Quepuca Ralco, Los Guindos, Ralco Lepoy, El Barco, and Guayalí. Callaqui, Pitril, 




Figure 2. Map of the district of Alto Bío Bío  
 
Pehuenche communities are not organized into proper villages. Large distances between 
houses are the rule and there is generally no place that can be considered the centre of 
the community. This tendency has often been understood as an expression of the 
importance Mapuche people place upon protecting their autonomy and independence 
(Faron 1964; Foerster 2004; Melville 1976). Moreover, this pattern can also be 
explained by the fact that Pehuenche people, like many other Amerindian societies, do 
not perceive their environment as a space of peace and quiet, since ‘hostility between 
local group is endemic’ (Surrales 2003:779). To give an example, during my fieldwork, 
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conflicts between people from Trapa Trapa and Malla Malla were always a delicate issue 
in the Queco valley.   
Most Pehuenche people are bilingual in Spanish and Chedungun, which is a mutually 
intelligible dialect of Mapundugun. Chedungun, is spoken less in the communities 
situated near Ralco, such as Pitril or Callaqui, however, whereas in the communities 
situated near the Argentinean border (Butalelbun, Trapa Trapa, Malla Malla and even 
Cauñikú), Chedungun is spoken on a daily basis. 
Ralco is the village where the Municipality and general public services such as the 
district health centre (the Center for Family Health, or Cesfam) are located, and this is 
why it is considered to be l pueblo - the town. The Cesfam coordinates the work of the 
eight other rural clinics in the valleys of the Queco and Bío Bío rivers. For more 
specialized medical inquiries, people have to go to the Santa Bárbara Hospital. Even 
though the Santa Bárbara Hospital has belonged to a different district since 2004, being 
the closest hospital, it has great importance for the population of Alto Bío Bío.   
 
1.1 Methodological notes 
In terms of data collection, this ethnography is mostly based on participant observation. I 
filled several hand-written notebooks during my fieldwork, in which I used to write 
every night after my encounters, activities, and conversations. Moreover, whereas 
carrying out interviews with public health workers did not involve any problems in 
terms of using my recorder, to record conversations with Pehuenche people was not 
possible as they clearly experienced discomfort in the presence of a recorder. Towards 
the end of my fieldwork however, after having spent more than a year in Alto Bío Bío, I 
did ask a few particular people if I could conduct interviews with them, in order to have 
some recordings about the topics I was investigatin. I interviewed not only public 
health workers such as doctors, psychologists, nurses, and midwives, among others, but I 
also audio-documented some of the conversations I had with my closest Pehuenche 
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friends in Ralco, Pitril and Cauñikú. The final month of my fieldwork was therefore 
spent conducting interviews that I later transcribed. In order to protect the privacy and 
anonymity of the people I interviewed, all of their names have been modified. Last but 
not least, after having finished my fieldwork I was kindly invited to teach a master level 
course in the linguistics department at Leiden University in the Netherlands. This course, 
entitled ‘Healing Networks and Intercultural Communication: the Pehuenche case’ was 
fully based on my ethnography. The preparation of the course, as well as the vivid 
discussions with students about the main subjects of this thesis, were an invaluable 
contribution to the further analysis and organization of my ethnographical data. 
I decided to undertake my research in this area after  pre-fieldwork trip in January 
2009. During that journey, I visited four different places in Southern Chile that were 
pertinent to the main topic of my research at the time: the implementation of state 
intercultural health programs concerning Mapuche people post-Pinochet (1973-1989). I 
chose to carry out my fieldwork in the Bío Bío district due to several considerations. 
Firstly, the state workers there were willing to collaborate with my research and showed 
a warm enthusiasm for my project. Secondly, Alto Bíio is a place in the Andes where 
most of the population is Pehuenche, and many are speakers of Chedungun. Thirdly, the 
particular approach the State was developing with rega ds to the Indigenous populations 
in this area caught my interest and curiosity. In my preliminary meetings I was told that 
public health activities in ‘intercultural health’ were based on the idea that they should 
not interfere with traditional practices of healing. In contrast to other areas, for instance, 
traditional healers here were not required to work within hospitals or clinics but instead 
worked in locations of their own choosing. Finally, during my first visit I was 
immediately struck by the beauty of the landscape. After having completed my research 
however, I can now say that only the last consideration was completely true in the end.  
 I began my fieldwork in October 2009. I spent more than six months living in the 
village of Ralco, where I was focused on the work in intercultural health. For some 
reason, what was called ‘intercultural health,’ and responded to wider national policies in 
‘intercultural health,’ did not involve the whole tam of public health workers, as I was 
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expecting, but rather was mainly focused on the work of a group of mental health 
workers. My first degree in psychology was therefor very helpful in introducing myself 
to this team, particularly because anthropologists were not very well regarded due to 
negative experiences in the past.  
My presence in town was immediately the subject of controversy. The fact that I was 
doing research on health but did not belong to the professional team resulted in rejection 
by some of the professionals, who in the beginning saw me as a spy (Sp. soplón) for the 
State. I was only able to shake this label when I started to attend informal and friendly 
gatherings with these professionals. Eventually, I was able to move freely within the 
medical institutions however. This was because I had built good relationships with 
people whose work involved the practical aspects of everyday life and who were not 
directly involved in more political activities.  
During this period, I came to understand that ‘intercultural’ activities mainly involved 
the occasional referral of patients to traditional healers (see Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five). These referrals were to two different types of traditional healers: herbalists (Ch. 
lawentuncheve) and shamans (Ch. machi). In order to collaborate with these healers, the 
public health clinic provided people with transportation to a machi near Temuco, four 
hours away from Ralco (see Chapter Five). The work of a lawentuncheve was sometimes 
also required, and public health workers made referrals to them in certain situations 
(Chapter Four). My own fieldwork and ethnography aimed at following the paths of 
referral travelled by patients with the aid of the C sfam and its intercultural health 
program. I therefore focused my interest on getting o know these traditional healers, 
particularly Juana, a machi in Temuco, and a lawentuncheve named Flora from the 
Pehuenche community of Cauñikú. 3 I spent some time living with machi Juana and her 
patients, and I was living there when the Chilean erthquake (Nüyün in Chedungun) 
occurred in Febrary 2010 (Chapter Five).  
                                                
3 According to the health team, this healer was consulted because there are no shamans left in Alto Bío 
Bío. 
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During my first six months in the field, I also asse ed the possibility of living with 
Flora in Cauñikú. I spent many days with her having informal conversations about my 
research topics. All Pehuenche communities in Alto Bí Bío have experienced much 
intervention by the State and ENDESA during the last few decades. For this reason, 
there is a general discontentment about Chilean people coming to live in their 
communities. I therefore found it rather difficult to have access to these communities. 
My attempts at living with Flora failed in the end. Having agreed at first, she later 
changed her mind, as some other women had expressed their concerns about having 
another colono (a word used by the Pehuenche people to refer to inhab tants that are not 
Pehuenche) in the community. Furthermore, my professional health contacts were not 
helpful in creating direct links with people from these communities. I had to distance 
myself from the health workers in order to spend some time living among the 
Pehuenche. 
Throughout my fieldwork, I focused on the work that the Cesfam undertook in 
collaboration with the nearest hospital in Santa Bárbara. Both of these institutions 
worked with machi Juana, and oftentimes the hospital was a compulsory top for 
patients before seeing her. I established a good relation with the hospital’s psychologist, 
who told me straightforwardly that the work in intercultural health was strongly related 
to mental health (see Chapter Four). Several times, I went with the health team and their 
patients to see the machi, and I eventually got permission to live with machi Juana and 
her patients for a time (Chapter Five). I also followed some of the professional activities 
held by the Cesfam team for Pehuenche patients. One of th se was group therapy session 
organized once a month by the psychologists for Pehuenche women coming from the 
Queuco Valley. Besides this, I also took part in the Cesfam health team’s annual 
preventive health visit to veranadas in the mountains (Chapter Five).  
Besides my relationships with the health workers, I also met people working in tourism 
projects, which have recently become one of the most important economic activities in 
the area. In nearly all the communities in the Queco Valley there are Pehuenche people 
dedicated to this activity, which mainly consists in taking national and international 
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tourists into the mountains for short periods of time during the summer. I met some of 
the people working in this field, and I started to a tend some of the informal gatherings 
these people had after working hours in Ralco. There I met Teresa, who was originally 
from the Pitril community, and her friends. I spoke to her about my intention of living 
within a community, and she kindly invited me to her ouse to spend a few weekends 
with her family in Pitril.  
 
 
Figure 3. Map of Pitril within the Alto Bío Bío district 
 
Her family wanted to have me as a guest because Pedro, Teresa's father, was very lonely 
during the week and they saw me as a good companion for him. Thus, in April 2010 I 
went to live with Pedro, a man in his eighties and o e of the oldest Pehuenche in Pitril 
(thirteen kilometers from Ralco). Whilst living with him, I quickly got to know most of 
the ‘Pitrilanos,’ and during the ten months I lived in Pitril I got involved in many 
different daily activities such as helping Pedro's son build his house, helping with the 
sheep and lambs and the caring for small animals, planting potatoes, and so on. I also 
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spent time going around with him on his visits to friends’ homes, as well as to the 
Evangelical church Pedro attended every Sunday (Chapter Three).  
During this time I also spent many days with Flora’s family in the community of 
Cauñikú. Every time I went to visit I helped her collect wood nearby, and this became a 
kind of natural exchange between us. During the summer I helped her with the 
demanding work of cutting grass for the horses, and other activities of this kind. The ten-
month period I spent in Pehuenche communities was therefore divided between Pitril 
(where I slept) and Cauñikú. 
There are some important issues about the Chedungun language I should mention here. 
During my initial days in the field, I met a Mapuche man from Temuco who had been a 
teacher of Mapudungun. He agreed to teach me only if I managed to involve more 
people. After having found a couple of interested pople (none of them from the medical 
institutions) we started lessons that were very helpful in getting a general idea about the 
language. However, since I was based in Ralco and was mainly focusing on state 
actions, I could not really improve my competence in Chedungun. Moreover, I think 
being Chilean did not help me in learning the language. Most of the times I tried to 
speak in Chedungun, even if Pehuenche people were clearly happy about my attempts, 
they always replied to me in Spanish. I was expecting to improve my Chedungun while 
living in Pitril, but unfortunately I discovered that most of the people there use Spanish 
in their daily life. The only place where I could really improve and learn a little bit more 
was in Cauñikú, during my visits with Flora. As a result, I achieved a very basic level of 
competence in the language, which allowed me to understand some concepts and the 
general gist of Chedungun interactions. However, my permanent interest in the language 
did help enormously with regards to the way people perceived my daily participation in 
Pitril. After a couple of months in the field, people started to say that I did not really look 
like a Chilean person. I became known as the foreigner that could understand a little 
Chedungun, so they were no longer able to talk negatively about me when I was present. 
Pedro always introduced me by saying: ‘He likes to be among the Pehuenche. He speaks 
a little and he eats everything we eat.’ By the endof my fieldwork, some friends were 
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calling me katripache, which in Chedungun means a person who comes from another 
place. Or to say it with more perspectival vocabulary, I had acquired another point of 
view:  
‘By modifying the body through alimentation, change in habits, and the establishment of social 
relations with other subjects, another point of view s acquired: the world is now seen in the same 
way as the new companions, that is, the members of other species’ (Vilaça 2002:351). 
 
2. Historical background 
2.1 Some historical considerations of Mapuche people 
Although it is a highly complex matter to determine whether or not Mapuche people, 
better known as Araucanos (Araucanians) during colonial times, constituted a 
homogenous cultural group, it is believed that they w re divided into groups of people 
living in different areas. 4 Thus, there are names for different groups depending on which 
part of the land was involved: the Lafkenche, ‘people of the coast,’ the Williche, ‘people 
of the South,’ the Pikunche, ‘people of the North,’ the Puelche, ‘people of the East,’ and 
last but not least, the Pehuenche, ‘people of the Pewen’ (araucaria araucana). 
Originally however, Pehuenche people did not belong to the Mapuche ethnic group 
(Bengoa 1999). For this reason, and because most of my ieldwork was carried out 
among the Pehuenche, I reserve a separate section for a discussion of their specific 
history.  
It has been estimated that the Mapuche population numbered around one million persons 
at the time of the arrival of the Spanish (Bengoa 2003; Foerster 2004; Mariman et al. 
2006). They used to live between the Copiapo Valley (27S Lat.) and the Gulf of 
Reloncavi (41S Lat.). Between 1541 and 1641, during a period known as the Guerra de 
Arauco, which was characterized by bloody warfare and where, without doubt, extreme 
violence against Indigenous peoples was exercised, it is believed their population 
                                                
4 This particular denomination araucanos encompassing certain Indigenous populations comes from 
Ercilla’s (1981) epic poem, La Araucana. See Bengoa 2003. 
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decreased by almost 80% (Bengoa 2003). However, the Spanish did not succeed in their 
colonizing attempts and were rather surprised by the capacity of Mapuche people to 
adapt in issues of warfare. To explain such a strong resistance, scholars stress that the 
Mapuche did not have a clear hierarchical structure (Latcham 1924). In the famous 1598 
‘Battle of Curalaba’ the Spaniards were defeated by the Mapuche people. This year is 
known as a marker or turning point in the conquest period, as the Spanish decided to 
change their strategy, giving up their attempts to colonize Mapuche through the use of 
force. This change resulted in a sort of ‘defensive’ war using non-violent mechanisms of 
colonization such as evangelization and education. Thus, in 1641 the Spanish conceded 
defeat and peace was declared with a parliament known as the ‘Peace of Quilin,’ and the 
Bío Bío River (36S Lat.) was established as the northern frontier of Mapuche territory.  
For about two centuries from the signing of the Peace of Quilin treaty, relations between 
Mapuche people and the Spanish were marked by processes of missionizing mainly 
carried out by Jesuits who also had the support of Franciscan and Dominican priests on 
the one hand, and the parliaments, on the other. Th latter were the predominant social 
space for social relations and negotiations between Mapuche people and the Spanish, 
including the trade of cattle and horses. This trade played a central role in the process 
known as the Araucanizacion de la pampas (Araucanization of the pampas), namely, the 
significant economic and territorial spread of Mapuche people throughout the southern 
cone, and the creation of a very strong regional economic network (Boccara 1999; 
Bengoa 2004; Foerster 2004; Marimán et al. 2006).  
In the 19th century, the spread of independence struggles and the creation of new nations 
all around the southern cone of Chile changed the stable coexistence Mapuche people 
had established with the Spanish during the previous two hundred years. Mapuche 
people became an admirable symbol of strength and bravery for citizens of the newly 
independent Chilean State, given their apparent capacity for fighting against the 
Spaniards demonstrated during the colonial period. However, the new Chilean 
nationalists and their new state sharply influenced the Mapuche way of life and their 
social organization. At the start of the 19th century, the resistance against the new 
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Chilean State was not equally distributed among the Mapuche and some of them even 
supported the Chileans. These people reactivated th previous Spanish ways of 
negotiation within this area, such as the parliament and the misiones, at least during the 
first half of the century (Pinto 2000). This situation changed as Mapuche lands started to 
be seen as a significant priority for the Chilean economy, especially within the context of 
a threatening global economic crisis that took place round the fifties. Even if none of 
the Chilean constitutions during that century had referred explicitly to the Mapuche 
people and their lands, the need to govern and exploit natural resources in the Araucanía 
region led the government to create a new legal province named the Arauco province in 
1852 (Foerster 2004; Pinto 2000). This resulted in Chilean jurisdiction being applied to 
Mapuche people - probably the most important effort in expanding the State’s normative 
power over Mapuche territory (Foerster 2004 & 2008). The creation of the Arauco 
province was a way of placing territories between the Bío Bío River and the Valdivia 
province in the South under Chilean jurisdiction. Until this date, almost all Mapuche 
territory had been outside Chilean jurisdiction. Around the eighteen sixties, Chile had to 
cope with the first true export crisis in the grain market, and at the same time faced the 
impact of a European economic crisis. Within this context, territories such as Araucanía 
took on significant value and were thought to be a solution to the economic problems 
Chile was going through (Pinto 2000). Araucanía represented a new market with plenty 
of new opportunities, not only because of its natural resources but also because of the 
labour force the Mapuche might become. The Mapuche revolution in the South (in 
1859), which had its strongest and most active expression from within the Pehuenche 
population, was also a factor in the government decision to intervene in Araucanía 
(Bengoa 2003). This process ironically became known as the ‘pacification of Araucanía,’ 
and this period was dramatically marked by the process of radicación, which consisted 
in placing the Mapuche population into bounded areas of land called reducciones. These 
were legally supported by a law passed in 1866, and so Mapuche lands were in a sense 
transformed into land titles, titulos de merced. In the words of the contemporary 
Mapuche poet Elicura Chihuailaf, the reducciones meant  
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that most of our people were not only assaulted in their houses but also punished, 
tortured and taken to places far away from their communities. Most of them were also 
killed. Reducción or ‘privatization’, another name for the same processes, is a concept 
that was formulated in the middle of the 19th century, and which was put into practice by 
the end of that period. It points out the fact that our People were reduced, ‘re-localized’ 
in lands that were generally much less productive than the Mapuche ones’ (Chihuailaf 
1999:53, my own translation). 
Thus it seems to be undeniable that reducciones implied a significant change in 
Mapuche social, economic, and cultural organization. This is clear from the fact that just 
five hundred thousand hectares of a traditional territory of ten million hectares was 
assigned to the Mapuche during the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century (Aylwin 2002).  
For Mapuche people, the 20th century was marked by the effects of radicación, as it 
involved a sharply different way of living, changin daily interactions, as well as the 
collective Mapuche demand for rights and lands. Legally speaking, a significant change 
occurred in the seventies, during the disastrous dictatorship of General Pinochet. In 
1978, the reducciones were abolished, and although the new law did not all w the 
Mapuche to sell their lands, they could be leased for almost 100 years. This was another 
gesture of sovereignty, in line with a growing neoliberal spirit that attempted to bring 
lands into a neoliberal economic logic by encouraging market liberalization. 
In the nineties, with the first democratic governmet after Pinochet (led by President 
Patricio Alwin), a sentiment of hope predominated among Mapuche people. A spirit of 
political collaboration was proclaimed at the famous Parliament of Nueva Imperial in 
1989. Nevertheless, neoliberal forces have constantly i volved the Mapuche in 
controversial and devastating political decisions supported by the State, such as the 
development of the forest industry, the construction of highways and hydroelectric dams, 
and so on. 
 
2.2 Some historical considerations of Pehuenche people 
Pehuenche means the ‘people of Pehuen’ in Chedungun (monkey puzzle tree, or 
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araucania araucana). Their current territory extends from Trapa Trapa to the Icalma 
Lagoon and includes the valleys that feed the tributaries of the Bío Bío River. 
Topographically, the region consists of valleys, mountain ranges and high volcanic peaks 
(such as Antuco, Copahue, Callaqui, and Lonquimay). The original Pehuenche 
settlement spread far beyond the Andean mountain range, covering regions on either side 
between Talca and Lonquimay and between the Diamante River and the southern part of 
the Neuquén river in the trans-Andean region. The pr sence of Pehuenche people 
between Maule and Chillán was sporadic and consisted of groups that spread from the 
eastern region of the mountain range. Some of the very early Spanish settlers provided 
accounts of the Pehuenche. In 1550, Jerónimo de Vivar (1989) said of the Pehuenche:  
These people come down the mountains to make contact with other peoples at a certain 
time of year because it is at that time, around February until the end of March, when the 
snow has melted, that they can move freely. This is the end of summer in this land 
because winter starts in April, and that is why they leave again at the end of March (De 
Vivar 1989:132, my own translation). 
Moreover, the Jesuit Juan Ignacio Molina (1978:65) said in 1776 that: 
The Pehuenche are a large tribe that live in that par of the Chilean mountain range 
between the latitude limits 34° and 37°S, in other words, to the East of the Spanish 
provinces of Colchagua, Maule, Chillean and Huilquilemu (Molina 1978:65, my own 
translation). 
As already mentioned, originally the Pehuenche people did not belong to the Mapuche 
ethnic group (Bengoa 1999). They were a nomadic hunter-gatherer mountain tribe that 
spoke a now-extinct language that was different to the Mapuche Mapudungun, and of 
which there is no record (Adelaar 2004). According to Bengoa (2000): 
Before the arrival of the Spanish in Chile, the Argentine Pampas were inhabited by small 
Indigenous groups that were not Mapuche. They were nomadic groups that hunted ñandúes 
(ostriches), camelids and llamas. The Mapuches had no ties with the Pampa and their region was 
circumscribed to Chilean territory. The same went for the inhabitants of the mountains, the 
people of the Pehueneras. They spoke another language and were probably ethnically related to 
the Patagonians and, in general, to the non-Mapuche inhabitants of the Pampas and Patagonia 
(Bengoa 2000:54, my own translation).  
As a consequence of the wars following the arrival of the Spanish, the Mapuche fled to 
the Andean region and settled in the pine forests of he mountains. It appears that rather 
than waging war or creating conflict with the existing inhabitants, they merged with 
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these tribes. According to Bengoa (2000), the anthropologist Canals Frau states that the 
Pehuenche were: 
araucanized in the mid or late 17th century (from 1650 onwards). In other words, a 
hundred years after the arrival of the Spanish […]. From then on, the Pehuenches 
merged with the Mapuche and started to speak Mapudungun (Bengoa 2000:55, my own 
translation). 
This fusion led to linguistic territorialism and triggered certain social, cultural and 
economic changes among the Pehuenche. These changes wer  only to further the 
araucanization of the Pampas by allowing the mountainous region to open up to groups 
that transported cattle towards the vast prairies of the ultra-cordillera. At the beginning 
of the 18th century the Pehuenche had become araucanized as a result of a process that 
began with the practice of exogamy and economic exchange and which continued owing 
to the migratory flow that passed through their mountainous regions on the way to the 
Argentine region. However, this Mapuche presence did not eradicate the Pehuenche 
people’s own cultural characteristics. They continued to harvest pine nuts as their main 
source of food and their subsistence continued to rely on hunting and harvesting as well 
as the seasonal migration of livestock between the mountain valley regions and the 
araucaria forests (Correa & Molina 1998). 
During colonial times, the Pehuenche had maintained th  sovereignty and independence 
of their lands from the Spanish, but were engaged in isputes with other Mapuche 
groups. This explains why, during the 17th and 18th centuries, alliances were established 
between the Pehuenche and the Spanish, rather than between Pehuenche and Mapuche 
people (Latcham 1924). Accordingly, in 1774 the Parliament of Tapihue was held 
between the Pehuenche and the Spanish in order to reach peace and mutual defense 
treaties. It was agreed that the mountain settlements in Alto Bío Bío should be reduced. 
For the most part, the Pehuenche territory had remained stable until the creation of the 
Chilean and Argentinean nation states at the start of the 18th century.   
At the beginning of the Republic, Pehuenche territory spread along both sides of the 
Andean mountain range, and included permanent settlements from Antuco to 
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Lonquimay. Some Pehuenche groups were involved in the War of Independence. 
Although there is no written record, their involvemnt is attested to by the many stories 
passed down from generation to generation, especially in stories referring to their 
participation in the battle of Cancha Rayada between the Chileans and the Spanish, in 
Talca in 1818. These and other stories also reflect a demand by Pehuenche people for the 
Chilean authorities to respect Indigenous jurisdiction, property and territory.  
As the pacification of Araucanía took its first steps, the Mapuche looked to establish 
alliances with the Pehuenche. The Chilean army took steps to keep Pehuenche 
communities out of the conflict however. In 1865, numerous loncos (Ch. chiefs) from 
Alto Bío Bío were summoned by the Chilean captain Domingo Salvo to make sure they 
remained neutral and did not create an alliance with the Mapuche further south (Correa 
& Molina 1998) 
As previously mentioned, in the mid 19th century the Chilean government decided to 
create the province of Arauco as a first step towards the absorption of Mapuche 
territories. The cordilleran territories inhabited by the Pehuenche communities were also 
included in the plan. This new administrative division would be important as the Chilean 
acquisition of Indigenous lands would be overseen from Los Angeles and Mulchén, and 
notaries and registrars would give legal support to he establishment of large private 
landholdings based on deceitful and fraudulent purchases of the shares and rights (Sp. 
acciones y derechos) of Indigenous lands. The western side of Pehuenche territory 
(Chile), which stretched across both sides of the Andean Cordillera, had gradually been 
converted into private property. On the eastern side (Argentina) however, the Pehuenche 
territory remained intact from the Negro River up to Limay and the Andean Cordillera, 
an area known as Neuquén. The Argentinean government enacted a law that moved its 
southern border to the Negro and Neuquén rivers, ruling out the conquest of the 
Mapuche territory. In order to move their frontline, the Argentinean government sent 
numerous troops of soldiers that repeatedly attacked th  pampeanos, with complete 
success (Curruhuinca-Roux 1984). Having defeated th pampeanos, the Argentines now 
had to face the Pehuenche in the frontier behind the Negro River, a problem that would 
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be taken care of by the so-called Campaña del Desierto (Conquest of the Desert). The 
first campaign ended in 1880, but as a consequence of the first phase of the campaigns, 
about 14000 Indians were either lost, imprisoned or killed (Ibid.). In the same year, the 
army forced Indigenous people to flee and take refug  in the Cordillera and in the 
valleys of Alto Bío Bío and Antuco. The last stage of the Conquest of the Desert 
involved a series of raids by the Argentinean army against the Pehuenche and Huilliche, 
and concluded with the Campaña de los Andes (Andes Campaign) between November 
1882 and March 1883, which sealed the occupation of the Neuquén region. Many 
Pehuenche people took refuge in the valleys of Trapa Trapa, Queuco, Guallaly and 
Lonquimay, entering various border valleys that were al eady under Chilean jurisdiction 
and where they were taken in by the Pehuenche inhabitants already living there. 
The Chilean military occupation of the Queuco Valley and Alto Bío Bío took place in the 
first few years of the 1880s, in the closing stages of the incorporation of Araucanía. The 
first advancement of the border had taken place in 1862, when Angol was founded and 
the Malleco frontier was strengthened, leaving the old border of Bío Bío obsolete. 
Chilean colonists and usurpers of Indigenous land consequently occupied the lands 
around it. In 1869 the Chilean army undertook an offensive. Although the Mapuche 
initially resisted, they ended up fleeing from the region and taking refuge in the 
Cordilleran valleys. In 1881 the Chilean border reached the Cautín River and the last 
large-scale Mapuche uprising took place, though it was squashed by the Chilean army. 
Towards the end of the process called the Pacification of Araucanía, the Expedition to 
the Araucanian Cordillera was carried out under the command of Martín Drouilly. This 
expedition sought to strengthen the borders of Alto Bí  Bío and establish Chilean 
jurisdiction in the region of the cordillera, to put a stop to the constant incursions by 
Argentinean soldiers that came in search of Pehuenche people (Correa & Molina 1998). 
A second expedition into the Bío Bío cordillera took place in 1883, this time with the 
objective of reinforcing military posts and forging new ones. The establishment of 
several forts in 1883 satisfied the goal of the Chilean State to carry out a military 
occupation of Alto Bío Bío and to include the regions occupied by Indigenous people 
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under the jurisdiction of the Chilean government. 
The loss of Pehuenche territory occurred in a context of conflict and persecution that 
made it easy for speculators to carve up the land for themselves. Through the purchase 
of acciones y derechos from Indigenous people, they acquired large expanses of land. 
The land obtained from Indigenous people through under-the-table transactions was then 
legalized by notaries and deeds (Sp. titulos de tierra) registered in the Land Registry 
(Sp. Conservador de Bienes Raíces). The rapid accumulation of land and the 
establishment of farming estates by powerful local Chileans had begun around 1860. 
Their efforts to accumulate land were furthered through diverse methods of 
appropriation. Two decades later these Chilean men, alo g with others, carried out raids 
in Alto Bío Bío and established large private landhol ings from their purchase of 
Pehuenche lands. But it would be in the early 1880s, when the military incursion into 
Bío Bío was in full swing, that all the other great private landholdings would be 
established.5 With these appropriations, the entire Pehuenche territory between Trapa 
Trapa, the Queuco River, the Bío Bío River, Guallaly, nd the Andean Cordillera was 
converted into private landholdings in less than a decade. The appropriation of land 
achieved through deliberate mistranslation is a mechanism described in 1856 in the 
following way:  
The speculators bring educated bilinguals with them who mistranslate the words of the 
Indians to the public officials and only convey ideas in accordance with what the 
untrustworthy speculators want (Donoso & Velazco 1971:112, my own translation). 
The result was that Indigenous people lost control over their lands. The purchase of 
Indigenous lands was legalized by notaries who were knowingly involved in these 
fraudulent transactions. However, the new owners did not actually physically occupy the 
land, and Indigenous people continued to inhabit the region. 
The Pehuenche communities therefore found themselves in a precarious situation of 
                                                
5 In 1880 José Miguel Brito and Pedro Arias took contr l of territories in the Callaqui community. In 1881 
Rafael Anguita took control of lands in the Pehuenche ommunity of Ralco, establishing an estate of the 
same name. That same year Martin Bunster took control of Guallaly, adjoining Ralco, and Mariano 
Palacios and Luis Parada took over Trapa Trapa (Correa & Molina 1998). 
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occupation towards the end of the 19th century, despite being able to make use of their 
ancestral land. This was due to attempts by landowners to block any form of legal 
settlement and the pressure they exerted to expel the Pehuenche from their land. The 
Indigenous Settlement Commission (Sp. Comisión Radicadora de Indígenas) that 
awarded titulos de merced only managed to operate in the Queuco Valley, where the 
communities demanded its presence in order to settle definitively. Between 1919 and 
1920, settlements (Sp. radicaciones) were established in Cauñiku, Malla Malla and 
Trapa Trapa, situated inland of the Queuco Valley. Although the settlement commission 
(Sp. comisión radicadora) marked out an area of land located near the conflue ce of the 
Queuco River and the Bío Bío River that was still in the hands of the Indigenous people, 
it never granted titulos de merced. In Pitril, the lands could be found in the public land 
registry records under the name of the Indigenous people, but in 1920 a part of these 
lands remained under the power of private individuals nd the other was used as 
communal land by the Gallina Indigenous group. The private property established on 
Indigenous land was protected to a large extent and the total amount of territory 
occupied and claimed by the communities was not taken into account by the Chilean 
administration (Correa & Molina 1998). 
The Chilean agrarian reform initiated in 1967 had a campesinista (peasant-like) bias to it 
in Alto Bío Bío. Despite Indigenous people holding a claim over the large expropriated 
private landholdings, the agrarian reform in Alto Bío Bío benefited mainly the Chilean 
colonial occupants rather than the Pehuenche communities, and moreover frustrated the 
Indigenous people's expectations of recovering their ancestral lands. During this time, 
the private estates established out of Indigenous lands were occupied by tenants, lease-
holders and Chilean sharecroppers. These new inhabitants (called colonos by the locals) 
imitated the Pehuenche economy and way of life, which was the only way of surviving 
in the cordillera environment of Alto Bío Bío. In this way, the use of the summer and 
winter pastures and the pastoral economy derived from the harvest of pine nuts and 
small crops consolidated the territorial occupation f these private premises and 
redefined the territory occupied by the Pehuenche. However, the new inhabitants denied 
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Pehuenche people access to the traditional land that was essential to their economy. 
Pehuenche attempts to regain their ancestral lands met with opposition, not only from 
those landowners who actually lived on their own estat , but also from the tenant 
farmers. At one point, the Trapa Trapa community demanded the devolution of the 
pastures of Cochico. This triggered numerous incidents with the colonos on the estate 
who were against the Pehuenche entering the pastures. Th  dispute over the use of the 
land was to culminate tragically in the murder of three Pehuenche men who were living 
in the area of Cochico, at the hands of Chilean colonists (Correa & Molina 1998). 
During the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1989), processes of land transfer were not 
exempt from disagreements between the fiscal entitis that favoured private ownership 
and the groups that fought for the lands to be distributed amongst the different 
communities. This led to disagreements between Indigenous community members 
whose opinions were divided, some for and some against the divisory policy regulating 
the partition of land executed by Pinochet’s dictatorship during the 1980s. When the 
redistribution of land was complete, the old Pehuench  territories ended up being 
divided into Indigenous property, private property belonging to the country workers, and 
private property belonging to large landowners. Thecommunities with titulos de merced 
managed to retain communal possession of their land however, and are among the few 
present-day communities that have not been fragmented. 
 
2.3 The current situation of Pehuenche people  
The history of the Pehuenche during the last forty years has been no less controversial. 
Being the biggest river in the country, the Bío Bío is considered an attractive place for 
energy resource industries, and studies of its productivity have been carried out since the 
1960s. During the last twenty years, the multinational company ENDESA (National 
Energy Enterprise), a former state enterprise that was privatized during the military 
dictatorship and is currently owned by a Spanish-Italian corporation, has built two 
hydroelectric dams on the Bío Bío River, both supported by government approval. 
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Pangue was the first of the dams built in the area nd was finished in 1994, although its 
construction was initially planned during the last years of the Chilean dictatorship. The 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), a branch of the World Bank, gave a US$ 170 
million loan to ENDESA for the Pangue dam. US$ 28 million were provided by the 
Swedish Board for Industrial and Technical Co-operation, US$ 14 million by the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation, and US$ 100 million by 10 
European banks (Nesti 1999). 
Until 1993 there was no legal protection for Indigenous land rights, nor for the 
environment threatened by these kinds of projects. Pangue was built without 
consultation with Pehuenche communities and with no serious concern for its social and 
environmental impact (Aylwin 2002). During the first years of the current century, 
Ralco, a bigger dam, was also built. The construction of this second dam was much more 
controversial than Pangue, as it involved not only the violation of the new Chilean 
Indigenous law, but also because concern had been raised by several studies in relation 
to the violation of World Bank directives on environmental and social policies and dam 
and reservoir projects, including operational direct ves 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples and 
4.01 on Environmental Assessment (Downing 1996 & Hair 1997, in Aylwin 2002). 
Furthermore, Ralco was built with the approval of CONAMA (Comisión Nacional del 
Medio Ambiente, the State Environmental Agency), without considering the opinion of 
more than twenty public agencies that had analyzed th  project (Moraga 2001). The 
construction also involved the controversial displacement and resettlement of nearly 100 
families from their ancestral lands, people who now live in conditions of extreme 
vulnerability and social exclusion (Gonzáles Parra & Simon 2008). Moreover, Ralco 
was built over ancestral cemeteries, which implied other kinds of social problems for 
Pehuenche people. In a sense, all these recent political and economical developments 
involving the Pehuenche population are not surprising or ‘new,’ but are just the icing on 
the cake when located within a wider historical framework.  
In this context, several local informants have pointed out that Pehuenche suicide is a 
main area of concern due to its significant rise during the past five years. National data 
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provided by the CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe,  
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Health suggests that the suicide rate is higher among Indigenous people than 
non-Indigenous people. Furthermore, data provided by the local health clinic in Ralco 
(Inzulza & Basualto 2007) offer clues about a phenomenon that has not yet been studied: 
suicide by hanging from trees was the primary cause of death in 2008 in the Pehuenche 
district. While conducting my fieldwork, I considered focusing my entire research on 
understandings of Pehuenche suicide. Nevertheless, I quickly dismissed this idea when I 
realized that most of the people generally avoid speaking about suicide. 
In 2008, after almost twenty years of negotiations in the Chilean Parliament, Convention 
No.169 of the International Labour Organization (OLI/ NU) was finally approved, 
Chile being the last country to sign it. This document is the most significant international 
legal tool in relation to acknowledging the rights and protection of Indigenous and Tribal 
peoples in independent countries. This convention is of particular importance to my 
thesis, as it requires governments to ensure that adequate health services are made 
available to Indigenous peoples, or to provide them with resources to allow them to 
design and deliver such services under their own responsibility and control. In line with 
this convention, the Chilean government has establihed clear aims and political 
priorities relating to the Política Indígena (Indigenous Policy) through the document Re-
conocer: Pacto Social por la Multiculturalidad (Re-cognizing: Social Pact for a 
Multicultural Country). Amongst the central points of this pact, the government has 
declared the improvement of the ‘Indigenous Health Program’ to be a necessity. 
Generally speaking, this document points to a streng hening of multicultural sensitivity 
within health programs all over the country, but wihout defining what is actually meant 
by ‘multicultural.’6  However, what does it really mean for an institutional health project 
- in practical and epistemological terms - to be engaged in a dialogue framed by different 
ontologies? Furthermore, what are the consequences for the (Indigenous) people directly 
involved in this project? These are some of the questions this thesis intends to answer.  
                                                
6 In the theoretical framework section of this project I will develop a wider critical analysis with regards to 
the concept of ‘multicultural,’ which is associated with a ‘multiculturalist approach’ in anthropology. 
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3. The place of this research 
3.1 The sick body in Mapuche literature  
Whilst much research has been conducted in the field of Mapuche ethnohistory (Bengoa 
1999, 2000, 2003 & 2004; Boccara 1998 & 1999; Dillehay 1990 & 2007; Foerster 2004; 
Mallon 2004; Pinto 2000; Vergara 2005; Villalobos 1982 & 1995; Zavala 2000) and 
Indigenous rights (Saavedra 2002; Berglund 1977; Richards 2004), very few studies 
have focused on health and healing within Mapuche communities (Oyarce 1998; 
Bacigalupo 2001, 2003, 2004 & 2007; Citarella et al. 2000). This thesis aims to make a 
contribution to the body of literature on Mapuche peo le by focusing on two different 
points.   
First, previous scholars (Ibid.) have suggested that t e processes related to health and 
illness are, for Mapuche people, predominantly related to their conceptualization of 
different planes through which their cosmology is organized. This spatial explanation 
conceives of the Mapuche world as made up of three diff rent vertical planes. In this 
context, illnesses (Ch. kutran) emerge as a result of a disruption to the general bal nce 
between these planes (Bacigalupo 2007).  Most importantly, it has been stated that 
humans, animals, and natural phenomena all possess a body and a spiritual essence that 
is separate from that body (Ibid.). Illnesses, in this context, are the result of the capture 
of the one’s spiritual essence by witches or other spirits (Ibid.). The body, however, has 
not been properly defined. Thus, the very likely specificities of the Mapuche body have 
remained obscured by the vague dualist definitions of the ‘soul and body’. Illnesses, in 
this context, are the result of the capture of the spiritual essence by witches or other 
spirits (Ibid.). Moreover, Oyarce (1989) and Bacigalupo (2007) have described some 
‘natural’ Mapuche illnesses as being localized in the body, the body remaining inside an 
unquestioned black box. Having said this, this thesis can be seen as a rethinking of 
conceptualizations of the body, which have in the past been made in an uncritical 
manner and been framed by a general assumption that conceives of the body as a 
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universal entity.  
Secondly, one of the important analytical efforts in Mapuche studies regarding illnesses 
has been to create a taxonomical categorization according to their cause, intensity, 
duration and location (Grebe 1975; Oyarce 1988; Citarella 2000; Bacigalupo 2007). 
These authors classify illnesses in the following way: Causes can be natural (Ch. 
rekutran), spiritual (Ch. wenumapukutran), or mental (Ch. wesalongko). In terms of 
intensity, illnesses can be minor (Ch. wichukutran) or major (Ch. futakutran). According 
to duration, these authors mention recent ailments (Ch. lefkutran) and illnesses of a 
longer duration (Ch. kuifikutran). Finally, as far as the location of illness is con erned, 
they can be localized in the head (Ch. kutranlongko), heart (Ch. kutranpiuke), tooth and 
bone (Ch. kutran forro), stomach (Ch. kutranputra), and foot (Ch. kutrannamun). This 
strong interest in classification was not a real concern for the laypeople I met in the field 
however. For them, the sensory experience of illnesses was far more important than their 
categorization and the creation of a taxological order. In this sense, my ethnography may 
introduce new insights to this discussion, mainly b exploring Pehuenche visual 
experiences of illness, framed by ontological conceptions of personhood and vision. In 
general terms, I hope to contribute to the dialogue by seriously considering Pehuenche 
conceptualizations of personhood without having to refer to an a priori universal liberal 
body. Without denying the illuminating insights previous scholars have provided 
regarding Mapuche health issues, this thesis points ou  a territory that has not been 
accurately addressed, namely the role of visibility, invisibility and visual practices within 
intra- and inter-cultural contexts.  
Moreover, the relationship between the Chilean State and Pehuenche people within the 
realm of the Chilean public health system is also a key concern of this research. No 
information is currently available regarding conceptualizations of the body within 
intercultural networks involving public health services and Pehuenche people. 
Therefore, I also hope to contribute to anthropological approaches that have strongly 
criticized ideological aspects of intercultural health, of which Boccara’s (2004, 2007 & 
2008) is the paradigmatic position in an Indigenous and Chilean context. Boccara’s 
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reflections are a clear contribution to the analysis of ideological aspects and power 
relations within Chilean policies on intercultural health, and can certainly be seen as a 
wider contextual frame for the current work. However, this thesis does not prioritize 
global capitalism and neoliberal forces (as Boccara does) as the key analytical elements 
to be considered when analyzing intercultural healt issues (see Chapter Two). In 
contrast, this research attempts to analyze the theoretical and practical aspects of 
intercultural healing networks, which have remained totally unexamined by scholars 
working within Mapuche contexts. By considering Pehu nche people’s experiences of 
illness within intra- and inter-cultural contexts, his research attempts to analyze notions 
of personal agency, personhood, and sociality. In order to do so, rather than keeping 
neoliberal forces in the foreground, my work places a greater emphasis on local idioms 
of health and illness related to visual practices within Indigenous socio-cosmo-politics.   
 
 3.2 Mapuche literature in context 
Historically speaking, anthropological literature on Mapuche people has not considered 
theoretical reflections coming from the study of other Amerindian groups. The work of 
Course (2011) however, can be considered a turning point for this trend. By engaging 
Mapuche ontologies within a wider perspectival theoretical framework, Course has 
emphasized the relevance of understandings of personhood as prerequisite to discussing 
wider inter-personal relations. By analyzing the Mapuche concept of the true person (Ch. 
che), understood as the non-essentialistic construction of different types of socialities 
(Ibid.), Course has interfered in the classic debat on Mapuche group formation and 
social structure, seen as unavoidable points of departure for understandings of Mapuche 
people (Titiev 1951; Faron 1964 & Stuchlik 1976). 
 Taking into account Course's (2011) illuminations on Mapuche personhood and 
sociality, my thesis offers a deeper and more specific reflection on the sensory 
experience of vision within intercultural health devices. More particularly, by 
considering the central ontological dilemma of Mapuche life, which according to Course 
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(2011:161) is the idea that ‘to be a person one must enter into social relations and it is 
through the perspective of the ‘Other’ that one is attributed the status of che,’ this thesis 
offers a deeper theoretical reflection of illness processes as a result of persons' non-
stable subjectivities. This dissertation deals with this ontological dilemma not only by 
considering illnesses related to witchcraft, but also by focusing on how intercultural 
relations themselves are premised on different understandings of personhood, sociality 
and more particularly, visual experience. Furthermore, having noticed a gap in theories 
of intercultural relations within health devices, this study explores how ontological 
contrasts (Latour 2009a) within networks of healing are related to particular 
conceptualizations of visibility and invisibility. Moreover, in considering Amerindian 
reflections on the body and vision, this research seek  to overcome arbitrary 
geographical divisions in ethnographic research in South America (Course 2011; 
Gonzalez Galvez 2012).  
 
3.3 Global anthropological concerns and the place of this thesis 
Broadly speaking, this thesis also contributes to contemporary debates about Indigenous 
conceptualizations of the body. More specifically, this thesis engages with reflections 
about the body coming from both medical anthropology and Amerindian perspectivism. 
Even though this thesis considers theoretical differences between these disciplines as 
configuring a positive tension with which to reflect, I believe they cannot be fully 
commensurable, since their very understandings of nature and culture differ strongly. 
Firstly, within the realm of medical anthropology, and especially within American 
medical anthropology, the debate about the body has been understood as a key element 
in the exploration of wider social and cultural processes (Csordas 1994; Good 1998; 
Kleinman 1999; Beihl, Good & Kliemann 2007). Broadly speaking, research in this field 
has proposed a key understanding of the self as corporeal, the body being part of 
technical, political, and social processes. Several thnographic studies have tried to 
make apparent how the body mediates medical models, po itical economy, and social 
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networks (Csordas 1994; Good 1998; Kleinman 1999). Nevertheless, even if there have 
been attempts at theorizing ‘local biologies’7  (Lock 1993; Lock & Kaufert 2001; 
Worthman 1999), there is a general trend within thefield to assume a biological 
foundation over which the subsequent theoretical discussion is built.8  Within this 
context, recent literature has mainly focused on the body as a segmented object of 
research (Cohen 1999; Lock 1993 & 2002; Sharp 2000). Thus, it has remained a 
significant foundational debate to the background, amely, that which refers to 
understandings about the body as a gestalt, as a unit (Mauss 1973; Turner, 1967; Evans-
Pritchard 1963; Levy-Bruhl 1963; Leenhardt 1971). In this sense, I see my research as 
contributing to anthropologies of the body that have ttempted to rethink the very basic 
concepts of reality (Strathern 1996). In order to do the same, this thesis is built on the 
consideration of the sensory experience of vision as a point of departure to discuss wider 
concepts of Pehuenche reality. If forced to situate this thesis within the medical 
anthropological realm, I would consider it to be a project framed by ‘Evidence-Based 
Medical Anthropology’ (Ecks 2008), which established a challenge to the taken-for-
granted premises on which evidence-based medicine is founded.   
Secondly, considering the strand of ethnographic research on the body in South America, 
this research is built over several anthropological reflections stemming from Amerindian 
perspectivism (Viveiros de Castro 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002a, 2002b & 2004a).9 
Following a discussion held by Aparecida Vilaça (2005), Amerindian anthropological 
literature on the body has pointed out how medical anthropological literature itself has 
                                                
7 This concept refers to the manner in which one’s bodily experience is mutually constituted by biology 
and culture (Lock 1993). In this sense, it can be said that this concept, even if it is an attempt at 
overcoming universalisms, is still framed within a multiculturalist approach, which this project will put 
into question. 
8 The most notable exception to this trend is the work f Annemarie Mol (1999 & 2002), who has 
questioned the biomedical understanding of the body with reference to Western biomedical and biological 
practices, demonstrating that it is produced in a way that is neither holistic nor systematic, thereby bearing 
witness to its non-unitary character. In this vein, some authors from fields outside of medical anthropol gy 
have criticized the notion of the alleged universal n tural body - the owner of health and sickness - a  the 
gold standard of hegemonic social discourse (Haraway 1990), and the understanding of biology (and the 
body) as a monolithic objectivity that needs to be continually transformed from object to agent (Haraway 
1991). 
9 For a general description of Amerindian perspectivist ontologies see Viveiros de Castro 1996a, 1998 and 
Lima 1996. 
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taken for granted biological notions of the body, rendering these scholars blind to 
sharply different Indigenous concepts of humanity (Taylor 1996, 1998, 2000 & 2002). 
This difference between concepts of humanity has been clearly explained by Viveiros de 
Castro (1998 & 2004a), who claims that while a Western multicultural cosmology 
postulates a physical continuity and metaphysical discontinuity (one human nature, 
many cultures), Amerindian perspectivism proposes a multi-naturalism based on 
‘metaphysical continuity’ and ‘physical discontinuity.’ This physical discontinuity has 
been conceptualized as configuring a multi-natural ontology, which entails that the 
fabrication of the human body ‘is based on negativity: on a negation of the possibilities 
of the "non-human" body’ (Viveiros de Castro 1987, in Vilaça 2005:450).10 Thus, 
Amerindian multi-naturalism provides the most radicl ritique of the notion of nature as 
used by classic medical anthropologists. In other words, this critique sharply challenges 
the assumption made by those medical anthropologists who have decided not to deny the 
material existence and physical properties of the body as a biological system that has a 
reality separate from human consciousness (Scheper-Hughes & Lock 1987). This thesis 
illustrates the potential of exploring these Amerindian statements within networks of 
healing existing in an ongoing ontological tension between cosmologies. Considering 
that ‘indigenous socio-logics is based on a physio-logics’ (Segger, Da Matta & Viveiros 
de Castro 1979:13), this work aims to analyze the possible implications of this premise 
in terms of practices of healing in intercultural health. 
 
3.4 The place of this thesis within reflections on Amerindian intercultural health 
Amazonian ethnography has also offered examinations of the articulation of bio-medical 
and Indigenous health systems. These contributions (see the volumes edited by Buchillet 
1991; Santos & Coimbra Jr. 1994; Chiappino & Alès 1997; Langdon & Garnello 2004) 
have strongly emphasized Indigenous notions of the body, illness and healing to explain 
                                                
10 For the creation of proper human bodies and how people are produced, see Basso 1996; Belaunde 2000 
& 2001; Conklin 2001a & 2001b; Descola 2001; Fisher 2001; Gow 2000, 2001; Hugh Jones 2001; Lagrou 
2000; McCallum 2001; Overing & Passes 2000b; Vilaça 2000 & 2002. 
 44 
the reactions of native people to bio-medical system . However, even though this thesis 
also analyzes these research topics (in a broad sense), its main concern is with the 
materiality of visual practices as a key element in understanding intra- and inter-cultural 
interactions within health domains. The relevance of visual practices is based on 
ethnographic data, which subsequently turned into a analytical anthropological effort to 
understand radical difference in a visual domain. I must make it clear from the outset 
that the focus of this thesis is not on the transformative relations between health 
practitioners and Indigenous peoples (Kelly 2011), but rather on the ontological 
relevance of the visual experiences of the many actors that configure the realm of 
intercultural health.11  In other words, my central concern is not related to the process of 
‘becoming Other,’ which has been the core of a strong anthropological reflection on 
Amazonian societies (Gow 1991 & 2001; Kelly 2011; Vilaça 2002 & Rival 2002). 
Without denying the importance of these contributions to the field of anthropology, my 
thesis aims to highlight intercultural spaces where processes of ‘not becoming Other,’ so 
to speak, are at stake.12 However, in line with Kelly’s (2011) research motivations, even 
if this thesis takes medical anthropology as a general theoretical background, it is more 
concerned with Amazonianist literature. This is due to the simple fact that the current 
work seriously considers Indigenous cosmological conceptualizations and practices 
beyond the territory of Western medicine. This contribution examines Mapuche 
conceptualizations of visual experiences and illness processes with the goal of 
understanding them within a wider relational frame of reference related to particular 
understandings of personhood. By taking seriously incommensurable aspects of visual 
experience within intercultural health domains, my ambition is to practice anthropology 
as an ‘art of determining the problems posed by each culture, not the art of finding 
solutions to those problems posed by our own’ (Viveiros de Castro 2003:9).  
                                                
11 Kelly’s work is an ethnographic account of the relation between health workers and Yãnomãmi people 
that makes apparent how conceptual articulations of medical systems are a matter of mutual 
misunderstanding. In Kelly’s work, these misunderstandings are strongly rooted on the ‘the meaning of 
being and becoming “Yanomami” and “napë” for Yãnomãmi people and whites alike’ (Kelly 2011:2).  
These relational transformations, and in particular the Indigenous desire for Western medicine mentioned 
by Kelly (Ibid.), were not a prominent issue for the Pehuenche people I met in the field. 
12 For studies on how Amazonianist theory can account for relations with the state, see Gow 2001, Vilaça 
2006 & Gordon 2006. 
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3.5 Incommensurability and political ontology  
This thesis can also be seen as a radical critique to multiculturalist approaches as 
predicated on a modern ontological assumption of multiple cultures being partial 
perspectives on a single reality. Since the starting point of multiculturalism conceives of 
reality as existing ‘out there’ (Povinelli 2001), partial perspectives of a single reality 
might be mutually commensurable (Blaser 2009; Kirsch 2006).13  By considering 
interactions between public health practitioners and Pehuenche people, this thesis 
examines the ontological tensions between incommensurable worlds (Povinelli 2001). 
Here, this tension is seen as the convergence of cosmol gies postulating, on one side, 
‘physical continuity’ (and its subsequent medical practices built upon a notion of nature 
as a non-coded category), and cosmologies based on ‘physical discontinuity’ (and its 
subsequent healing practices) on the other. Thus, tis thesis engages with debates about 
the incommensurability of the body (Vilaça 2005) in intercultural situations: What is at 
stake is not ‘another view of the same body, but another concept of the body, whose 
underlying dissonance to its ‘homonymy’ with our own is, precisely, the problem’ 
(Viveiros de Castro 2002:140). My ethnography may introduce new insights into this 
discussion, mainly by considering Pehuenche conceptualizations of personhood and 
visual experience in intra- and inter-cultural contexts.  
By considering intercultural contexts where multi-natural ontologies coexist with 
multicultural ones, this thesis can be also seen as a contribution to the wider arena of 
political ontology (Mol 1999; Blaser 2009). This means that it considers inherent 
conflicts and tensions that emerge ‘as being about the continuous enactment, 
stabilization, and protection of different and asymmetrically connected ontologies’ 
(Blaser 2009:10). The not innocuous risk of one world being reduced by another has 
been rendered explicit by several authors working with Indigenous ontologies (Blaser 
                                                
13 For attempts at integrating Indigenous knowledges into development agendas within a multiculturalist 
approach see Ellen et al. 2000; Fernando 2003; Martin & Vermeylen 2005; Spak 2005. 
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2009; Clammer et al. 2004; Cruikshank 2005; De la Cadena 2007; Nadasdy 2007; 
Poirier 2008; Povinelli 1995). I engage with this dcussion by exploring how Pehuenche 
people conceptualize both multicultural and multi-natural ontologies, as well as by 
focusing on the implications of particular ontological clashes. In short, this thesis will 
contribute to this debate by focusing on the convergence of Pehuenche cosmopolitical 
visions and multicultural political divisions configuring the realm of intercultural health.   
 
3.6 Vision 
This research also engages with conceptualizations of vision and sensory experience 
emerging from Amerindian literature. On the one hand, both the relevance of the eye and 
the point of view have been crucial for perspectival analytics since their very foundation 
(see Viveiros de Castro 1996a, 1998 and Lima 1996). The eye has been conceptualized 
as the locus of perception, and the perception of the world is strongly determined by the 
eye (Lima 1996). On the other hand, as I have already suggested, the body has been 
conceived of as a radically relational position notprone to being totalized (Vilaça 2005), 
as well as radically instable: its reality, it has been famously stated, ‘lies in the eyes of 
others’ (Ibid. p.449). This implies ontological challenges regarding how to build a 
‘minimally stable subjectivity’ (Taylor 1996:202), a problem that in the case of the 
Mapuche has been analyzed in detail by Course (2011) in terms of sociality, personhood 
and kinship. Here I must admit a personal inclination: during the last four years I have 
been seduced by these ethnographical Amerindian analytics. I want to make it clear 
however, that my personal proclivity was strongly fostered by my ethnography, and not 
the other way around. Pehuenche people are very concerned with and placed great 
importance on particular tensions between a visible and an invisible dimension. Being 
interested in doing ethnography within the field of intercultural health, I was very 
impressed by how significant it was for my Pehuench friends that public health 
practitioners were not capable of seeing the causes of their suffering. Examples of the 
importance of the visible and the invisible among the Pehuenche are many, and they can 
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be found throughout the current work. I should also add, as Gonzalez Galvez (2012) has 
pointed out, that Pehuenche ontology can hardly be seen as perspectival tout court, its 
multi-natural dimension and the relevance of vision being its most important ontological 
feature. What is striking however, ethnographically speaking, is the major relevance of 
visual experience in the daily life of Pehuenche peopl .  
 It seems to me that there is a theoretical distinctio  within some Amerindian reflections 
that might be slightly misleading when trying to understand Pehuenche visual 
experience in its own terms. This distinction is implicit, for instance, in one of the most 
convincing papers written about vision in Lowland South America (Ewart 2008). Ewart 
(2008) has shown how the social significance of sensory perception has had little 
attention within the anthropological field, studies about vision in its shamanic version 
being more prominent (see Chaumeil 1983 & Riviere 1999). By examining visual 
practices among the Panará people, Elizabeth Ewart (2008:507) has convincingly argued 
that the ‘social significance of the senses is as much bound up with an understanding of 
sociality (…) as it is bound up with sensory experience itself’ (emphasis added). In 
particular, following Taylor (1993) and Surrales (2003), she has shown how vision may 
be a key outstanding sensory dimension in distinguishing the human from the non-
human within Amazonian cosmologies. Taking into account Ewart’s suggestions as a 
inspirational point of departure, in this thesis I would like to push this idea a little further 
by suggesting that when Pehuenche ontologies are exmined, ‘sensory experience itself’ 
should be considered as the materiality of sociality. I suggest that it does not make any 
sense to think of the social significance of sensory perception, simply because ‘seeing 
refers to percepts rather than concepts’ (Viveiros de Castro 2005:38). Perception is social 
as much as sociality is perceptual. Or, to put it differently, the very idea of ‘sensory 
experience itself’ is still embedded in a multicultural analytic for which the senses might 
exist ‘out there’ (sensu Povinelli).  
Significant reflections on vision have also come from outside Amerindian literature. 
Within a debate that goes beyond Amerindian issues, Ingold (2000) has approached 
vision in his work on the education of attention, a activity that entails multi-sensory 
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experience and personal apprenticeship. For Ingold, sight and hearing should not be 
conceived of as separate performances, since they are experientially entangled. He has 
stated that the definition of the self is strongly related to these performances, vision (not 
hearing) being a key element for the definition of an individual self in opposition to 
others (Ingold 2000). More particularly, reciprocal vision entails a social relationship in 
a way uni-directional vision does not. This work has influenced the development of an 
anthropology of vision that primarily focuses on visual training and on particular 
practices of looking (see Grasseni 2007). Within ths framework of ‘visual enskilment,’ 
even if vision is not considered an ‘isolated given,’ it is understood as being in 
interaction with the other - given - senses (Grasseni 2007:3). Thus, the grounded, 
‘situated body’ (Ibid. p.8) and its given liberal senses are not fully questioned.  
The many great insights these reflections have offered to the anthropology of vision 
cannot be denied. However, the emphasis on training, skills, or on the education of the 
senses does not help to understand how Pehuenche peopl  conceive of and evince visual 
performances with a visual bias of their own. What I will try to demonstrate throughout 
this thesis is that Pehuenche vision is not simply visual, but rather, it refers to 
ontological relational differences. In my ethnography, apart from the problems related to 
both the concept of the ‘situated body’ and the very Ingoldian concept of the individual 
self (see Chapter one), the self as such does not appear in opposition to others, but rather 
through mutual vision, in which the self and the other emerge as mutual agents of human 
perception. I hope this thesis can be a contribution to all these debates on various levels.  
 
4. The organization of this thesis  
The central argument of this thesis is divided into tw  parts. In the first part (Chapters 
One, Two, and Three) entitled ‘Cosmopolitics of Pehuenche Vision,’ I explore different 
ethnographic moments in which the Pehuenche’s self-determined experience of the 
visible (Ch. pefal) and of the non-visible (Ch. pefalay) appear in their entire ontological 
splendour. More specifically, through the examination of different ethnographical 
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subjects such as the composition of a Pehuenche person, greetings, funerals, nocturnal 
attacks, performances by evil spirits, doubles’ revenge, myths, healing practices, and so 
on, I show how vision, for the Pehuenche, is a precondition for the establishment of 
social relations between real people. This leads me to emphasize the relevance of mutual 
vision in the configuration of the Pehuenche person, vision being a key operator for the 
emergence of real people. In the second part of the thesis (Chapters Four and Five) 
entitled ‘Political vision and divisions,’ I explore what kind of vision is being 
conceptualized and enacted by public health practitioners. In particular, I focus on 
multicultural conceptualizations of the person and the body, paying particular attention 
to the consequences of the encounter between incommensurable worlds. This thesis 
therefore starts with a focus on Pehuenche intra-cultural understandings of vision then 
shifts to the examination of intercultural visual interactions.    
In Chapter One I advance two claims which are central to my argument as a whole: 
firstly, that a Pehuenche person is a composition of different capacities and elements, 
and secondly that this personal composition can only be fully activated by mutual vision 
among real people. This is accomplished primarily b looking at Pehuenche 
conceptualizations of personal composition, focusing o  three key elements: am, püllü, 
and bodily matter, or corporeal support. I suggest tha this personal composition can be 
thought of as a wider relational scheme shared by different human subjects. I also 
explore the relevance of touching and seeing as main operators for the distinction 
between us (human) and them (non-human). As I will argue throughout this thesis, 
mutual vision among the Pehuenche is a social action necessary for someone to appear 
as a real person for another real person, as well as a key activity for the definition and 
delineation of a Pehuenche visible world of visible real people.  
In order to clarify the complex relationship between personal composition and 
Pehuenche vision, in Chapter Two I describe particular moments in which mutual vision 
between people is not possible. I explore a mode of vision I call ‘unilateral vision,’ the 
paradigmatic case of which is situations of nguken, a term which refers to nocturnal 
experiences during which sleeping people are the targ t of unknown visitors’ predation. I 
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describe how the nguken concept serves as an illustration of how unilateral visual 
perception in situations of witchcraft entails a particular form of cannibalistic 
consumption. By building on the concept of equivocation proposed by Viveiros de 
Castro (2004) and taking into account ethnographic explorations of the ontological 
consequences of multicultural biomedical technologies in relation to nguken moments, I 
suggest that the reality of Pehuenche vision is incommensurable when compared to 
multicultural ontologies. In short, in this Chapter I show how vision performances, 
illness and witchcraft are strongly related within Pehuenche ontologies.    
In Chapter Three, through an ethnographic account of tw  different healing practices, I 
argue that the restoration of the normal plane of Pehuenche visibility can only be 
achieved through particular visual performances. By exploring how different healers 
work, through what they call the ‘gift of vision,’ I suggest that healing practices aim to 
generate a relational movement within a predatory interaction. This Chapter also 
explores how this is accomplished through the assemblage of particular visual capacities 
that I call gazes for detachment. I conclude this Chapter by suggesting that the int nse 
efforts of the Pehuenche to keep the potential affinity of spirits out of sight can be 
conceptualized as practices of cosmo-activism. I stress how, in Alto Bío Bío, vision 
plays a central role in the protection of a human relational field in a world where getting 
sick is always related to an alteration of the process of construction of similarity.  
With this model of Pehuenche vision in mind, the second part of the thesis examines 
intercultural issues within the realm of the Chilean public health. In Chapter Four, I 
focus on one of the most important political activities performed by the Chilean State 
and its public health institutions in Alto Bío Bío during recent years: the act of 
‘visualizing’ - as workers of the State called it - the existence of traditional healers 
within Indigenous communities. Through an ethnographic exploration of how the State’s 
actions in ‘intercultural health’ are implemented, this Chapter disentangles what the 
concept of ‘visualizing’ entails for the multicultural vision of public health institutions. I 
suggest that the visibility of public health in Pehu nche communities is constructed 
through a clear, bounded and a priori idea of what cultural difference is, and is based on 
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multicultural understandings of the body. Another ky point I seek to make in this 
Chapter is that emergent initiatives designated as ‘intercultural health’ and characterized 
by a multicultural and equivocated relationship between mind and culture have quite a 
dramatic impact on the lives of Pehuenche people.  
In Chapter Five I explore how Indigenous people both react to and conceptualize the 
State’s attempts at ‘visualizing’ Indigenous actors within the realm of intercultural 
health. I suggest that natives’ complaints against state functionaries can be thought of as 
a response to a certain kind of paradigmatic sociality enacted by the functionaries 
themselves and characterized by an u productive sociality. I suggest that this 
paradigmatic sociality takes shape through the creation of a web of relationships that, 
paradoxically, do not allow the emergence of real relationships among real people 
through mutual vision. Taking into account the signif cance of the relation of mutual 
vision needed for the emergence of a person, I suggest that this type of sociality can be 
conceptualized as a particular type of blind sociality. I conclude the Chapter by 
suggesting that fleeting Indigenous contentions against the State respond to the 
particular transcendental way functionaries of the State visually interpellate (sensu 
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On People and Mutual Vision 
 
It was towards the end of my fieldwork, and after having spent three whole days taking 
part in the most important fertility ritual for the Pehuenche of the Pitril community in 
Alto Bío Bío, that my host and friend Pedro surprised me with one of the most striking 
stories I had heard about the mythical origins of that particular fertility ritual called 
ngillatun. I am not interested in describing the ritual itself, as many anthropologists 
might anticipate however.14 Rather, the mythical narrative I am about to report is an 
excellent starting point for this thesis, since it illuminates certain mythical aspects of 
Pehuenche life that are expressed daily in various ways. In particular, some of the 
elements of this narrative introduce the central aspects of what it means to be a 
Pehuenche person. Strangely enough, this was one of the very few conversations I 
actually recorded during my fieldwork. This allows me to report this myth (Ch. epew) 
here, respecting the exact words my friend Pedro used that day, as we shared a glass of 
wine under the beauty of a spring night in Pitril. 
Once upon a time, an old man (Ch. koiviche) was walking around in the mountains 
when he suddenly fainted. Sometimes there are many clouds and it is not easy at all to 
be there, you are always lost in the clouds. This old man fell down, losing 
consciousness. His ‘ina mongen’ or ‘am’ was captured, and it was taken to the volcano. 
He later reported that while he was there, two elderly people, a couple, greeted him and 
asked if he was well. They told him to look around, but he did not see anything. But then, 
the old person, the master (Ch. ngen) of the volcano, moved his hands, inviting him to 
look around again. The man then saw the whole universe, the earth, as well as all the 
people on the earth. He could see how their ritual, ngillatun, was organized and 
performed, paying special attention to those who were taking part in the ritual with real 
faith. ‘We are watching you all the time,’ he was told. This couple then gave the old man 
some advice (Ch. ngulam) saying that people should never ever forget the ngillatun. ‘We 
                                                
14 Since the sixteenth century, ngillatun has been a focal point of ethnographic research. For a summary of 
historical accounts of ngillatun, see Zúñiga 1976 and Zapater 1998. For current accounts see Casamiquela 
1964; Hassler 1979; Dillehay 1990 & 2007; Pereda & Perrotta 1994; and Bacigalupo 2007. For a recent 
analysis of ngillatun as a key ritual affording the construction of similarity, see Course 2011.  
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are going to be watching you,’ he was told.  
After that revelatory dream (Ch. perimontun), that old man became a very wise person 
(ch. kimche) because of all the important advice he had gotten in that place. There, the 
volcano’s masters had ‘visualized him.’15 They prepared him by warning him about 
possible dangers to be found on his way back down t the earth. He was told: ‘I have a 
son who is a messenger (Ch. werken), he is going to be around while you are travelling 
back. Please, take care of him. You must not greet anyone until the fourth greeting. Just 
answer at the fourth greeting! If someone greets you with ‘mari mari,’ do not answer! 16 
If you do so, you will be stuck here and your soul-‘am,’ will not be able to go back.’ 
The old man said that suddenly, he started hearing some noises, and the earth suddenly 
trembled. At his right side, he could see many male heads passing by, whereas at his left 
side, they were many female heads. He knew them. He recognized some relatives and 
some friends. Some of them greeted him loudly ‘mari i!’ and shouted his name out. 
Yet, only when the fourth greeting was uttered did he answer, reciprocating the greeting 
by saying ‘mari mari.’ He was really prepared! 
 Immediately after this, his ‘am’ came back. He could awaken and stand up. He was 
able to look around again, without really knowing what had happened. Yet, he 
remembered everything. He had been told to speak to all the people about the 
importance of ngillatun, so he did. He started telling people about his dream, while 
advising them not to forget about that ritual. Some people told him he was crazy, 
turning against him. However, after a year or so, all of those people died, because their 
souls had been captured and taken away. That man was a wise man, a kimche. He learnt 
all the norms of the ritual, and he taught them to his people. I think this is why we do the 
ngillatun in the way we do.  
In this Chapter, I would like to analyze three essential aspects of this myth that are 
visibly connected to the central topic of this thesis, namely, Pehuenche vision. Firstly, I 
will focus on the components considered necessary for a person to be a person, and 
examine the essential aspects of the Pehuenche people’s complex conceptualizations of 
personhood in a world inhabited by different version  of humanity. Secondly, I will 
describe how this personal composition can be thougt of as a relational scheme shared 
by different human subjects. I will illustrate how different types of humans can see each 
other only under particular conditions, and how Pehuenche people need to engage in 
relations with personal compositions in order to inhabit their normal plane of visibility. 
Finally, I will briefly point out the ontological relevance of the perceptual experience of 
greetings for the Pehuenche. By referring to my previous elaboration on the personal 
                                                
15 This is a literal translation of the Spanish words Pedro used: ‘A ese hombre ahi lo visualizaron.’ This 
expression may appear, to be a very odd grammatical construction for a native speaker of Spanish, since a 
person, in spoken Spanish, is never the object of the verb ‘to visualize.’  
16 The expression mari mari is the most common greeting among Pehuenche people.  
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composition, I will argue that not only can these acts be thought of as crucial operators 
discriminating between different human worlds, but they are also a precondition for the 
establishment of social relations. Thus, by prioritizing a particular aspect of the affective 
dimension of greetings, namely, their visual dimensio , I deviate from the analytical 
focus of previous ethnographers in southern Chile who have not considered the 
importance of the visual interactions inherent in greetings for the emergence of social 
interactions. 
In short, in this Chapter I advance two claims which are central to my argument as a 
whole: firstly, that a Pehuenche person is a composition of different capacities and 
elements, and secondly, that this personal composition can only be fully activated by 
mutual vision among real people. Thus, in the first part of this Chapter I introduce 
Pehuenche conceptualizations of personal composition, mainly by focusing on three key 
elements: am, püllü, and bodily matter or corporeal support. Such a step is a necessary 
prerequisite to exploring the ways in which such persons see each other as real persons 
and the ontological shifting that might occur when subjects are seen by different 
expressions of being. In the final part of the Chapter I examine the importance of 
touching and seeing as main operators for the distinction between us (human) and them 
(non-human). As I shall argue throughout this thesis, mutual vision among the 
Pehuenche is a social action necessary in order for someone to appear as a real person 
for another real person. I hope to demonstrate how mutual vision is a key activity for the 
definition and delineation of a Pehuenche visible world of visible real people.   
 
1.1 Pehuenche personal composition 
Before beginning, it must be rendered explicit that in order to substantiate the whole 
argument of my thesis, I am initially obligated to inhabit an epistemological paradox, at 
least temporarily. Given my intent to describe Pehuenche personhood as a composition 
of capacities linked to particular personal elements, I will need to characterize 
Pehuenche ideas about personhood and vision in a way that may seem to reduce them to 
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univocal definitions. Mindful of that danger, and aware of the partial and equivocal 
nature of my own understanding, I will do my best to only gesture towards a Pehuenche 
territory, rather than trying to control it through a series of conceptual definitions (cf. 
Pakman 2011). 
Having said that, most of the Pehuenche conceptualize themselves as having two spirits, 
and their self-understanding is mostly expressed through idioms of ‘having’ rather than 
‘being’ (Viveiros de Castro 2003; Candea 2010; Vargas 2010).. In the vernacular, the 
model of relations always implies a constitutive multiplicity. Let us begin by thinking 
about the spirit that my friend Francisco described to me as ‘the little crazy one’ or am. 
Francisco was an evangelical pastor in his sixties who lived in Pitril. While we were 
talking around the fire he once told me: 
People have two spirits, one that is capable of goin  away, the little crazy one called 
am, and the other one which always stays close to people and which is a spirit of life: 
the püllü. 
This am was also described to me by my friend Pablo as in  mongen. Pablo was a young 
Pehuenche in his thirties from the Callaqui community, with whom I discussed many 
different topics while I lived in Ralco. He told me that the ina mongen is  
[…] one's spirit, their ina that walks behind them, that comes behind. Their mongen is 
what is alive, too, but is invisible. That's their ina mongen. 
These kinds of descriptions caught my attention throughout my fieldwork, since I found 
it difficult to conceptualize personal life as a non-unitary territory. This seemed to me, at 
least at the very beginning of my fieldwork, to be a contradictory claim. I was puzzled 
by the fact that the Pehuenche soul was p rt of the self, but not totally, and also by the 
fact that it was described to me as the invisible side of a visible person. As I will 
demonstrate, the concept of an invisible world is highly relevant to the daily lives of 
Pehuenche people on every level.  
For a person initially trained as a psychologist, and more recently as an anthropologist, it 
was hard to imagine a person that does not coincide with a single ‘someone’: ‘one walks 
behind the other,’ my friend Pablo used to say. Moreover, the ina mongen has been 
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described to me as the invisible image of the visible person. How could I imagine an 
image that was not visible? It was only once I had left the field, and after several months 
of reflecting upon these seemingly paradoxical issue , that I finally understood that my 
difficulty in understanding such descriptions of personhood was at least in part the 
product of a certain liberal individualist tradition to which I belonged. The latter pushed 
me to conceptualize the am as a paradoxical concept since, for that tradition, the 
sameness of what it means to be oneself cannot be another self. This alleged 
contradiction, of course, was not at all problematic for my friends in Alto Bío Bío. My 
thinking was being shaped by particular ideas about the self, property, and the body that 
are associated with liberal premises founded the arguments of John Locke.17 In his Two 
Treatises of Government (1689), Locke proposed the foundations of individual freedom, 
basing private property on natural law. The concept of self-ownership, which implied a 
theory of personal identity, became a key solution for his philosophical problems:  
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be comm n to all Men, yet every Man has a 
Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself (Locke 
1988:287. Book II, Chapter V, § 27). 
Thus, within this tradition, a person was a ‘thinking intelligent being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places’ (Locke 1987:xxx; Bk.II, Ch.XXVII, § 9). Considering these liberal premises, it 
is plausible that my thinking was being governed by the mode of identity (rather than 
difference) inherent to that tradition, or in other words, by the mode of being rather than 
having. As Fausto (2008:237) has convincingly argued, ‘without reducing difference to 
zero, sociability cannot be founded on appropriative individuals who are free because 
they own themselves.’ Liberal premises are thus grounded on identity rather than 
difference. Yet, in Alto Bío Bío, the two main attributes for Locke’s (1988) subjects, 
namely, self-identity maintained over time on the one hand, and personal ownership of 
their acts as owners of their bodies on the other, w e not adequate conceptual tools with 
which to understand Pehuenche conceptualizations of personhood. In fact, Pehuenche 
cosmologies activate very different premises. So again, coming back to my 
                                                
17 For a similar point see Fausto 2008. 
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ethnographical material, how could I imagine a self that was an image that was not 
visible? How could I conceptualize this spiritual part of personal composition without 
having to remain trapped within a logical liberal pradox? One possible way to think 
about this, offered by Viveiros de Castro (2007) when considering xapiripë spirits, is to 
think of an image in an indexical way, rather than through its iconic nature.18 
And to complete the picture, we can note the somewhat paradoxical nature of an image 
that is at once non-iconic and non-visible. What defines spirits, in a certain sense, is the 
fact that they index characteristic affects of the sp cies of which they are the image […] 
without, for this very reason, appearing like the sp cies of which they are the image: 
they are indexes, not icons. By the same token, what defines an ‘image’ in general is its 
eminent visibility: an image is something-to-be-seen, it is the necessary objective 
correlative of a gaze, an exteriority which posits itself as the target of an intentionally 
aimed look; but the xapiripë are interior images, ‘internal moulds,’ inaccessible to the 
empirical exercise of vision (Viveiros de Castro 2007:159-160). 
In my Pehuenche ethnography, which is a conscious invention of Pehuenche culture (cf. 
Wagner 1981), a person appears to be a dialogical composition within a complex 
ontology.19 As can also be seen from ethnographies of other South American indigenous 
groups, this ontology is characterised by an affirmation of the two rather than the 
negation of the one (Clastres 1974a & 1974b; Lima 1996). In fact, some of my 
Pehuenche friends often greeted me with a phrase that clearly reflects this principle: 
‘You have already arrived, you were already here!’ The self-evoked in that sentence was 
in fact the ‘little crazy’ am, as Francisco called it. Over time, I realised thate ‘I’ of my 
ethnographic relation to the Pehuenche was not simply located where my physical body 
seemed to be. The sameness of my bodily presence was seen as a multiple presence - a 
presence unregulated by the categories of space and time to which my Lockean tradition 
had disciplined (sensu Foucault) my thought. At the risk of offering a univocal 
definition, it can be said that in Alto Bío Bío, visible persons (and animals) are always 
conceived of relationally, along with their invisible doubles, their am. This conception of 
personhood is always defined, to a certain extent, by a duality: as the law of each being 
                                                
18 For Pierce’s classic discussion about classes of sign, ee Peirce 1998. In dealing with the possible 
relations between sign and representation, Peirce proposed that a sign might stand for its object by virtue 
of alikeness to it (icon), by virtue of an existential connection to it (index), or by virtue of a habit or a law 
(symbol) (Ibid.).   
19 For a similar idea regarding relational modes of having rather than being, see Holquist’s (1990) book 
Dialogism, about Bakhtin’s idiom of co-being. 
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as well as each event (Lima 1996).20  
I want to suggest that the presence of this invisible aspect of a person is needed to 
establish social relations with other persons who sare similar physicalities. This will 
become apparent in Chapter two when I describe the capacities and incapacities of a 
person whose personal composition is not fully achieved. Yet, in daily life and under 
normal conditions, what a person is capable of seeing is not the indexical am of another 
person, but rather their visible corporeal support (Ch. kalül). I will return to this concept 
later on in this Chapter. The kalül is capable of being seen by others through the social 
capacities of the am in relation to their particular corporeal supports. I suggest that 
seeing, therefore, is always a relational capacity implying the presence of different 
dynamic capacities. Thus, the relational, visible ground between Pehuench  people 
requires the convergence of at least an am and its corporeal support within a dynamic 
space that I will call a singular dynamic composition. Moreover, as I will elaborate 
further below, Pehuenche humanity refers to a generic ground shared by different 
species. In this sense, even if the am is always explicitly defined as the invisible part of a 
human, animals are also often described as having an am. One of the outstanding 
capacities of this particular ‘soul,’ if you will, is that it is capable of dislocating from its 
corporeal support. That is, the ina mongen can be seen in one place when the person's 
physical body is in another, sharply challenging Lockes’s liberal premises about what a 
person should be. These appearances are known in Chedungun as amche (Ch. am, ‘soul,’ 
Ch. che, ‘person’). In other words, it is possible to be in two places at the same time. For 
example, Pablo once told me that he had been seen in the community of Callaqui while 
he was working in another place.  
As far as animals’ souls are concerned, there are mny stories of people seeing animals 
appear somewhere in the mountains, but suddenly disappearing without leaving any 
visible sign behind. The community of Cauñiku was the setting for one of these animal 
apparitions (Sp. apariencia animal). Specifically, a horse (Ch. kawell) was briefly seen 
                                                
20 See Viveiros de Castro (2001:33):‘One's own soul is never really one's own, being the other side of the 
person, it is also the side of the Other.’  
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near the water (Ch. ko) of a lake before quickly disappearing. These apparitions are often 
seen in the areas of high altitude where people tak their animals during the summer (Sp. 
veranadas). Marcelo told me that when he was a child, he and some other children once 
saw a little calf near the river while they were looking for their cow, which was eating 
grass somewhere in the area. After having found their cow, they came back to the place 
where the little calf had been. Surprisingly, they could not find it, and there were no 
visible traces of the animal at all. On another occasion, and again in that same place, 
they heard the loud roaring of a bull. When they looked for the bull, ready to catch it 
with a rope, there was no sign of it anywhere. These animals that appear and disappear 
are called enchanted animals (Sp. animales encantados), or they are referred to as the 
animal's am (Ch. am kullin). In other words, every time someone who is awake sees the 
invisible form of another person or animal, they refe  to this as am: an invisible double 
that manifests itself as a fleeting visible appearance, able to be seen but not touched. I 
will come back to the relation between seeing and touching at the end of this Chapter. 
What I am interested in emphasizing here is that while a person is awake, their am 
typically (though not always) coincides spatially with their corporeal support. In other 
words, although in normal situations the ina mongen is always a little ‘behind’ (Ch. ina), 
its invisibility allows the person to be seen by other persons as a non-multiple sameness. 
Yet, any illusion of a personal unity that exists during waking hours is dispelled during 
the night. While a person is sleeping, the set of personal relations contained within their 
dynamic singularity tends -in Candea’s (2010a) vocabul ry- toward detachment. 21 This 
should not be understood as the opposite of connectio , but rather as a particular mode 
of non-relating. A person's ina mongen goes away, at which time the composition of the 
                                                
21 The apparent fissure between the am and the body renders inadequate any attempt to call Pehuenche 
personal multiplicity an ‘internal multiplicity,’ as has been suggested recently for the Marubo (Cesarino 
2010). Nor does Radcliffe-Brown's (1922 & 1966) classic description of Andaman islanders and their 
‘body doubles’ fit here, since he insists on using the spatial metaphors of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ in his 
descriptions of their dreaming. For example, in his scheme, Mateeah corresponds to the external body, 
which is visible and concrete and responds to time and to surrounding situations. Enteeah, on the other 
hand, corresponds to the inner body, which is invisble and abstract. Neither the dichotomy between 
internal and external, nor any concept of ‘dream doubles’ are sufficient to describe the Pehuenche's 
conception of the person. To be more precise, the am cannot be described as detachable, since it never 
corresponds exactly to the location of the sensible body in the first place. Rather, the am is always already 
detached. 
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dynamic personal singularity takes a particular shape, or rather it loses its composition in 
a particular way. When a Pehuenche person goes to sleep, one of the essential capacities 
that constitutes them when they are awake detaches itself from their corporeal support 
and goes out, in the words of an herbalist friend of mine, ‘to travel around its life.’ 22  In 
other words, it goes out to explore or circumnavigate the life of the sleeping person, 
which is, of course, its own life too. While the Pehu nche sleep, they can be in different 
places at the same time, because of the capacity of the ina mongen ‘to travel around.’ 
Conversely, the waking up of a person is possible because another person engages in a 
relation with the one who was dislocated while sleeping. An am in relation to its 
corporeal support needs another am in relation to its corporeal support in order for a 
person to be enacted as real person.  
Following Course’s (2011) illumination of Mapuche sociality, these personal 
conjunctions can be seen as the sum of human physicality inherent to the corporeal 
support, or kalül, plus the capacity for productive sociality inherent to the am. In some 
way, these ideas can be seen as an analytical cosmological extension of Course’s (2011) 
work on personhood and sociality. Whereas he has suggested that the attribution of 
personhood by the Mapuche is based upon the correct conjunction of human physicality 
and the capacity for productive sociality, I will develop a similar argument from another 
angle, that is, by considering the different components of the person that are only fully 
enacted through mutual vision among real people (or personal compositions). I argue 
that it is through mutual vision among people that all these relations are objectified 
(Strathern 1988) as persons.  
It might provisionally be said that the multiple person composed of a singular ina 
mongen—their supernatural or virtual dimension—and a visible corporeal support—
their sensible natural dimension—never ‘walks’ about the earth alone. Many Pehuenche 
                                                
22 I prefer the phrase ‘corporeal support’ to ‘body,’ given that the latter has clear and distinct uses in 
different traditions such as the perspectivist tradi ion in anthropology or the biomedical tradition i the 
sciences. By ‘corporeal support’ I mean that materil structure which is related to the other essences 
described here as belonging to Pehuenche cosmology. 
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told me that the ina mongen is always accompanied by a spirit called püllü.23 Although 
the word püllü is strongly polysemic, it often refers to the spirit of the earth, the mapu, 
which does not belong to the person. The püllü that accompanies a person literally ‘rises 
up’ from the earth to protect and accompany them.  
This is how, in reality, a person's ‘identity’ is never identical with itself: the multiple 
person contradicts the presumption of identity and ppears as a point of convergence for 
the alterities suspended in the virtual (Cesarino 2010).24 In other words, in Alto Bío Bío, 
personhood seems to be a personal composition multiply constructed. The philosopher 
Jean-Luc Nancy (2008), in his attempt to define a corpus as an ‘open space’ or ‘a space 
of existence,’ helps express the concept of personho d I am interested in here:  
Bodies aren't some kind of fullness or filled space, th y are open space, implying, in 
some sense, a space more spacious than spatial, what could also be called a pl ce. 
Bodies are places of existence, and nothing exists without a place (Nancy 2008:15). 
The place of existence co-inhabited by a person's visible corporeal support and their 
invisible image, or double (Ch. am) seems to always be dislocated (Ch. ina ‘behind’) in 
the person's life (Ch. mongen): singularity appears as dislocation and multiplicty. 
Having said this, the main purpose of this thesis will be an attempt to conceptualize 
vision and seeing without having to refer to liberal conceptual premises of identity, but 
rather by trying to conceptualize Pehuenche vision in the terms of Pehuenche people 
themselves. The description of the personal composition is therefore essential to the 
overall purpose of this thesis.  
 
1.1.1 Personal dislocation and grammar 
The dislocation of a personal composition is expressed in different ways in Alto Bío Bío, 
and it can be revealing to examine the cognitive idioms people use to refer to the moral 
                                                
23 For a detailed analysis of püllü and shamanism, see Montencinos 1997 and Chapter Thre of the current 
work. 
24 Many ethnographers working in South America have described this multiple personhood in different 
ways - see Kelly 2001; Viveiros de Castro 2002; Oakdale 2005 and Course 2007. 
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relational particularities of personal compositions. The Pehuenche cognitive experience 
of thinking is called rakiduam, and is generally translated by laypeople and scholars as 
‘thought.’ This word is always related to the moral p rticularity of a specific personal 
singularity. For instance, küme rakiduam corresponds to the positive person's moral 
intentionality, to the moral intentionality of the personal composition with regard to 
other people or other personal compositions.    
At this point, it is necessary to say more about the relationship between am as the 
invisible person, and its rakiduam, or ‘thought,’ within the personal composition. If we 
consider that in the personal composition, during the day the ina mongen always walks a 
little bit behind, it should not be surprising that singular utterances with the verb ‘to 
think’ that refer to the speaker's centre (‘I think’) are not used, but that a passive form (‘I 
was told by my thought’) is the usual way of referring to one’s thoughts. I  is not 
necessary to speak Chedungun to realize the importance of this grammatical form, since 
even when speaking Spanish, Pehuenche people refer to thoughts as slightly separated 
from the person, and they never articulate sentences such as ‘I think.’ 25 Their rakiduam 
appears separated from themselves, and the multiplicity is illustrated in utterances such 
as: ‘I do not know what my thought is,’ and ‘What does your thought think about this?’ 
This is not surprising if we conceive of a person as a composition without a centre, or, 
put differently, as a dialogic composition framed by an ontology of multiplicity. 
It is worthwhile to note that in my entire time doing fieldwork I never heard anyone 
asking questions such as ‘What are you thinking about?’ which are typical among 
Westerners who assume that the other coincides with the subject of thought. In this way, 
Pehuenche cosmology seems to be indifferent to the identity, or to the understanding of 
the point of view as a whole. In some way, personal composition in the Pehuenche 
world, or the Pehuenche person's subjectivity, is, following Nancy (2008), always 
                                                
25 A few examples of the use of the word rakiduam in Mapudungum from Course (2009): Kalifilepen nga 
pipingetuy ñi rakiduam nga pu peñiengun: ‘Let me be this way,’ said my thought, my brothers. Amuan 
nga, amuan nga, inantukuafin nga pilen nga ñi rakiduam ‘I will go, yes, I’ll follow her,’ said my thought. 
Femlayan nga pikunomekutun ñi rakiduam kuyfi nga kuyfi ‘I cannot accept I,’ said my thought long, long 
ago. See also Cesarino (2010) for an analysis of the constituent enunciative multiplicity of the verbal 
marubo art.  
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configured as a withdrawal, as a dislocation in the place of existence, a Pehuenche 
corpus, if you will:   
The ego-point of a body enunciating or extending (itself) also forms, identically and 
without contradiction, even when contrary, a point of extreme concentration where the 
self extending or enunciating (itself) also obscures the extension, or the body, that it is. 
Ego enunciated is instantly detached from ego enunciati g, precisely because it's the 
same, and hence, ego: it's an identity withdrawn, identified as withdrawn, identical to its 
withdrawal. It withdraws at the point of its own contrariety: wherever corpus declares 
(itself) as ‘ego’ ego enters into contrariety, being countered by a self that confronts its 
self, with corpus becoming the matter-obstacle of this contrariety (and the very site of its 
declaration). (…) corpus is never properly me (Nancy 2008:29).  
Put differently, the person who is awake, or che, is a convergent personal space 
consisting of ina mongen or am, püllü, and an organic body (corporeal support). Even 
this phrase ‘organic body’ is inadequate however, given that there are no words in 
Chedungun that refer to the body as an organic entity separated from the ina mongen. 
Only once was I told that the word to describe the body as a whole was kalül, but that 
word is no longer in common usage in Alto Bío Bío. I remember a situation in which 
two people were talking in Chedungun about a certain woman’s health problems. Even if 
most of the conversation was held in Chedungun (this occurred in Cauñikú where 
Chedungun is still spoken in daily life), I noticed that the Spanish word ‘body’ (Sp. 
cuerpo) was used every time they referred to the physical deterioration the woman was 
being affected by. In this sense, and again following Nancy (2008), it is useful to think 
of the Pehuenche body not only as a place of existence but also as a site or moment of 
organism: 
Something with a head and a tail rises up from a site, not a place: head and tail are 
placed alongside a sense (direction, meaning), the ensemble itself placing a setting for 
sense, and all the sets are included in the great head-to-tail of the Universal Animal. But 
something without-head-or-tail isn't a part of this organization, of this compact 
thickness. Bodies don't take place in discourse or in matter. They don't inhabit ‘mind’ or 
‘body’. They take place at the limit, qua limit: limit-external border, the fracture and 
intersection of anything foreign in a continuum of sense, a continuum of matter. An 
opening, discreteness. Bodies, in the end, are alsothat -head and tail-: the very 
discreteness of the sites of sense, of the moments of an organism, of the elements of 
matter (Nancy 2008:17). 
In sum, a person's singularity is multiple: ina mongen or am corresponds to the 
particular image of a person: the person, che, is and has an image, precisely because it is 
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double and multiple. Human experience is double by definition: a person is a visible site 
and at the same time an invisible am. In other parts of the continent, these categories 
have been denominated, for lack of better terms, as ‘n ture’ and ‘supernature’ (Lima 
1996). 26 Following a Melanesian conceptual trend, in South America a living person has 
been described as ‘dividual’: a body and soul, internally constituted by a self/other, or 
consanguine/affine polarity (Taylor 2000; Viveiros de Castro 2001). 
These descriptions of the relations between am, püllü and corporeal support should only 
be regarded as a rough outline of possible interactions however. There are many aspects 
of Pehuenche conceptions of personhood and seeing that remain opaque. Throughout all 
of my ethnographic experience I was unable to discern if the images in dreams, for 
instance, corresponded to the travels of the ina mongen or to the relationship between 
the püllü and the deity Ngenechen. 27  Or perhaps they correspond to both, or to 
something entirely different. 
In spite of these conceptual difficulties, what stands out at this juncture is the temporal 
dislocation of the ina mongen with respect to the corporeal support, which generally 
occurs during sleep. In short, one possible way of conceiving of the dynamic personal 
singularity at night is as the detachment of the capacities of the ina mongen. It is during 
sleep that the dichotomy between physical and metaphysical domains becomes clearer 
and gains more significance in the Pehuenche world. In Mapuche ontologies, the ina 
mongen cannot exit social relations altogether.28 The ina mongen, therefore, must seek 
out social relations elsewhere. But if the ina mongen never sleeps and temporarily flees 
from the ‘centre’ of personal singularity, what is the state of the sleeping corporeal 
                                                
26 ‘The double is invisible not exactly because it is immaterial, or even because its substance is different 
from that of the body. Soul and body are concepts which primarily designate not substances but 
perspectival effects. These concepts operate by means of the notion of point of view which articulates the 
two dimensions of human experience, just as it articulates the sensible dimension of the body with the 
spiritual dimension of the soul. We could designate these last two dimensions “Nature” and “Supernature” 
while remembering that such concepts are necessarily dependent on someone's point of view; that is, they
work as relational categories’ (Lima 1996:122). 
27 Ngenechen is the Mapuche supreme being. For an extensive ontological and historical analysis of 
Ngenechen in Mapuche ontologies, see Bacigalupo 1997, Alonqueo 1979, and Foerster 1993. 
28 On this pervasive centrifugal Mapuche sociality, see Course 2011. 
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support detached from its am? 29 This question lends itself to the possibility of thinking 
of the am not only as an image but also as a capacity: what is  corporeal support 
incapable of when it is separated from its am? I will deal with these questions in Chapter 
Two. For the moment, it is plausible to think of the am as a capacity enabling the very 
possibility of human interaction in general, and human vision in particular.  
To sum up, the corporeal support and the am are divided aspects of one singularity. The 
am is the am of and for a corporeal support, and the visible corporeal support is of and 
for its invisible am. This singularity, together with the püllü, is what I call the personal 
composition. Moreover, the person's image (Ch. amche) has the possibility of ‘leaving’ 
this personal composition in certain situations, the most common of which is during 
sleep. 
 
1.2 Human capacities: on am and ngen  
The personal composition, or the interaction of a visible corporeal support with an 
invisible double spirit (Ch. am) plus a spiritual land caring force (Ch. püllü), can be 
thought of as part of a wider relational scheme. My contention here is that the personal 
composition should not be considered as an exclusive relational aspect among and 
between people or animals. The personal composition s part of a wider relational 
scheme involving other entities that can be equally conceived of as ‘human,’ and is 
shared by different species.  
Framed by this dual ontological law, words such as ngen (usually translated as ‘owner’ 
or ‘master’) and am are often used by the Pehuenche to refer to the capacity of certain 
beings to understand themselves as human. Generally speaking, trees, rivers, mountains, 
stars, the moon and the sun, and so on, have/are thei  invisible double, known as ngen, 
                                                
29 It must be reiterated here that personal composition does not ‘have’ a ‘centre’ but rather is a space of 
convergence that constructs the multiple person. 
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and generally translated as ‘owner.’30 Some examples of this are the ngen of the sun (Ch. 
ngenantu), of the moon (Ch. ngenkullen), of the stars (Ch. ngenwalen), of the araucaria 
tree (Ch. ngendegi), etc. Each time someone enters an uninhabited place, or whenever 
someone needs to pick medicinal plants from the mountains, it is necessary to approach 
the place’s or the plant’s ngen and ask its permission. Ignoring the authority of thengen 
can cause trouble later on. The ngens are capable of avenging themselves, since they 
possess ‘an intentionality analogous to the human’ (Viveiros de Castro 2002:354). My 
friend, Bernardita, told me that she discovered that ‘t e mountain was really alive’ when 
years ago, the ngen of the mountain (Ch. ngenmawida) punished her and her sister Silvia 
because they were walking through forbidden places. Ngenmawida caused them to be 
disoriented so that they no longer knew where they w re. Furthermore, Grebe (1988) has 
provided ethnographical evidence that within the dimension of the deities (Ch. 
wenumapu), masters have lands, birds, and animals, they live in houses, and also 
organize rituals. In sum, they see themselves as humans. Ngens are also often described 
as having anthropomorphic features.  
In a general sense, my aim here is to examine the relational similarities between am and 
ngen, even if I have to admit that I never clearly understood the precise differences 
between them. A preliminary way to think about these is to conceive of the differences 
as being merely perspectival: the Pehuenche see themselves as being and having an am, 
even as they acknowledge the existence of other human subjectivities and ngen. In the 
same way, the ngen might see themselves as being and having an am, even as they 
acknowledge the existence of other human subjectivities that could possibly be called 
ngen. Having said this, it might be worth noting that peo le often speak about their own 
am, as well as those of animals, in an explicit way, while I have never heard people 
referring to the am of a ngen, so to speak. In other words, they do not use the word am 
when speaking about ngen as autonomous subjects living within open spaces. When 
people speak about their own doubles they do so by using the word am, whereas the 
                                                
30 The concept of ‘owner’ or ‘master’ is quite common in South America. For a more detailed analysis of 
this topic, see Viveiros de Castro 2002; Fausto 2008; and Cesarino 2010. For a study of the ngen, see 
Grebe 1993-1994 and Course 2012. 
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word ngen is often used to refer those human entities that do not belong to the domain of 
people, or che. Thus, there might be a common aspect between animals and people that I 
have never fully understood, but which is probably related to the fact that both share a 
similar way of being visible. While ngen, under normal conditions, should not be seen, 
and live their lives within determined places, keeping some distance from the 
Pehuenche, animals and people coexist within the same plane of visibility, sharing their 
own perspective.  
However, the word ngen can be used in different ways in Alto Bío Bío, and not only as 
an ontological noun or referring to a separate entity in relation to a particular visible 
corporeal support. While I was taking Chedungun lesson  with Matías during my first 
months of fieldwork in Santa Bárbara, he simply transl ted the word ngen as the verb ‘to 
be’ (Sp. ser). The word ngen therefore usually refers to the ‘being of someone,’ namely, 
a subjectivity. This subjectivity, according to different ethnographic moments, can refer 
either to the subjectivity of a person, or to the subjectivity of another being in relation to 
a visible aspect of (his/her own) reality. 
 
1.2.1 On am, ngen and residence 
At this point, it is illuminating to refer to Descola’s (1986) description of nature as 
domestic, since it is always the domus of or for someone. Describing relationships 
between subjectivities and their bodily matter in terms of ‘residence’ clarifies the 
relation between the ngen and their corresponding corporeal supports. For example, 
water (Ch. ko) is composed of its sensible dimension and the owner-double that inhabits 
it (Ch. ngenko). Once, I was walking around in Callaqui with my friend Pablo when he 
started to recount to me some of his childhood memories. In a very sad tone, he spoke 
about what the places we were passing looked like wh n he was ten or twelve years old. 
He told me that at that time, about thirty years before, there were streams all over the 
place. These places were necessary for the cattle, s they could drink water from the 
streams, but also, medicinal herbs used to grow near th se ‘water places’ (Ch. menoko) 
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and herbalists could collect these herbs with relative ease, without having to travel far. 
Nowadays, a lack of water is one of the major problems in this community, and during 
the last five years a special municipal truck has periodically distributed water among the 
inhabitants during the summer. While he was telling me this story, Pablo showed me the 
massive amounts of eucalyptus trees that had been introduced into Callaqui since land 
division was encouraged and put into practice by the Pinochet administration. This 
division did not affect the whole community, however, as Pablo clearly showed me: 
Half of the people, half of the whole community arep ivate owners of their lands, so 
they can do whatever they want with their land. In fact, their lands are dominated by the 
eucalyptus they have for sale, and there are no more streams around. But the other half 
of the people still have their shared rights over the land. If you compare both, the 
answer is obvious: those with private rights have lost their streams because the ngenko 
has left, and they do not have water, whereas in this part of the place there are still some 
streams, and also a few herbs. 
In this quote, the continuity, caring relationship, and strong interdependence between 
ngen and its corporeal support is apparent. Moreover, the strong conceptual contrast 
(even opposition) between the private ownership of land on the one hand, and the 
relational, caring ownership between a ngen and its corporeal support on the other, is 
more than obvious. In the same way an owner (Ch. ngen) inhabits a house (Ch. ruka), 
which is called ngenruka, I suggest that doubles inhabit and take care of their 
corresponding corporeal supports, a relationship framed by the same caring relational 
scheme as am-kalül. Besides the fact that the am also take care of their visible residence 
by enacting their human capacities, am can also exist beyond their temporary visible 
place of residence (Ch. kalül). The am and the ngen appear to be characterised by the 
usual capacities of knowing bodies, as described in the perspectival tradition (Viveiros 
de Castro 1998). That is to say they are characterised by commensality, by having a 
unique aesthetic appearance, by blood, by being human for themselves, and so on. As 
such, the am and its corporeal support, and the ngen and its corporeal support, are dual 
aspects of the same singularity. This conjunction between visible and invisible domains 
does not imply any kind of paradox for Pehuenche people in daily life. For instance, a 
Pehuenche woman named Flora, when trying to answer my question about how an 
invisible spiritual entity can in fact engage in material relations, once told me the 
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following: ‘Of course the am eats! If there is only one person eating, there can't be 
anyone else!’ I pressed her to answer whether it was the am or the physical matter that 
was doing the eating, however this binary distinction was inexistent for her. 
Let us now return to the central argument of this section: I suggest that both ngen and 
am can be thought of as human subjectivities characterized by a strong, yet not 
necessarily bilateral, relation of interdependence with their visible corporeal supports. 
This relation is not necessarily one of mutual constitution between corporeal supports 
and their doubles however. To say it simply: a double/owner can live without its 
corporeal support, whereas a corporeal support cannot do so without its double/owner. 
Am and ngen are not determined by the temporality and duration of their visible places 
of residence. However, both am and ngen can be thought of as constitutive parts of the 
space of existence of the personal dynamic singularity. Both am and ngen are capable of 
enacting the reflexive human capacities of different species, so they can be thought of as 
both separate entities and as the intrinsic reflexive capabilities of humans. In other 
words, am and ngen are in fact doubles, in the sense that they inhabit corporeal supports 
and are in a relation of continuity with them, but at the same time, they are capacities, 
since a corporeal support cannot see itself as a human and engage in human relations 
without the action/presence of an am or ngen. This fact is clearly evident in the 
mythological story reported at the beginning of this Chapter. In the supernatural 
encounter taking place between an am and a ngen, it is striking that in order to coexist in 
the same plane of interaction, the bodily matter of the person is automatically excluded 
(the person fainted).  
The reasons behind attempting to conceptualize these entities as the symmetrical 
configuration of double/human capacities are threefold. Firstly, both am and ngen can 
live beyond their corporeal support and establish a rel tion with it that does not 
necessarily coincide with it in terms of time and space. Personal singularity is always a 
fluid and dynamic space of capacities that can, under normal conditions, converge or 
remain distinct within the place of existence of the personal singularity itself. What 
seems to be undeniable is that both am and ngen are eternal subjectivities whose 
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existences go beyond the relational field of people existing with(in) corporeal supports. 
Within the Pehuenche world, these entities are seen as autonomous subjectivities, and 
even if they make possible the existence of people, th ir lives do not depend on the 
materiality of their corporeal supports. My host Pedro used to make jokes about 
evangelical promises related to the salvation of the body as matter. He used to laugh and 
say that they were nonsensical statements, since ther was no question that the am lives 
forever whereas the corporeal support will turn into soil. It is also very common to hear 
people complaining about ngen that have escaped or that have been threatened by the 
strong intervention of external forces (the State, Chilean schools, hydroelectric dams, the 
introduction of new foods, etc.), which results in the definitive withdrawal of the ngen 
(Ch. ma lükan ngen). Am an ngen therefore share the fact of living with some corporeal 
support within a particular place of existence, but without necessarily having a relation 
of bilateral, mutual constitution. In short: am and ngen keep on living for themselves 
‘somewhere,’ even if they have left their visible places of Pehuenche residence. 
Secondly, am and ngen are characterized by the establishment of a caring and non-
destructive relation with their corporeal supports. In the case of humans, the am affords 
not only the capacity to see other Pehuenche singularities, but also makes possible 
actions such as moving around, eating, and so on. It implies, in some way or another, the 
possibility of acting, or of enacting the person, or che, within the place of existence. For 
instance, the definitive departure of the am toward another dimension, different to the 
plane of mapu where people live, implies the death of the person. It is not because 
people die that their am goes away, but rather the reverse. Generally speaking, while 
alive, am take care of their corporeal supports by inhabiting hem, or to be more precise, 
by remaining very close to them. Ngen also share similar capacities.  
Thirdly, am and ngen are both in a continuous relation with püllü, as well as having 
corporeal supports. Püllü cannot be thought of as having a singular human form (as am 
and ngen do), but are often described as spirits that are presences without any form and 
who belong to the earth, or are simply soil. In fact, mong the Mapuche, püllü is also a 
word used to refer to soil (Course, personal communication). If there is any sense of 
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belonging involving am or ngen, it is not to the earth itself but to particular corp real 
supports.  
In daily life, these three features always overlap and are present in a complex way, as 
evidenced by the way people reflect about their ownlives. For this reason, I will provide 
some ethnographic data without having to explicitly refer to the epistemological 
categorization of my argument. In a general sense, and leaving aside the many 
complexities of the different uses of the word ngen, it is evident and undeniable that the 
word ngen always refers to the existence of one thing in relation to another: ngen is the 
evocation of a relation. The common translation of ngen as ‘owner’ (Sp. dueño) makes 
apparent its relational nature. However, this translation is partially equivocated, since 
ngen does not imply a relation of possession as the English term ‘ownership’ does 
(Course 2012; Cesarino 2010; Fausto 2008).31 Also, the implicit emphasis the word 
‘owner’ places on property rather than on relations b cures what I think is the central 
aspect of ngen relations, namely, their caring nature. Moreover, in order to be capable of 
taking care of their corporeal supports, the ngen necessarily need to be able to see what 
is happening in the surroundings of a particular enviro ment, element, or corporeal 
support. The relation between ngen and seeing was pointed out to me by Rebecca, one of 
my Pehuenche friends. She told me that the word ngencould also be translated as ‘gift’ 
(Sp. don), in the sense of a natural or acquired power. I was very impressed with this 
revelation, since she told me this at a time when I was trying to discover more about the 
particular visual capacities that some of the tradiional healers in Alto Bío Bío have (see 
Chapter Three). She stated that being able to see and m ke a diagnosis was a practice 
that could not be taught, since it implied having a particular ngen inherited from birth.  
You have to be born with a ngen; the ngen of the tre , or that of the water. There is 
nothing that you can learn about seeing, it is a gifted capacity. 
Sometime later, I had an opportunity to speak to Rebecca about this subject again, and I 
reminded her what she had told me. Surprisingly, she corrected herself, and told me that 
                                                
31 I am using the word ‘equivocation’ in line with Viveiros de Castro’s (2004b) proposal, to be discussed 
in the next Chapter.  
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what she intended to say was not that there was a ngen involved in the capacity of seeing 
that some healers had, but rather that they possess th  capacity of relating with a wenu 
püllü (see Chapter Three). She added that every time a healer needed to see what was 
happening with a sick person, it was necessary to pray and ask for the wenu püllü's 
presence, which would afford the possibility of rend ring visible that which was not. 
After this conversation, I started to think of the possibility that every ngen was in a 
relation with a püllü (among other relations), and that these words, even if used in a 
polysemic way, were not fully interchangeable but in fact referred to different aspects of 
personal singularities. Later on, this way of understanding the relation and separateness 
of ngen and püllü was further supported by some of Pablo's statements. While trying to 
tell me more about how healers can actually perform a particular way of seeing, he 
explained to me that this was possible since a ngen offered their püllü to a particular 
person who then became ‘gifted.’ Moreover, when Pedro was asking me for detailed 
information about the shaman I knew through the public health services, he said ‘Have 
you ever seen that shaman when she is in the püllü?’ (Sp. Has visto a la machi cuando 
está en el püllü?).  
I hope to have made it clear that the concept of personal composition in relation to 
humanity refers to the spread capacity of different tities. I have emphasized the fact 
that the relations between the different elements of he personal composition are possible 
within what, following Nancy (2008), I have called ‘a place of Pehuenche existence,’ 
characterized by an ongoing dislocation between its parts. This dislocation is an 
expression of a wider conceptualization of the world, in which different inhabitants exist 
in relation to different corporeal supports. In the case of Pehuenche people, the 
dislocation between soul as capacity and bodily matter as residence, can be highly 
problematic in daily life. This is why I now turn to he description of evil spirits called 
witranalwe, which, as I will argue, can be thought of as soul eternally exiled from their 
residence: eternal and problematic dislocations of depersonalized decompositions. 
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1.2.2 From am to witranalwe: an impersonal dislocation 
Now that, through a description of what anm is actually capable of doing, I have 
described what an am is, I can concentrate on describing the existence of wicked spirits 
known as witranalwe (the verb witran can mean ‘to visit’ whereas alwe is generally 
translated as ‘soul’). According to Bacigalupo (2007) witranalwe is the personification 
of Spanish men on a horse who exploit Mapuche people and rape their women. 
Moreover, according to Citarella (2000) and Course (2011) witranalwe is created by 
witches from femurs recovered from abandoned cemeteries. The bones are attached 
together and brought to life in a secret ceremony. The witranalwe is then sold to a 
customer. ‘Witranalwe serve their owners as guardians of the sheep and cttle which 
make up the owner’s wealth. During the day they will live in a small jar inside the 
house, and only at night do they emerge and take on their full size’ (Course 2011:34).   
My aim here is to be able to further explain the relationships that exist between the am
and the corporeal support (Ch. kalül), or rather, between the physical image that 
coincides with, or is, the person's metaphysical or indexical image. What I will try to 
render explicit here is that, for the Pehuenche, what is invisible should not be thought of 
in opposition to what is material. In my ethnography, t e uniqueness of witranalwe, and 
what renders them different from other evil spirits, s that they correspond to the am or 
ina mongen of a person who has died (see also Citarella 2000), but who did not fully 
reach the place of heights (Ch. wenu mapu), but rather, stayed strolling ‘somewhere 
around.’ Wenu mapu corresponds to the place the living am inhabits after a person's 
death. It is, so to speak, the residence of the invisible life of deceased people on the 
infinite farm of social virtuality (Viveiros of Castro 2002). There, am continue living as 
humans for themselves. In more specific terms, it is said that witranalwe correspond to 
the ex-am of a person who was not a good person during his or her life: a person that 
was a weya am (roughly translatable as ‘bad person,’ or ‘bad human intentionality’). 
Weya am are a favourite resource of witches; a witranalwe is an am that has been fixed 
by witches. In the words of Pedro: 
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And they, witches, take out spirits from the deceased, the am, the spirit, evil spirits that 
are fixed by those witches. There is good am, and evil am. The am is the spirit,… weya 
am, those are bad, those are around with witches, with the Devil. The witches (Ch. 
kalku) say that they are interested in having evil spirits (Ch. kalku) so they can harm 
other people. 32   
In a very general sense, as has been described by Course (2011), witranalwe can be seen 
as  a human non-person.’ However, I suggest that it is more precise to say that a 
witranalwe is a former person without corporeal support. That is, it is a form without 
form, so to speak33: a former am, in a certain sense depersonalized, given its existence as 
an eternal outsider of the personal composition or the place of existence of the che.  
There is a general consensus in Alto Bío Bío regarding the correlation between the 
morality of the am during the life of the che, and its later destination as pure virtuality. If 
a person leads a ‘clean’ life, characterized by good thoughts (Ch. küme rakiduam), the 
am can actually continue on its journey towards the wenu mapu. However, the moral 
particularity of rakiduam is always related to the moral particularity of the am or ina 
mongen. Küme rakiduam or ‘good thought’ corresponds to the person's moral 
intentionality in regards to other people or personal compositions. 
Although my objective here is not to analyze death, but rather Pehuenche vision as it 
relates to Pehuenche morality, it is important to mention some aspects of the Pehuenche 
person's death in order to understand a little bit more about their personal 
(de)composition.34  In general, and as other anthropologists have already demonstrated 
(Mosko 1983; Bloch 1988; Strathern 1988 & 1992), the moment of death is crucial in 
understanding a person's composition. It is interesing here to consider funeral practices 
that take part in cemeteries. Even if burial has recently been considered to be a ‘simple 
                                                
32 It is worth noting that the word kalku, ‘witch’ is indistinctly used to refer to either the subject or the 
object of witchcraft. 
33 A similar conceptualization has been made by Peders n (2011) by using the concept of ‘impossible 
form,’ regarding occult phenomena in Mongolia. 
34 For a detailed analysis of Mapuche death, considered as a process of synthesis carried out through the 
dead person's biography in ritual practices, see Course 2007. Course carries out a thorough analysis of the 
amulpüllün, the moment during the ritual that is crucial for allowing the püllü to go away. This analysis 
can be complemented by the study by Isla (unpublished) on püllü and kinship. My interest here, however, 
is to analyze the transformations of the am at the moment of Pehuenche death, with the aim of 
understanding the genealogy of the witranalwe. 
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affair’ inside ritual practices (Course 2009), I consider funeral practices to be crucial in 
understanding the Pehuenche person's decomposition at the moment of death. I seek to 
contribute to the analysis of Pehuenche death in its dimension as a cosmo-political 
process of division, particularly by referring to what becomes of the am. 
In all the burials that I witnessed, it was of great importance for each person, near the 
end of the ceremony, to throw one or two handfuls of soil over the coffin that was 
positioned in a hole in the ground. In Alto Bío Bío, this act is known as ‘the last service’ 
(Sp. el último servicio), and is intended to fully cover the corpse with soil, so people can 
make sure that the person is not going to become visible again. A typical mealtime joke 
among my herbalist friend's family was to say that ‘We should take advantage of being 
able to eat, because later on we will just be eating soil,’ referring with jocularity to the 
moment of the ‘last service.’ This ritual is clearly a way in which people protect 
themselves from the possibility of seeing the deceased (Sp. finao) in the form of an 
amche without corporeal support.35 Additionally, the ‘last service’ is important because 
people fear that witches with bad intentions (Ch. weya rakiduam) can use and abuse the 
am outside of the personal composition. However, it isalso possible that people fear the 
possible transformation of the am into witranalwe without any intervention of witches, 
but just as a result of the deceased’s immoral behavior while alive. The fear and concern 
among the living with regard to the quality of the d ceased’s decomposition are of vital 
importance. 
When an old ngendumu of the Pitril  community died, I noticed that my friend Pedro was 
particularly troubled. 36 His concern began at the finao's house, during the wake (Ch. 
umatun), when he noticed that the casket of the deceased was smaller than the corpse. 
‘He was one of the big ones,’ he told me, ‘and if no one changes the casket the deceased 
won't leave peacefully.’ Despite his strong concern, nobody did anything to remedy the 
situation. Pedro's concern increased when, once in the cemetery, he noticed that the hole 
they had dug for the coffin was not sufficiently wide or deep. ‘That hole is too small, the 
                                                
35 The word amche also means a person’s shadow.  
36 Ngendumu is the name given to one of the most important organizers of the fertitlity ritual nguillatún. 
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deceased will not leave satisfied.’ That night, while reminiscing about the departed's life, 
Pedro's concern had not disappeared. Another friend, days after, explained that the 
concern was due to the fear of actually seeing the deceased, or finao, as an am again, 
outside of the personal composition:  
If the deceased (Sp. finao) did not leave calmly, he is not going to rest in peace so he 
will reappear in his house. Somebody might see him, as an am flying around his house. 
More precisely, this would be the am outside of the personal composition, or a former-
person in a place of non-existence. This is why the separation process at cemeteries is 
crucial for the am itself. When someone dies, even as the corporeal support decomposes 
progressively, the am continues existing (for itself) as a reflexive human being - one that 
progressively loses its visible organic body. In this regards, Bonning (1995:112) has 
pointed out that the decomposition of a corpse is surely sign of the estrangement of the 
am, concluding that ‘the form of the body, the fenotype of the human body depends on 
the presence of the am.’ The author comes to the conclusion that the am is ‘a ‘formative 
principle’ that allows each thing (and not only human beings) to end up being exactly 
what it is’ (Bonning 1995:114). Morevoer, Citarella (2000) has defined the alwe as the 
soul (am) of a dead person whose duration of existence coincides with the rotting of the 
corpse. The am, however, must be aided in leaving the corpse by people who are still 
alive. 
In this procedure, the problem is that the am of the dead person is going through 
personal decomposition, far away from its visible corporeal support, hence outside of the 
field of visible human relationships. To say it differently, I suggest that the am lacks 
visible corporeal support - a residence, from where it can leave in peace autonomously. 
This fact also makes it incapable of communicating ts departure to its fellows. 
Following Nancy (2008), this can be expressed as the lack of a site in the place of 
existence. The person is not a person anymore precisely because of the lack of a visible 
material residence. The decomposition of the corpse does not allow the am to recompose 
with its visible material support, and as a result it is impossible for it to establish social 
relationships with people that would help it leave in peace. In this sense, it is particularly 
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interesting to note that am is often translated as the ‘appearance’ of a person, a double 
without support, an existence without a visible human support as its residence. During 
the night after a wake, a friend dreamt he was attending his own funeral, and he was 
actually able to see the proceedings from above. Th great problem in this dream was 
that he was unable to tell the people in the funeral that he was well: ‘I dreamt my am’ he 
told me. The impossibility of communicating affects the am in death, leaving it as an 
outsider to its own personal composition. Consequently, the person is left in a position of 
antisocial vulnerability that might lead it to be captured by witches’ powers. Thus, the 
am outside of the personal composition appears to be extremely dependent on the 
assistance of the community, or more specifically, on the last service. The last service is 
a service of reciprocity: the am is helped in order for it to leave successfully, but at the 
same time, the community is protected against its po sible reappearance. Cemeteries, 
however, imposed by Chilean law, create an additional risk for the Pehuenche 
communities since they imply the concentration of the complex processes of 
decomposition in a reduced space of earth. What was surely a great opportunity for the 
Chilean State resulted unknowingly in an equally great opportunity for witches. 
The main problem the former-person entails for the P huenche, especially when 
considered from the perspective of victims of nocturnal attacks (see ChapterTtwo), is 
that a witranalwe is a being that cannot be physically recognized nor touched, and a 
visitor that cannot be greeted is a person that cannot be fully activated. In other words, 
one could say that a witranalwe is a former-am without a residence, without corporeal 
support, that has been exiled for eternity from the relationships between kin, determined 
in part by the similarity of corporeal supports.37 In this sense, the witranalwe, as 
eternally exiled (or purely dislocated) from the personal composition, is a very good 
Pehuenche concept with which to consider mutual vision and personal composition. In 
part, I think that these spirits can be thought of as a social capacity turned in to an 
antisocial one. The lack of corporeal support makes mutual vision between real people 
                                                
37 For relations between bodies and kinship in South America, see Seeger, Da Matta & Viveiros de Castro 
1979; Turner 1995; Taylor 1996; Conklin 1996 & 2001; McCallum 1996 & 2001; Rival 1997; and Vilaça 
2002 & 2005, among many others.   
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impossible. In fact, in order to engage in relations with real Pehuenche people, it is 
necessary to be able to see and touch the other. I therefore conclude this Chapter by 
considering the importance of greetings among the Pehuenche, understood as 
performances in which personal compositions are fully activated by mutual vision.   
 
1.3 A final comment: on greetings and vision 
I will begin the conclusions of this Chapter by briefly referring to another aspect of the 
mythological narrative presented earlier, namely, greeting performances. By rendering 
explicit the relation between greetings and vision, as well as the crucial relevance of 
being seen by others for the achievement of personhood, I hope to demonstrate that 
mutual vision is indeed a precondition for the emergence of a relation between personal 
compositions.  
The extreme importance people confer on greetings i Alto Bío Bío is an ethnographical 
fact that any person spending a few days living in a Pehuenche community would easily 
notice. During my first weeks in the field, every time I explicitly declared my intention 
to live in a Pehuenche community, I was strongly advised to learn, as a prerequisite 
before doing so, how to greet people properly. This recommendation was surprising for 
me, and pushed me to begin thinking that the act of greeting was not conceived of as 
spontaneous speech, instrumental only in starting a conversation, but rather as a key 
ontological social transaction. In this sense, and s Course (2011) has convincingly 
argued, I quickly realized that among the Mapuche, to refuse a greeting is to refuse the 
existence of social relations and to refute the prerequisite to such relations: shared 
personhood. 
Once, when attending the funeral of a young Pehuenche woman, the commotion and the 
darkness of the occasion distracted me from noticing the presence of a good friend with 
whom I had spent the whole day. The day after, when w  met at work (we were building 
a house together), he was extremely offended becaus I had not seen him and greeted 
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him at the funeral. He asked me, in a very sad toneof voice, whether I really thought 
that he was not a proper person (Ch. Chengelan iñche? Sp. Am I not a person?). 38 What 
is important to stress regarding his statement is that it clearly points out one of the 
central arguments of my thesis: without mutual vision, a person can not be fully enacted, 
resulting in the non-establishment of proper kinship ties. In other words, a personal 
composition can only be fully activated though the eyes of others - relations are a 
prerequisite for personhood. This is a common idea among ethnographers of Amazonia, 
and has been extensively analyzed by Course (2011) in reference to the Mapuche. 
If we consider once again the myth this Chapter began with, it is clear that the act of 
greeting is understood as a key ontological operator between humans. In this myth, 
greeting someone who is not the one that should be acknowledged in that relation entails 
the risk of not being enacted as a real person and being excluded from the grounds of 
kinship ties between real people. This relational premise is present in daily life in Alto 
Bío Bío, and pervades every social interaction. 
As the Mapuche linguist Jaqueline Caniguan (2005) has argued, greetings are a social 
norm that can be expressed in more or less formal interactions. It is interesting to 
seriously consider Caniguan’s analysis of greetings and her particular focus on a specific 
word used to refer to the act of greeting. This word is pentukun, which has usually been 
translated with reference to the more structured conversational transaction two people 
have when meeting each other. However, what is striking for my argument is that the 
word pentukun itself is a semantic composition made of different ac ions or verbs: the 
verb ‘to see’ (Ch. pen) and the verb ‘to touch’ (Ch. tuku). Semantically speaking, it is the 
word itself makes no reference to acts of speech as such, but rather, it refers to sensorial 
experiences preceding language and rendering social rel tions possible. Alexander 
Surrales (2003) has made a similar point when examining the affective foundation that 
precedes speech, through the perceptual interaction of the Candoshi welcoming 
                                                
38 Course (2011) has also pointed out the same Mapuche concern about not being acknowledged as a 
person. Even if his ethnography was not carried out in Alto Bío Bío, the expression in Chedungun is 
exactly the same.   
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ceremony. His proposal to incorporate into the analysis the intensity of the affective 
dimension, and the perceptual interaction that governs social interactions in general, and 
welcoming rituals, in particular, seems to be highly relevant for my analysis of pentukun 
and its relevance to mutual vision. I suggest that mu ual vision also emphasizes the 
primacy of perception as a prerequisite for engaging in a proper social relation.  
However, what is even more interesting is that Caniguan (2005) conceives of seeing 
(Ch. pen) as a collective action that can also be translated s an encounter, as confirmed 
by the Mapuche dictionary by Augusta (1991). Within my argument, this very act of 
encountering necessarily entails not only physical contact between people, by shaking 
hands or hugging, but also the visual recognition of the participants. As far as greetings 
are concerned, I should render it explicit that I am not interested in analyzing the 
structure of a more formal pentukun (for this, see Caniguan 2005). Rather, I am 
surprised at how the relation between seeing and touching has been completely left out 
of analyses of pentukun and been obscured by the focus different scholars h ve put on 
spoken communication (Quidel Lincoleo 2001; Course 2007 & 2011), and will attempt 
to remedy this by emphasizing perceptual interactions rather than language transactions. 
However, it would not be enough to argue that seeing necessarily implies mutuality, as 
the latter is strongly related to the acknowledgment of the very status of a person by 
another person. I suggest that there are clear associ tions of continuity (if not fully 
apparent ones), between the actions of seeing and touching and the capacities of the 
soul-am and its corporeal support. To put it simply, a person needs to be seen by another 
person or personal composition in order to be a person, the very operator of this 
recognition being mutual vision. This act of seeing is not merely visual however, in the 
sense that it also implies touching – physical contact between corporeal supports. Put 
another way, if we consider personal compositions as objectified relations in the eyes of 
others, made up of a spiritual capacity and a material substance, it is not surprising that 
the very act of greeting involves actions concerning capacities of the soul-am (seeing) 
and the corporeal support (touching). 
Conversely, if we consider once again this Chapter’s introductory myth, it should not be 
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surprising that the very encounter between a soul-am and a soul-ngen does not include 
the bodily matter of Pehuenche people. This dislocati n, which as previously mentioned 
can occur while sleeping, can be understood as the dislocation of the visual human 
capacity beyond the realm or shared perspective of r al Pehuenche people. A plausible 
reading of the mythological story regarding the elements of personal composition might 
be as follows: what the human body (understood as a material assemblage of substances 
to be continually created through different collective practices) does is create a ground 
for relations among real Pehuenche people by excluding, under normal conditions, other 
expressions of humanity.39 In fact, a master (Ch. ngen) cannot be seen by the whole 
personal composition, but only by the visual spiritual capacity, the am, when it is 
dislocated from the very place of existence of the personal composition. In this sense, 
Surrales’ (2003) argument about cosmological communication is illuminating for my 
reflection on Pehuenche vision, as will become more apparent when examining visual 
practices and healing (Chapter Three):  
Communication between humans and not-humans is not always possible: it depends on 
the connections and the incompatibilities between the respective faculties of perception 
that the entities are believed to posses (language, will, vision, and so on) (Surrales 
2003:778-779).40 
Mutual vision between real people thus implies the very presence of personal 
compositions as particular assemblages, having as a re ult a particular human faculty of 
perception enacted by mutual vision among real people. Yet, what happens when mutual 
vision is not possible? What are the risks people face in situations where personal 
composition is highly dislocated, for instance, while sleeping? This is the question that 
will lead my reflections in the following Chapter. By exploring the importance of mutual 
vision in situations where this capacity is, in a wy, impossible, I hope to demonstrate 
that mutual vision and true people are in fact strongly related and communally 
constituted. 
                                                
39 For a similar point about the importance attached to the senses, and in particular to visual perception by 
the Jivaro, see Taylor (1993). For Taylor, visual perception is a key element in recognizing the nature of 
other entities (both human and non human) 




On Unilateral Vision and Nocturnal Visitors 
 
In order to clarify the complex relationship between personal composition and 
Pehuenche vision, in this Chapter I reflect on particular moments in which mutual vision 
between people is not possible. I explore a mode of vision I call unilateral vision, the 
paradigmatic cases of which are situations of nguken. This is a concept that Pehuenche 
people find impossible to translate into Spanish, but which refers to nocturnal 
experiences during which sleeping people are the targ t of unknown visitors’ predation. I 
suggest that while sleeping, a person is not able to be fully recognized as a person 
through mutual vision, since their soul-am, their capacity to see themselves as human, is 
dislocated from the personal composition (see Chapter One). However, my purpose is 
not to provide a conclusive definition of nguken, but rather to describe how the concept 
serves as an illustration of how unilateral visual perception, in situations of witchcraft, 
entails a particular form of cannibalistic consumption as well as predation.  
I begin this Chapter with an ethnographic exploratin of the ontological consequences of 
multicultural biomedical technologies in relation to nguken moments. I show how these 
moments are not susceptible to detection or treatment by biomedical technicians, as 
experiences of nguken are considered to simply be the product of sleep disor ers. I then 
go on to explore the reasons why according to Pehuenche people ‘doctors cannot see 
those illnesses.’ In this statement is embedded one of the central premises of this thesis: 
not only is the reality of witchcraft unrecognizable by the ‘cannons of evidence’ 
currently operating in the West (Siegel 2006:16), but also, the reality of Pehuenche 
vision is incommensurable when compared to multicultura  ontologies. Here I show how 
performances of vision, illness, and witchcraft arestrongly related, and in the final 
section of this Chapter, I demonstrate how unilateral vision in situations of nguken can 
be conceptualized as an act of antisocial visual perception with the destruction of 
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consanguinity as its goal. By building on the concept of equivocation proposed by 
Viveiros de Castro (2004), the following analysis ams to demonstrate that nguken 
situations, when considered not only from the point f view of the victim but also from 
that of the perpetrator, offer insight into the Pehu nche’s self-determined experience of 
the visible (Ch. pefal) and of the non-visible  (Ch. pefalay). 
 
2.1 Witchcraft and Modernity: a brief theoretical f ramework 
First, it must be rendered explicit that this is not a Chapter about witchcraft as such. Yet 
witchcraft is considered here because it is a useful tool with which to discuss the central 
topic of this thesis, namely, Pehuenche vision. However, in order to clarify my position 
on wider debates concerning witchcraft, I find it necessary to briefly situate my 
reflection within current anthropological trends about occult phenomena, which have 
been strongly dominated by ethnographers working in Africa. Both Peter Geschiere 
(1997) in his well-known book The Modernity of Witchcraft, as well as Comaroff and 
Comaroff’s (1990) studies on ‘occult economies’ have focused on analyzing witchcraft 
within the discourse of modernity in post-colonial contexts. Their analyses have 
attempted to demonstrate how discourses on witchcraft a e intertwined with modern 
transformations, global capitalism, democracy, statecr ft, and so on.41 Consequently, the 
global economy and the state appear as the most important settings to be considered by 
anthropologists interested in exploring occult phenomena.42 Furthermore, as Siegel 
(2006) has compellingly argued, these anthropologists have been less concerned with the 
violence of witchcraft than with its social functions. As Pedersen (2011:34) has already 
pointed out, these scholars reflect through  
‘symbolic-functionalist analytics in which witchcraft and shamanism are collective 
representations (…) and where occult phenomena is seen as symbolic language fulfilling certain 
                                                
41 In this line of reasoning, see, for example, Ashfort  2005; Comaroff & Comaroff 1999; Geschiere 1997; 
Meye & Pels 2003; Moore & Sanders 2001; West 2005 & 2007; Whitehead & Wright 2004. 
42 However, following Siegel (2006:16), witchcraft ‘is understandable only as the subjective beliefs and 
fears which the liberal state can regulate m rely in their external manifestations’ (emphasis added). For an 
analysis of state regulations of external manifestations of witchcraft, see Chapter Four.  
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purposes, such as 1-. the mystifying role of concealing hegemonic structures 2-. the counter-
hegemonic role of liberating oppressed subjects by exposing and subverting these structures, and 
3-. an assumed universal human existential need to make sense of the increasing uncertainties 
brought about by capitalism, globalization, neoliberal reform, and the postcolonial predicament 
as a whole.’43  
Following Siegel (2006) and Pedersen (2011), my goal here is to understand the local 
settings and considerations of some particular Pehuenche manifestations of witchcraft 
without necessarily having to refer to modern vectors, since I am convinced that 
‘witchcraft precedes the state and the international community, and it has to be first 
examined in its local settings because it is there that the ideas of witchcraft took shape’ 
(Siegel 2006:3). Thus, it might be worthwhile mentio ing from the outset that I am not 
interested in understanding the social functions of witchcraft among the Pehuenche. To 
do so would imply a Durkheimian tradition in anthropology characterized by its 
symbolic-functionalist analytics. Within this tradition (Evans Pritchard 1976; Marwick 
1965; Mary Douglas 1970) witchcraft and shamanism have been considered as part of a 
collective representation, possible because of the existence of an underlying reality: 
society. Witchcraft has been seen as an idiom of con li t representing those conflicts  
existing in the structure of society, which would have, as a result, social integration 
(Marwick 1965).44 By considering idioms of witchcraft in their local manifestations, and 
conceiving of them as part of a stable cosmological system pertaining to a local 
Pehuenche community, I will discuss the very specific and crucial role played by vision 
in general, and unilateral vision in particular, in the configuration of particular illnesses. 
In order to substantiate my argument about the relevance of local idioms of Pehuenche 
witchcraft beyond the influence of modernity, it is necessary to start by examining 
ethnographical material concerned with ‘modern’ multic tural state health practices 
dealing with occult phenomena (even if unwittingly). As a starting point for my 
argument, I will show how these practices are in no way concerned with visual 
transactions inherent to Pehuenche ontology. Thus, I hope to demonstrate that the 
remarkable situations occurring while Pehuenche people sleep should not necessarily be 
                                                
43 For studies of Mapuche witchcraft following this approach, see Brogard Kristensen 2007. 
44 For a recent critical analysis of this tradition, see Pedersen 2011 and Siegel 2006. 
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analyzed from within the discourse of modernity, but rather through seriously 
considering local Pehuenche ontologies. These particular situations are not amenable to 
negotiation and are related to how Pehuenche people ‘ref ct on the consequences of 
modernity’ (Ecks 2004:86).   
 
2.2 Equivocal Sleep disorders 
Alto Bío Bío, Southern Chile, February 2009: After another unbearably sleepless night, 
Pilar used a few eucalyptus branches to prepare a fi , and got ready to take the bus that 
connects the Pehuenche communities of the Queco Valley to the closest town, Ralco. On 
this morning, she had been invited along with twenty-five other Queco Valley women to 
a meeting for participants in the Ralco Family Health Centre's mental health programme. 
After arriving in Ralco, one of the centre's psychologists described to me the 
composition of the Pehuenche women gathered there: ‘We have a little bit of everything 
here, really a representative variety.’ I asked if she was referring to the variety of the 
women's backgrounds. ‘No,’ she said, ‘I'm referring to the variety of disorders, the 
different mental problems. We have some with anxiety disorder, some with depression, 
many borderline cases, and others.’ The meeting began with a short presentation in 
Spanish (not in the Pehuenche's native language of Chedungun). Ana, the psychologist, 
then gave a long introduction, explaining that the m eting would be useful because it 
was ‘therapeutic’ and would be complementary to the p armaceuticals the women were 
prescribed, which she claimed were ‘not enough’ on their own. She then went through 
several relaxation techniques, including massage and listening to music, all the while 
emphasising the importance of taking the medicine prescribed by the centre’s doctor. At 
the end of the meeting, Ana invited the women into her office to receive ‘the pills.’ She 
informed me afterward that she mostly gave out sleeping pills, since the majority of the 
women suffered from sleeping disorders. 
Pilar spent many nights in her ex-husband Pedro's hme in Pitril, where I was also 
staying. Pedro's home, as is typical for the Pehuenche, consisted of a sleeping area and a 
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cooking and dining area. Although the areas were close to one another, they were not 
physically connected. Pilar and I slept in rooms adjacent to the cooking and dining area, 
and Pedro slept in the actual sleeping area. It had been their shared home before their 
divorce, at which point Pilar went to live in a community near the Argentine border. The 
room where she now stayed shared a thin wooden wall with my own, which is how I 
learned that she always slept with the light on. I was also able to hear, whether I wanted 
to or not, her nocturnal movements. On many nights I awoke to the sound of her 
screams.  
As the months went by, it became a habit for us to eat breakfast together and then drink 
mate tea. We often discussed her nightmares from the previous night, which she always 
described with the words ‘as if they were nightmares.’ She explained in detail how evil 
spirits attacked her during the night, although it never was completely clear who exactly 
was visiting her: ‘Last night the evil one came, he was a great bearded snake!’ (Sp: 
Anoche llegó el malo, era un culebrón gigante con barba). Or, ‘Satan came to see me 
again last night. It was like a nightmare, so I left the light on all night and couldn't sleep.’ 
Or again, ‘The witranalwe came again, that one always bothers me. Now there is 
nowhere to live in peace.’ 
Pedro, Pilar's ex-husband, also had trouble sleeping: ‘That one,’ he told me, ‘always 
comes to bother me.’ When the visits became unbearale, he would go to one of his 
grown children's homes where he could finally get some sleep. Avoiding sleeping alone 
is clearly related to the possibility of defense against witchcraft attacks, which is 
guaranteed by another person’s presence. Indeed, several times I was told that if a person 
starts talking or moaning while sleeping, it is of vital urgency to wake them up. If a 
person moans while sleeping it is because he or she is b ing attacked. By waking the 
victim in the moment of the attack, according to myunderstanding, one produces a 
defensive situation in which the ina mongen is brought back to the personal composition 
of the sleeper through mutual vision. In other words, the sociality produced by kinship, 
and more precisely by mutual vision, allows the reconstruction of the personal 
composition. To recapture someone's capacities by means of reassembling the 
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convergence of his or her personal space allows this person to regain the capacity to see 
and to participate in the world of real people again.  
Pedro’s home was never empty since, he claimed, an evil spirit was always there lying in 
wait, ready to attack as soon as he fell sleep. Pedro's house was perceived as an 
attractive place for evil spirits, and on several occasions I was told that his house had 
been subjected to an evil spell several years previously. Pedro's son once stressed how 
evident it was for him that the house was loaded (Sp. cargada), since he remembered 
having ‘something like nightmares’ very often when he was younger, unmarried, and 
still living in that house. However, to stay prepared, Pedro developed a habit of sleeping 
with a torch and a knife at his side. Pedro, too, tld me of his nocturnal problems most 
mornings: ‘I didn't sleep well, it came to me again. I had to pray until it went away, and 
finally it did. Sometimes that thing waits until I am deep in sleep before it comes.’ 
One day in Pitril, Pilar unexpectedly told me that she had decided to stop taking the 
sleeping pills she had received from the health centre: ‘I had visits last night and I slept 
very poorly. The evil one came to see me again and I couldn't wake up because of those 
pills! He almost killed me this time, so I'll never take those pills again. It's too dangerous 
not to be able to wake up.’ 
Having briefly reported these ethnographical situatons, some plausible questions to be 
raised are the following: What is missing in the Chilean State’s pharmaceutical-based 
approach to health? How can we understand, in Pilar’s own terms, her fear of being 
murdered? And most importantly, how are Pehuenche visual capacities related to these 
nocturnal attacks? In a nutshell, I argue that for the Pehuenche dealing with these 
situations, the question is not so much how t  see like a state (Scott 1998), but rather 
how to deal with what the state cannot, in fact, make visible. Yet, before approaching 
these questions fully, I analyze the capabilities of the main technology used by health 
workers to treat Pilar’s nocturnal attacks: the sleeping pill.  
In biomedical terminology, sleeping pills such as benzodiazepines are psychotropic 
medicines that act upon the central nervous system and are frequently used to treat 
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‘anxiety disorders.’ Etymologically, ‘psychotropic’ is derived from the Greek words 
psyche, ‘mind,’ and tropein, ‘to change.’ Psychotropics, in short, work to change a 
patient's psyche; a psychotropic is a chemical agent that provokes temporary changes in 
perception, mood, state of consciousness and behaviour, producing sedative and 
anxiolytic effects. In Alto Bío Bío, psychotropics are part of the basic stock of generic 
medicines used in primary health care. The most frequently prescribed psychotropics are 
Diazepam, Midazolam and Clonazepam, and the primary group of patients prescribed 
psychotropics consists of women between the ages of twenty and sixty-four who are 
enrolled in the mental health programme. These women ar  diagnosed according to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), for the most part 
with ‘sleep disorders,’ ‘schizoid personality disorde s’ and ‘depressive disorders.’ In the 
remainder of this section, I examine in detail the relationship between psychotropic 
drugs and Pilar’s fear of being killed if she cannot wake up. In doing so, I intend to show 
that the central problem of this relationship is rooted in the fact that ‘sleep’ is a 
homonym that is being used unwittingly to refer to radically distinct experiences, 
experiences that are determined by incommensurable concepts of the body, personhood, 
sleeping, dreaming and seeing. As far as Pehuenche vision is concerned, this homonym 
points to different worlds that are perceived through different conceptualizations of what 
vision is all about. This disjuncture, however, which s characteristic of the interactions 
between the Pehuenche and the healthcare workers, is best understood through the work 
of the anthropologist Viveiros de Castro (2004a), who has revised the standard 
anthropological practice of ‘comparison’ using the concept of ‘equivocation.’45 
Viveiros de Castro's (2004b) understanding of equivocation is inspired by an anecdote 
Lévi-Strauss (1973) tells about the discovery of America. According to Lévi-Strauss, in 
the Greater Antilles ‘some years after the discovery of America, whilst the Spaniards 
were dispatching inquisitional commissions to investigate whether the natives had a soul 
                                                
45 For an exhaustive analysis of the concept of equivocation between state healthcare and the Yãnomãmi, 
see State Healthcare and the Yanomami by Kelly (2011). By considering an ethnographic account of the 
relation between health workers and Yãnomãmi people, Kelly shows how conceptual articulations of 
medical systems are subject to mutual misunderstandings. In this Chapter, the concept of equivocation will 
be used as a conceptual tool to discuss Pehuenche notions of vision.  
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or not, these very natives were drowning the white people they had captured in order to 
find out whether or not the corpses were subject to putrefaction’ (Lévi-Strauss 
1973:384).  For Viveiros de Castro, this anecdote describes the interaction of two types 
of ethnocentrism. While the Europeans doubted ‘whether other bodies had the same 
souls as they themselves (today we would call the soul ‘the mind,’ and the sixteenth-
century theological problem would now be the philosophical ‘problem of other minds’), 
Amerindian ethnocentrism on the other hand, consisted of doubting whether other souls 
had the same bodies’ (Viveiros de Castro 2004b:9). Each of these modes of investigating 
the nature of humanity enacts a distinct reality through its comparative practice (cf. Mol 
1999): the Spanish comparing ‘native’ bodies to their own ensouled bodies implies a 
reality in which bodies do or do not have souls, and the ‘natives’ comparing Spanish 
bodies to their own perishable ones enacts a reality in which bodies do or do not 
decompose. The collision and interaction of these ralities in turn produces not only new 
possibilities for existence (Haraway 1997; Law & Hass rd 1999; Mol 2002), but also 
what I call ‘ontological disorders’ (Bonelli, forthcoming).  When faced with the same or 
similar issues, different actors find different practical ways to reinforce their own 
definitions of society (Latour 2005). When the langua e games (Wittgenstein 1953) 
involved in understanding bodies are incommensurable, comparing these understandings 
is not simply difficult, but actually impossible.  
Viveiros de Castro (2004b) elaborates on Lévi-Strauss' Amerindian ethnographic 
anecdote in which different sorts of beings share a common culture but inhabit different 
natures: Amerindians, he argues, possess a ‘perspectivist anthropology’ (Viveiros de 
Castro 2004b:4) in which the distinct ways different beings have of viewing worlds are 
conceived of as constituting multiple ontologies. There are not, for Amerindians, many 
perspectives on a single world. Rather, the perspective of each type of being is a world 
in itself. Viveiros de Castro goes on to suggest tha academic anthropology can learn a 
methodology from the perspectival Amerindian world by recasting ‘comparison’ as 
‘equivocation.’ He conceives of the method of equivocation as a way of not only 
understanding the Amerindians’ trans-species communication —in which human and 
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non-human persons share a single culture— but also of demonstrating the equivocated 
territory of intercultural translation. Hence, ‘to translate is to presume that an 
equivocation always exists. It is to communicate by differences, instead of silencing the 
Other by presuming a univocality —an essential similarity— between what the Other 
and We are saying’ (Viveiros de Castro 2004b:10). Viveiros de Castro concludes that the 
opposite of the equivocal is not certitude or ‘rightness,’ but rather the univocal. The 
univocal, according to him, involves defining situations as if they only had one sense. 
On the other hand, univocity, the desire to force th  naming of the unnameable at any 
cost, is one of the elements that constitutes the problem of evil and is the beginning of 
disaster for Alain Badiou (2001). It is, furthermore, a constitutive element of the 
hegemonic ethical ideology that dominates relations between the state and Indigenous 
populations. This aspect of univocity will be explored in depth in Chapters Four and 
Five. For the moment, I only wish to emphasise that understanding comparison as 
equivocation can open relations to alterity when they appear to be closed by over-
determined interpretations of the Other. I argue in the following that the relations 
between the Pehuenche and healthcare workers are root d in equivocations that arise 
from their use of homonyms. This argument attends especially to the daily construction 
of a territory that is in ontological disorder, both in its ethical dimension, as seen in the 
main actors' actions, and in its aesthetic dimension, as seen in their imaginations.  
In Pilar's case, equivocation is at the heart of an interaction that generates controversy: 
she finds herself in a liminal ontological zone, in which the effects of the ‘medical thing’ 
alter a world, and not just a ‘mind.’ The drug requires a unitary body—material that is 
morphologically discrete—which it puts to sleep. Pilar, however, needs to wake up to 
survive. This tense situation demands that one takea position, a position I will call 
‘onto-ethical,’ in the face of the micropolitics per tuated by the drug. The onto-ethical 
position however, is taken within a reality that seems to be describable in Spanish only 
by analogy: what is it that prompts the ‘as if’ in the expression ‘as if they were 
nightmares’? How can this vernacular expression be seriously considered within 
Pehuenche conceptualizations of personhood and vision? In order to face these 
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questions, I will first analyze how a nightmare is conceptualized by the multicultural 
approach of the State.  
 
2.2.1 Multicultural nightmare  
The prescription of sleeping pills presumes that nightmares are the production of a 
cultural reality (the psyche) that can be healed by biochemical substances working on 
nature (the body). Dualist technology tout court, if you will. This dualist conception, 
moreover, is based on the unquestioned assumption that nightmares exist for everyone, 
and in the same way: all the different nightmares a person has arise out of their single 
‘unconscious,’ that cross-disciplinary explanatory principle (Bateson 1972) that has 
entered common sense. All beings that have similar bodies can suffer, and ‘see,’ 
nightmares. The nightmare is therefore conceived of as a mental capacity under the 
typical logic of multiculturalism, with its essential distinction between one nature and 
many cultures (Viveiros de Castro 1998) 
In general terms, multiculturalism's ontological dualism deals with questions of cultural 
difference by inquiring into the capabilities of the mind, on the assumption ‘that even 
our mental powers are ultimately generated by the brain (bodily part we have in 
common with others)’ (Holbraad & Willerslev 2007:329). Hence, a fundamental premise 
of multiculturalism is that bodies do the same things regardless of their location. Not 
only does each body sleep under the effect of benzodia epines, but each benzodiazepine 
will make anybody sleep. Nevertheless, Pilar's experience raises a question that 
challenges the logic of multiculturalist dualism: What does a body do and what are its 
capacities? (Deleuze & Guattari 1987). Or, to use idioms of vision, what does a body 
see, and what are its visual capacities?  
The function of benzodiazepines is a good example of how multicultural practices 
operate by assuming similarities between bodies. The pills are not only a symbolic 
extension of multiculturalism, but also an inventive technology of the same (cf. Wagner 
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1981). This technology enacts a purportedly universal naturalism that consists, following 
Descola (2005, 2006 & 2009), of a conception of similar physical realities (bodies) and 
dissimilar interior realities (nightmares). This universal naturalism appears, moreover, to 
be a hegemonic language game that considers the existence of a body (a physical 
continuity) and many cultures (a metaphysical discontinuity) as a fundamental premise 
of Western cosmology (Viveiros de Castro 2004a). It is therefore not surprising that the 
healthcare workers never question the meaning of a nightmare, nor do they inquire into 
what might be hidden in the analogical way of referring to them: ‘as if they were 
nightmares.’ Ethnography, which also has a psychotropic effect inasmuch as it alters the 
ethnographer's own conceptualisations, can help us understand how it is that a 
nightmare, in reality, has nothing to do with a nightmare in the multicultural sense. By 
focusing on Pehuenche visual capacities and visual nteractions, I hope to shed light on 
Pehuenche conceptualizations of nocturnal attacks in their own terms, which are 
incommensurable with the nature of multicultural nightmares.  
As previously mentioned, in Spanish it is very common to hear the following expression 
in the description of nguken moments: ‘as if they were nightmares.’ The words as if 
clearly indicate equivocation, since, to be precise, th y imply that these attacks are not 
nightmares at all. In this section, I will try to demonstrate that in the Pehuenche world, if 
we understand them as individual oneiric productions by an individual sleeping subject 
as the liberal Western psychoanalytical tradition has affirmed with vehemence, 
nightmares do not exist. Even if it would be absurd to deny that the ‘West’ is also 
marked by controversies about the definition of nightmares, it is important to keep in 
mind that the perspectival framework used in this tesis aims to question hegemonic 
Western trends in thinking. Having said this, the hegemonic naturalist approach within 
the psychoanalytical tradition has been strongly marked by the ever-lasting significance 
given to naturalism as a point of departure for dream analysis (see Lansky 1992). 
Attempts at studying nightmares within Mapuche cosmlogy (Nakashima Degarrod  
1990a, 1990b, 1998), based on the significant importance nightmares have for natives 
(as pointed out by classic Mapuche literature such as Farón 1964 and Titiev 1951), have 
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proceeded with the assumption that dreams (Ch. peuma) are a universal reality 
determined by cultural beliefs. More specifically, previous literature on Mapuche dreams 
has homologized nightmares with the native idiom ‘bad dreams’ (Ch. weda pewman), 
while nguken has been translated as night panics (Nakashima Degarrod 1986). Both of 
these concepts have been understood as premonitions of illness. However, nguken 
experiences in particular have as of yet not been seriously considered as part of real 
witches’ attacks. The way I conceptualize of nguken here is very different from 
Nakashima Degarrod's work. Due to the highly problematic dilemmas and the intense 
suffering nguken experiences entail for Pehuenche people, I focus on the relational 
ontological aspects of these situations for the victim, rather than simply framing them, as 
Nakashima Degarrod does, as the victim's individual night panics (Nakashima Degarrod 
1986). As many have told me, nguken are not nightmares, but are as nightmares. My 
own analysis considers nightmares to be constituents of he Pehuenche world, and not 
only sub-products of a supposed cultural belief based on a universal nature, as is 
characteristic of multicultural reflections (see Chapters Four and Five). However the 
similarity that allows this analogy to be made is based upon shared aspects of 
‘nightmares’ and ‘as nightmares.’ Specifically, they are both situations that produce 
unwanted effects and imply images or appearances whose nature cannot be accurately 
determined. This fact renders it impossible to speak clearly about them.  
 Every night my friends were bothered (Sp. molestados) by the ‘thing’ (Sp. la cuestión) 
while they were sleeping. But just as ‘nightmares’ are not ‘nightmares’ in the Pehuenche 
world, neither is Pehuenche sleeping equivalent to he Western biomedical idea of 
sleeping as an asocial activity that the organic body (nature) carries out while the mind 
(culture) imagines and dreams. At this point, it is necessary to reformulate the tradition 
of the comparative analysis of dreams (Tedlock 1987) as an analysis of the equivocation 
of sleeping. This analytical exercise must take ethnographical evidence seriously as 
testimony to a distinctive reality, and not merely as the disclosure of an epistemological 
variation or of a ‘cultural belief in nightmares as if they were actions of evil spirits’ 
(Nakashima Degarrod 1990:192, emphasis added). Rather, as Argyrou (2002) argues, it 
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is anthropology's own nightmare that reduces realiti s (ontologies) to beliefs 
(epistemologies), and explains differences through similarities. Having said this, what 
kind of ontological situations is the word ‘nightmare’ referring to?  
 
2.3 Nguken as unilateral vision 
In the following section, I will provide further evidence for my conceptualization of 
nguken as attacks characterized by wicked unilateral vision. In order to do so, I will 
describe separately the performances that a person carries out while nguken occurs, on 
the one hand, and the performances carried out by evil spirits on the other. I will sketch 
an outline of this (so-called) ‘encounter,’ in order to better understand the ontological 
problem that a victim of witchcraft has to deal with when experiencing nguken.  
As I hope to demonstrate in this section, the strong link between witchcraft, illness and 
vision in Alto Bío Bío is an ethnographic fact. I have implicitly argued that what is 
dismissed by the multicultural approach to nightmares is the relations existing between 
visible and invisible beings within the Pehuenche world. Under the lens of the sleeping 
pills action, nightmares appear as individual actions executed by a liberal subject (see 
Chapter One). Conversely, within Pehuenche ontology, the relations configuring 
nocturnal attacks entail complex visual configurations, which will be discussed below.     
Generally speaking, in Alto Bío Bío it is extremely common to hear conversations about 
people suffering from illnesses (Ch. kutran) related to witchcraft (Sp. males Ch. 
kalkutun). The word kutran is usually translated as ‘illness’ (Sp. enfermedad), but it also 
means ‘pain.’ However, in some communities like Pitril, where Chedungun is no longer 
spoken daily (especially by the younger generations) a d where only some native words 
are commonly used, the Spanish word for ‘illness’ (Sp. enfermedad) is used to refer to 
health problems not involving witchcraft performances. One of the people I spent 
several months living with used to say that his problem ‘was not an illness’ (Sp. no es 
enfermedad), but was in fact witchcraft (Sp. mal). During the day, he was often tired and 
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suffered from headaches: ‘I walk as if I had been made drunk,’ he said, because evil 
spirits had visited and weakened him by sucking his bloodwhile he was sleeping. 46   As I 
will show below, this sucking action is inextricably linked to the visual capacities of the 
unwanted visitor. For the moment, I will focus my reflection upon the Pehuenche visual 
capacities and incapacities involved in evil nocturnal visitations (Ch. nguken) caused by 
witchcraft. It must be noted that this discussion will not address witchcraft actions 
executed through the use of poisons and food (Ch. ilel) or objects (Ch. unfitun), but will 
only make reference to nocturnal attacks (Ch. nguken). In order to understand the 
epistemology of nguken experiences, I will try to avoid structuring my reflection through 
the classification and defining of local illness nosologies, as many scholars have already 
done (Grebe 1975; Oyarce 1988 & 1989; Bacigalupo 2007 for example). Thinking 
through rigid and descriptive classificatory logics would be forcing a particular 
understanding of the complex and vague way illnesses ar  experienced daily, and the 
ways in which these experiences are conceptualized by the Pehuenche. However, if 
forced to classified nguken situations within the categories of previous scholars, I would 
have to consider them to be evil illnesses (Ch. weya kutran): illnesses implying an 
intentionality on the part of those who provoke them.   
In daily life, the most common expressions used to talk about evil illnesses refer to the 
illnesses themselves as active beings. ‘The illness walks around’ (Sp. anda la Ch. 
kutran), for example, is a very common expression in Alto Bí  Bío, used to refer to the 
presence of an illness and the vigilance required to avoid being afflicted with it. 
Evidently, what is around (the illness) has a threatening character for people, since they 
are susceptible to falling victim to such illnesses. This threat, on the other hand, is 
always related to the (absent) presence of a witch. The act of casting witchcraft upon 
another person is described in the vernacular as ‘to do a job’ (Sp. hacer un trabajo), a 
sentence used to refer to both the practices of witches and the practices of those who 
heal. Broadly speaking, witches are characterized by their negative personal 
intentionality (Ch. weya rakiduam) towards another person. This job, or wicked activity, 
                                                
46 For a similar point concerning the Piaroa, see Overing 1988. For the Piaroa, ‘disease is always 
considered to be a process of being eaten’ (Overing 1983-84: 342). 
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always requires the presence of a witch (Ch. kalku), a word that means different things 
in different situations: a person who has the capacity to do witchcraft is a kalku, the 
device or instrument that this person uses to ‘do the job’ is a kalku, and the spiritual 
beings related to the witch are also kalku.47     
In the vernacular, witches are considered to be people (Ch. che), but not true people (Ch. 
reche). Accordingly, the dictionary of Augusta (1916) defin s reche as ‘any individual 
that is not kalku,’ a definition that my ethnography strongly corroborates in certain ways. 
The conceptualization of witches as not being real people can be found among other 
Indigenous peoples in South America. For example, Ewart (2008) has argued that 
witches ‘do not subscribe to the productive and social life characteristic of real people as 
embodied by the Panará values of social availability and energy for collective endeavors’ 
(Ibid. p.517). In daily life, the topic of who is and is not a witch is often a subject of late 
night conversation and debate, but it is never declar d with accuracy who is indeed a 
witch. Moreover, people speak about alleged witches with extreme caution, and convey 
a desire to avoid excessive discussion of this topic. Indeed, when I spoke about this topic 
with friends I was frequently asked to be quiet or was offered a whispered warning that I 
should not speak about these things aloud because the kalku could be ‘listening and 
observing somewhere around.’  When compared to interactions of mutual vision (as 
discussed in Chapter One), the presence of a witch is aracterized by unilateral vision. 
They can see but not be seen, they can listen but not be heard. As I hope to demonstrate, 
this unilateral vision inherent to the Pehuenche conceptualization of witches is 
crystallized in nguken situations.   
It is necessary to emphasize that in daily life, witches always remain hidden. In a sense, 
they are always outside the realm of the visible (kin) that is shared by real people. For 
example, one of my friends had a mother-in-law whom many of my acquaintances 
suspected was a witch. This man had a very difficult relationship with tha  woman, yet, 
                                                
47 For historical accounts of kalku within Mapuche literature, see Guevara 1908 and Latcham 1924. For 
other ethnographies in South America concerning dark shamanism and the moral ambiguity of 
shamans/witches, see Whitehead & Wright 2004. For an analysis of this ambiguity among the Mapuche 
people, see also Bacigalupo 2001 and 2007.  
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he was forced to visit her very often. Many friends would express curiosity about these 
visits, and would frequently ask him if he ‘had seen something.’ This man never noticed 
anything that would corroborate the hypothesis thathis mother-in-law was in fact a 
witch however. Thus, the capacity to hide and to be outside of the normal Pehuenche 
range of sight seems to be a feature of the powers of those who undertake witchcraft.48 
In fact, my old friend Pedro told me that the old peo le used to say that witches ‘hide the 
kalku in the vagina’ (Sp. se escondian los kalku en la zorra). Here, he was implying that 
the witch's vagina was an inaccessible place where the kalku could be concealed and 
made invisible.49  Victims of witchcraft are therefore always victims of a type of 
presence incapable of being clearly defined or detect d, and characterized by both the 
capacity for continuous transformation (discussed further below), and unilateral vision. 
Within the Pehuenche world, knowledge of witchcraft is always incomplete and 
impossible, and appears as a difference that does nt generate any difference (Bateson 
1972). This is the case with nguken experiences when analyzed from the victim’s point 
of view, to which I now turn. Amongst different moments related to contingent visual 
capacities and incapacities, sleeping is the privileged moment for an attack by a 
nocturnal visitor. In order to understand how this is possible, I would like to examine 
both the visual symptoms a person develops when they ar  the target of nocturnal 
attacks, as well as the contingent visual capacities nherent to a sleeper. In a way, the 
former can be understood through the latter.  
 
 2.3.1 Symptoms: sick from visions   
What are the symptoms experienced by victims of nguken? What problems and 
dilemmas do nguken create for Pehuenche people? People from Alto Bío Bío typically 
state that victims of nocturnal witchcraft ‘see visions’ (Sp. la gente ve visiones). 
                                                
48 For a similar point among Panará witches, see Ewart 2008. 
49 I am aware of the possible gender-based criticisms this statement might trigger in the reader. However, I 
am using this data only because of its relevance for my argument concerning vision, visibility and 
invisibility. For gender studies about the Mapuche, see Bacigalupo 2007. 
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‘Visions’ refers to the experience of seeing something that cannot be clearly perceived 
and is therefore difficult to define. In other words, for victims of witchcraft, ‘seeing 
visions’ is a daily experience during which they see things that should not be seen under 
normal circumstances, and are not completely identifiable. ‘Seeing visions’ is thus a 
literally unspeakable situation characterized by the presence of shapeless visitors. Thus, 
when people speak about their experiences of falling v ctim to a night visitor, they use 
rather vague language.50 Wicked visitors are referred to with many vague Spanish words 
such as: 
thing:  Sp. cosa. e.g. ‘Yesterday that thing came to see me once again.’ 
bug: Sp. bicho e.g. ‘Last night the bug was around.’ 
that one: Sp. ese. e.g. ‘Again that one appeared, bothering.’ 
appearance: Sp. apariencia. e.g. ‘That appearance was around in the night, one 
believes that it is something but it never really is as it appears.’ 
silly thing:  Sp. lesera. e.g. ‘I don't like that silly thing that comes to see me.’ 
It is evident that none of these nouns clearly specifies an unambiguous perception of the 
identity of the wicked visitor. Thus, these beings are frequently labeled as ‘wicked 
spirits’ (Sp. espíritus malos), an expression that does not provide any details about what 
these wicked spirits really are.51 Moreover, the expression ‘wicked spirits’ is also 
ambiguous, as it is used to designate both kalkutun beings related to witches, as well as 
beings that have no relation to the wicked will of a third person (see Chapter Three on 
wekuve). I argue that this descriptive difficulty is related to the special transformational 
power of nocturnal visitors on the one hand, and the particular states a person is in while 
sleeping on the other. The particular contingent state of the personal composition while 
sleeping places victims of kalkutun in an extremely vulnerable state in which the enemy 
is never known. To be more precise, the enemy is not even an enemy, since, as Siegel 
                                                
50 For a general review of similar issues in South America, see Whitehead & Wright 2004. 
51 For a similar point related to the shamanic death of Kanaima in the Caribbean, see contributions by 
Colson and Whitehead, in Rival &Whitehead 2001. 
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(2006) has convincingly argued, the fear people have of witches is directed against 
something that cannot be truly named and remains outside the possibility of recognition:  
The witch is the opposite of an enemy because the enemy is always an equivalent: 
someone recognizable who offers the possibility of being conquered. The witch, 
however, asserts a non-dialectical possibility, in effect a power of discourse that is 
outside the control of even the person who is accused (Siegel 2006:217). 
Having said this, I can now enunciate one of the key points of my argument: The visitor 
(which technically should not be considered a true en my) is powerful because he is 
able to unilaterally see his victim. Evidence of this from Spanish are sentences such as 
‘Yesterday that thing came to see me,’ or ‘I don't like that silly thing that comes to see 
me.’ In Chedungun, the most common expression is witrangemen (witra: visitor; nge: 
being; me: going and coming back) or pepan (pe: seeing; pa: here). According to one of 
my friends there are many ways to refer to visitations, and most of them are formed with 
the verb ‘to see’ (Ch. pe). In other words, the nguken experience is always a situation 
that implies different actors with different visual capacities and incapacities: whereas the 
visitor is able to see its victim, the victim is not able to clearly see his or her visitor. The 
victim then experiences visual symptoms, becoming, in fact, sick from visions. This kind 
of visual asymmetry gives the visitor a distinct adv ntage, and places the victim in the 
position of having to deal with beings of an uncertain ontological state (Course 2011). In 
this way, the nocturnal visitor, in the victim's exp rience, is nothing other than an 
appearance; that is to say, something that is not as it appears.52 Thus, unilateral vision is 
an integral component of nocturnal visitations, andI would argue is the main source of 
the kalku’s destructive power. However, this unilateral vision is only possible because 
the victim is not fully capable, given the dislocated nature of his or her personal 
composition while sleeping, of really seeing who the visitor is.  
As described in Chapter One, from the Pehuenche perspective, when someone goes to 
sleep, their ina mongen goes out ‘to travel around its life.’ This dislocation suggests that 
sleep is a particular situation in which a person's physical body is left in solitude to some 
                                                
52 This reminds me of the deceptive nature of appearances in Amazonia, where, as argued by Riviere 
(1994), what you see is not necessarily what you get, due to the ‘highly transformational world’ in whic  
Amerindian people take part.  
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extent. Part of the person is exposed as a moment of organism, as Nancy (2008) puts it. 
On the other hand, when the am exits the personal composition, the püllü remains to 
watch out for the sleeper. In fact, one can conceive of the relationship between the püllü 
and the earth—in some parts of southern Chile, these words are even interchangeable—
as that which enables the püllü to remain in the domestic space and care for the sleeper 
while the am goes out on its own, sometimes to places far beyond its community. This 
raises the following question: What is it that thepüllü is taking care of, considering that 
‘oneself’ is somewhere else? Or better still, to put it in a way that does not betray the 
performances involving evil spirits and sleeping persons: exactly which part of the 
personal composition is prey to evil spirits? 
During sleep, a person comes closest to a state of pure materiality, to being a site rather 
than a place (see Chapter One and Nancy 2008): the sleeping person appears as a site, 
given the maximum dislocation of his or her ina mongen in the space of existence. This 
dislocation of the constituents of the personal comp sition, understood in a more 
Amerindian jargon as the personal conjunction of sel /other or consanguine/affine 
(Viveiros de Castro 2001), reaches its maximum intensi y during sleep. As a result, the 
corporeal support of the sleeper emerges as the person, but in their de-affinalized 
version: while sleeping, a stage of dislocated sociability is produced. At the time when 
the visitor arrives, the person inhabits this dislocation. This can also be described as an 
impersonal moment, or at least a stage where the personal composition reaches its 
maximum fragmentation: the site of the corporeal support of the sleeper is de-
personalised. Put differently, the person is truly exposed while s eeping, due to his or her 
condition as a mere organism. Evidently, as I will show, this condition is conducive to
antisocial interactions. 
What is being taken care of by the püllü is the person, but characterized by a particular 
incapacity: a visual-social incapacity. This is due to the dislocation of the capacity to see 
oneself as human, a capacity inherent to the ina mongen. The püllü is thus taking care of 
a personal decomposition, a blind version of the personal composition dislocated from 
the capacity to be a reflexive human. The person's con tant tendency to escape from the 
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centre, (if we admit (mistakenly) that he or she can even have something like a centre) - 
the am actually ‘departs’ from a multiple composition - means that, while the person is 
asleep, his or her ina mongen looks to establish social relationships somewhere els . In 
this sense, the ina mongen can be understood as an ‘insomniac social capacity’ which 
temporarily flees from the ‘centre’ of personal singularity. However, in order to be able 
to truly understand why nocturnal attacks are dangerous, it is also useful to concentrate 
on the type of performance an evil spirit carries out when visiting its victim. 
 
2.4 Antisocial visual perception 
It must be stressed that for the victim, the existence of evil spirits manifests as a 
peculiarly visual experience: people ‘see visions’ (Sp. la gente ve visiones), or more 
precisely, they ‘see appearances’ (Sp. ven solo apariencias). This act of (not) seeing 
reinforces the victims’ awareness that they will not be able to fully see the evil spirit that 
lurks behind a given appearance or manifestation. Furthermore, as if this was not 
enough, the victim also finds himself unable to defend himself from these 
manifestations. Indeed, such manifestations cannot be counter-attacked physically: ‘If I 
could, I would hit them with a stick,’ Pedro told me one night, rendering explicit the fact 
that not being able to do so was an important part of his problem as a victim.  
The experiences of witchcraft victims (particularly in instances of nguken) involve the 
impossibility of seeing beyond the immediate appearances of these evil spirits, which 
ultimately leads to the impossibility of speaking clearly about them. I suggest that the 
lack of mutual vision leads to the impossibility of constructing a social relation. Nguken 
experiences are thus not particularly enlightening. Following Ecks (2010) and his 
reflection on Kant's famous work What the Enlightenment is? (1784 [1996]), it can be 
said that these experiences do not respect the Kantian definition of the enlightened 
capacity to reflect, through thoughts and reasonable words, on anything that is 
susceptible to being seen. Rather, I suggest that nguken moments are (in opposition to 
Kant) an experience of impossible enlightenment, due in part to the characteristics of 
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what is being (un)observed. Nguken implies the inability to talk clearly about what one 
has ‘seen without really seeing,’ precisely because vi ion, as an ‘affective dimension’ 
(Surrales 2000 & 2003), is a prerequisite for language. Moreover, following Siegel 
(2006) and his reflections on Kant, nguken experiences cannot even be considered 
experiences of the sublime: 
In nature exists an objective quality which we cannot cognize (…). Faced with such, we 
feel overcome (…) the sublime is something that we know in retrospect. After the event 
we see what we went through using ours powers of memory and analysis. But suppose 
that we had not recovered such abilities. We would then suspect, rather than know, that 
something was affecting us (Siegel 2006:23-24, emphasis added).  
The very non-accountability of nguken experiences, as events dominated by a fear of the 
uncanny, would not have been a real possibility for Kant. A rather different way to frame 
these issues would be to follow Lévi-Strauss' (1963) illuminations about witchcraft. In a 
general sense, he argues that there is nothing that esc pes signification, coherence being 
the most important thing in social life. Lévi-Strauss claims that the expression of truth 
(and therefore, the achievement of coherence) is more important than justice. For the 
Pehuenche, as I have tried to demonstrate, this is not the case, since coherence can never 
be achieved. 
One day my friend Pedro seemed to lose patience with my persistent enquiries about his 
nocturnal aggressors. He told me emphatically: 
One cannot see that thing. You just can see as in dreams, nothing more, but that one is 
always bothering me. Since there are always bad people, I cannot know who it is, 
nobody can. I do not know what it is. There are some names, antümalen… three names, 
the wekuve, the antümalen and the chonchon.    
In many ways, this was the most enlightening comment that Pedro had made about his 
encounters with wicked spirits. However, this comment was also his clearest request for 
me to cease questioning him on the matter. In that moment, I understood that the names 
Pedro used to refer to evil spirits were not of primary importance. After all, the identity 
of these spirits (even if ‘identity’ is not the best word to use here) was never clear nor 
distinct. As mythological beings, evil spirits are characterized by their self-difference, 
rather than their self-identity (Viveiros de Castro 2007). The ambiguous terms Pedro 
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used to refer to these spirits (in opposition to the clear and distinct Descartes expression) 
challenged my professional tendency to categorize clearly. For him, chon chon, 
antümalen, and wekuve were nothing more than names used to designate an unk own 
source of evil. 53 These names demonstrated an attempt to shed light on something that 
cannot be fully illuminated, since xperiences with evil spirits cannot be captured in 
words. This kind of speech has been conceptualized by Siegel (2006:8) as an attempt to 
‘domesticate the pure gift,’ witchcraft experiences being a ‘pure gift, which is not 
considered even as a gift and therefore cannot be reciprocated since one cannot account 
for its origins’ (Ibid. p.6). That is, the evil spirits cannot be subjected and are always 
moving through a non-determined space, which is problematic when thought of from a 
liberal logic based on self-identity (see Chapter One). In fact, even when an evil spirit 
manifests itself, this manifestation is never fixed or definitive and can instead be 
repeatedly transformed. An evangelical Pehuenche friend once told me that evil spirits 
‘can turn themselves into cats, dogs, chickens, roosters, people, male goats… thousands 
of things. The bad spirit is art. Those birds are artifact, they are art.’ 
Ineke Smeets (1989) has provided us with some linguistic evidence from Chedungun 
that I would like to report here, since it allows one to grasp the incommensurability of 
these grammatical constructions when translated into Englishas well as the inherently 
transformational capacity of these evil visitors.54  In the native language, the sentence 
‘they turn themselves into cats, or dogs, or people’ can be uttered as narkiluwkiyngün 
‘they turn themselves into cats,’ trewaluwkiyngün ‘they turn themselves into dogs’ or 
cheluwkiyngün ‘they turn themselves into people’ (Smeets 1989:546). In Mapudungun, 
these transformative expressions are usually uttered with the particular suffix -uw. This 
suffix is referred to by Smeets as a reflexive reciprocal suffix (Ibid.). Having said that, 
and analyzing these grammatical aspect analogically (Course 2010), I would add that 
evil spirits have the deceitful, reflexive, and inherent capacity to transform themselves 
                                                
53 I am not concerned here with providing ethnographic descriptions of these entities and the possible 
narratives surrounding them. This has been done extnsively by Waag 1982 and Citarella et al. 2000. 
Regarding wekuve and its relation to potential affinity, see Chapter Th ee. 
54 Regarding the limits and uses of grammar in comparative ethnographical writing, see Course 2010. 
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into different entities precisely because they are constitutively composed of self-
difference rather than self-identity. In the words of one of my hosts ‘the evil spirit 
visitors (Ch. witranalwe) who arrive at my body (Sp. que llegan a mi cuerpo) can come 
in any form - as snakes, toads, or any other species - but it is always an appearance that 
one cannot see, and it is not known who is really there.’  
The word ‘relationship’ is not the most appropriate to describe moments of maximum 
proximity between evil spirits and kalkutun victims in nguken situations. Neither is the 
word ‘encounter.’ Both words connote social interactions, but what characterizes the 
attacks by wicked spirits against their victims is, in my opinion, their violent anti-social 
quality.55 The word used most often by Pehuenche people to refer to these situations is 
the word ‘visitors,’ which refers to those who come close to the domestic space ‘to see’ 
people. As Alexander Surrales (2003:779) has already pointed out, many Amerindian 
societies do not perceive their environment as a space of peace and quiet, since ‘hostility 
between local groups is endemic, settlements are isolated, and conditions of transport 
within the tropical forest are difficult’. In these contexts, visits are rare, so people seek to 
overcome their geographical isolation ‘through schemes of formal visitations between 
households settlements’ (Surrales 2003:779). Visitors, therefore, have to be received 
properly to avoid latent hostility.  
Doubts about the exact nature of the strangers is the primary concern, for the notion of 
humanity is precarious from an ‘animist’ perspective. As the visitors come from deep 
within the forest where ‘non-humans’ dwell, it is necessary to ensure their ontological 
status (Ibid. p.784).  
In Alto Bío Bío, this is also the case. People livein fairly isolated areas, and schemes of 
formal visitations are very common.  In nguken situations, however, these visitors are 
not welcome. 
In sum, so far I have described the experiences of victims of kalkutun in the context of 
nguken as ones in which the victim sees temporary and superficial manifestations of 
beings that cannot be readily defined and are capable of transformation. The visual 
                                                
55 For an exhaustive analysis of the violence of witchcraft (rather than its functioning), see Siegel 2006. 
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limitations of the victim are due in part to the deceitful, reflexive, and inherent capacity 
of unknown visitors to transform themselves into different entities, but also to the 
particular states of sleepers, who are highly exposed and not fully activated (through 
mutual vision) as real people.   
 
2.4.1 Motivation for nguken: eating blood  
The evil spirit visits its victim every time he or she is sleeping. This is not a coincidence, 
but rather an opportunity for attackers. In fact, it is the consequence of a deliberate 
decision on the part of the evil spirit and his or her witch owner. Several times Pedro 
told me that the ‘thing’ was ‘waiting’ until he was sound asleep to visit him:  
Witches tell their evil spirits that they have to g kill that particular person, to weaken 
him, to beat him at night when he is in bed. So the evil spirit waits to take advantage.  
It is also significant that evil spirits attack when the person is in a horizontal position, 
which is a good opportunity for an attack by antisoc al beings. Specifically, the person 
does not have their feet on the earth, a connection that in Alto Bío Bío is very important. 
For instance, new constructions made of cement are problematic for the Pehuenche 
people in that the artificial structures interfere with the direct contact between a person 
and the earth-soil. Furthermore, as we have seen, sl eping is also a time when the am 
leaves its corporeal support. At that time, evil sprits can ‘take advantage,’ as my friend 
told me, of the particular situation during which the personal composition is not fully 
attained. In this sense, following Fausto’s (2007) conceptualizations about cannibalism, 
nguken experiences can be thought of as situations of opportunistic cannibalism.56 
During sleep, the ina mongen, that is, life in the form of a person with his or her full 
reflexive human capacities awakened, is absent. It is somewhere else. That is the reason 
                                                
56 Fausto (2007) describes the indispensable Indigenous eating practices needed for de-subjectivizing prey 
in a world inhabited by humans and non-humans, where predation is the more productive relational 
schema. These are performed through a series of shamanic and culinary operations, in order to avoid 
cannibalism: the game animal (which is considered to be human) needs to be produced as food and ‘to be 
reduced to the condition of an inert object’ (Fausto 2007:503). Conversely, nguken experiences do not 
require any work by evil spirits, other than waiting for the best moment to attack and eat sleeping persons. 
They are an ontological opportunity, rather than the result of a process.  
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why the sleeping person is, in a way, unfolded, dislocated, and unable to establish social 
relationships. In other words, while sleeping the human capacity is away from its 
corporeal residence and a person is in a state of natural de-subjectivation. This is surely 
the reason why the püllü has to be devoted to taking care of the body during nocturnal 
states (see Chapter One). While sleeping, people are in a temporary stage of personal 
decomposition (a moment when the distinction between physics and metaphysics is 
meaningful). At this time, the person is in an antisocial stage, which presents an 
opportunity for evil spirits to attack. Before being able to do so however, the evil spirits 
have to face the püllü, the caretaker spirit.  
That thing waits until I am deeply asleep, then it frightens my spirit, and then the truth 
is, there is nothing one can do against him, that it is the problem. If I could, I would 
grab him, I’d grab him and beat him with a stick.57 
This is what Pedro told me one day, scared and worried before going to bed. Taking into 
account what has been discussed up to this point, it is evident or at least reasonable to 
think that what the evil spirit attacks is the body, the corporeal support. It is the body of 
a person, detached from his or her human capacity to engage in social life, the am, and 
also unbound from its caretaker spirit (‘then it frightens my spirit’), the püllü. Evil spirits 
can then attack this un-composed, or fragmented person. In other words, what the ‘thing’ 
does is take advantage of one of the few, or perhaps the only situation during which the 
Pehuenche person reaches a state of maximum vulnerability. This means that the evil 
spirit is able to take advantage of a situation in which the Pehuenche person is unfolded 
and exposes itself fully as prey. Pedro told me several times that the evil spirit ‘arrived at 
his body’: 
The evil spirit arrives at the body and I don't know how it enters. I don't understand how 
it enters if my body is all closed, if the head is all closed, how does it enter?58  
                                                
57 In other places on the continent, predation against other humans through sorcery has been conceived of 
as hunting (Chaumeil 1983) or as invisible warfare (Albert 1985). 
58 The use of the word cuerpo, ‘body,’ as a space the evil spirit can get into, c incides with the definition 
of kalül given by Augusta (1916) Kalül is the body, or the stomach. Augusta also states that the expression 
kalülelkukalen is a shamanistic expression to indicate that some spirit is ‘in’ the body of the victim. On the 
other hand, Ibacache (2002) uses the word kalül as a literal translation of the physical body, while 
Huirimilla (2007) translates it as the physical body susceptible to feeling the erotic pleasures of flesh.  
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During our long conversations, Pedro also referred to his body as a body in which the 
am was absent, because he understands that the m exits the personal composition while 
he sleeps at night. Once the evil spirits have arrived however, what do they do? How are 
their attacks finally executed? 
Taking into account the previously-stated argument about unilateral vision performed by 
evil spirits against their sleeping victims, it might be plausible now to conceptualize 
nocturnal attacks as cannibalistic moments, since people's blood is in fact eaten. These 
attacks are performed through what I will provisionally call anti-greetings. In Chapter 
One I rendered explicit the importance of mutual vision and greetings in order for a 
person to be activated as a real person. I also pointed out the relevance of seeing and 
touching as key elements required for the establishment of a social relation. Yet, 
throughout the current Chapter I have described how t ese affective capabilities emerge 
as an impossibility for sleepers: they cannot see nor touch their visitors. They are, in a 
way, forced to take part in a visitation where real greetings are impossible, and where 
any sort of reciprocal exchange with the visitor can never take place. In this sense, and 
following Siegel (2006), when nguken experiences are considered from within gift 
exchange logics, the very possibility of exchange never takes place: ‘This would be the 
indescribable experience of the pure gift, the non-event which, though it never happens, 
leaves a trace’ (Siegel 2006:25). On the other hand, these visits are responses to a 
destructive will, which is why I refer to them as wicked unilateral visits, or anti-
greetings. Sleepers are thus in the ‘face of the pur gift’ (Ibid. p.26). Yet, from the point 
of view of the visitor, nguken can be conceptualized as actions of cannibal consumption, 
blood being the focus of attention.  
Broadly speaking, blood (Ch. mollbüm) seems to be a crucial element in defining the 
moral qualities of a Pehuenche person, and it is also the main target of the attacks by evil 
spirits. A Pehuenche person can be defined by others as having either weak-bad blood 
(Ch. weya mollbün) or good-strong blood (Ch. kvme mollbüm). One of my friends once 
told me that  
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Those who have bad thoughts or evil thoughts and want to fight and kill someone, that is 
the evil, that’s bad blood (Ch. weya mollbün), that is arrogant blood. 
On the contrary, good blood (Ch. küme mollbüm) refers to a humble attitude, the attitude 
of a person who does not look down on people. Good bl od is also often used as 
synonym for good thinking (Ch. küme rakiduam). As many people told me, one can 
think properly precisely ‘because one has good blood.’ I suggest that witches’ and evil 
spirits’ motivation is to seize and to destroy the good human intentionality of the victim 
through the visual predatory dynamics I have called unilateral vision. This was fully 
apparent for me the day a relative of a person who had recently died because of 
witchcraft told me the following:  
What witches want is to destroy people, because they do not have the heart that allows 
them to look at other people on the same level (Sp. No tienen el corazón para mirar a 
otras personas de igual a igual.) They want people to be destroyed, and that’s why they 
do witchcraft and they use those malignant spirits.  
Witches are not able to ‘look at other people on the same level,’ and are therefore not 
fully part of the realm of mutual vision that allows the mutual recognition of persons as 
real persons. They are on a different plane, one involving unilateral vision. In this sense, 
it is interesting to note that witches are always characterized by feelings of envy, a 
negative moral intentionality.59 They appear to be antisocial beings who threaten th  
social stability generated among people of good blood. Not surprisingly, as has already 
been stated, witches are not considered true people (Ch. reche) in Alto Bío Bío and are 
excluded from good (Ch. küme) social relationships. 
The only time I met Marianela, a supposed witch from Pitril, she confessed to me that 
she was extremely upset with the people who were organizing the nguillatun ritual 
because they had not invited her to participate with the rest of the community. For this 
reason, she had conducted her own ceremony with their family, but without friends.60 
When I told my friends in the community about this encounter, admittedly feeling a 
general sensation of uneasiness, they advised me not to talk to Marianela again, the 
                                                
59 For a classic article on envy and morality, see Foster 1965.  
60 For the importance of friends in the construction of true people, see Course 2011. 
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reason being that ‘she throws blows.’ Marianela had bad blood and badthinking, they 
said. Hence, it was necessary to keep away from her and her evil, cannibalistic 
intentions. As Pedro told me one night: 
Witches are only interested in having bad spirits to damage other people. The cheruve is 
where the spirits take their strength from, that is where the witch is stuck, because 
cheruve is thinking of eating Christians, sucking blood, and witches get the spirit from 
there. The cheruve is interested in Christian blood. All the old people said that, that the 
cheruve is thinking of sucking the Christian’s blood and killing him.61 
Cheruve means ‘ball of fire,’ one seen blazing in the darkness. It is frequently described 
as a very dangerous and evil fireball that may be the source of the evil (see Lenz 1897; 
Augusta 1919; Koessler-Ilg 1962; Gundermann 1981; Waag 1982; Citarella 2000; and 
Hernandez 1995 & 2006). There is a general consensu i  Alto Bío Bío regarding the 
cannibalistic need to eat blood that characterizes and defines evil spirits. It does not 
seem to be a coincidence that the two most common evil spirits, namely, the witranalwe 
and the antümalen, do not have proper corporeal support and blood. 62 According to my 
friend Pedro, while people are ‘filled with blood and are in fact people for this reason,’ 
the witranalwe and the antümalen do not share this attribute. Both beings are 
characterized by the absence of a proper residence. 
Having said this, I argue that blood for the Pehuench  is not only a visible bodily fluid, 
but is also the invisible moral intentionality of a person. Indeed, blood can be thought of 
as a hinge between the visible corporeal support and the invisible spiritual person. This 
may seem like a paradox or a contradiction, however for the Pehuenche it is not: evil 
spirits do not leave any visible prints or signs in or on the sleeper’s physical body when 
they suck his or her blood; in its material quality the body-site remains untouched. 
                                                
61 It could be argued that in the case of the Pehuenche, not all perspectives are equal, hence the spirits 
want to gain access to the human perspective throug the blood of humans. If this is the case, Pehuench  
ontology would be closer to Londono-Sulkin’s (2005) ideas of perspectivism, as configured by the 
morality of non-equivalent perspectives.  
62 Antümalen means ‘child of the sun’ and is often described as ‘shining like the moon’ or appearing as a 
bright pebble on the ground. It is often described as the burnt body of a child - a body without blood. It 
can only be seen as a tiny light, its luminosity being its most important feature. For a brief analysis of 
conceptualizations of light among the Pehuenche, se Chapter Three. For accounts of the antümalen 
within mapuche literature, see Guevara 1908; Latcham 1924; Koessler-Ilg 1962; Casimiquela 1964; and 
Waag 1982. 
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The production of good blood can be achieved by practices of commensality, which 
represent a key preventive action against evil outsider spirits for the Pehuenche.63  For 
this reason, it is very important for people in Alto Bío Bío to always be well fed, and to 
share food with others. Once, while having breakfast with my friend Flora, her small 
nephew Juan complained because he did not want to eat. ‘If you don't want an evil spirit 
to come and get you and kill you like your uncle, it is better that you eat… you need to 
have strong blood (Ch. küme mollbüm) if you want to go to the mountains,’ she said. 
Flora’s brother had been ‘grabbed by the devil.’ He had committed suicide (Ch. kidu 
lamwvun, literally ‘kill himself alone’). They had found him hanging from a tree near 
her house a couple of years ago. Although this example refers to situations that are not 
necessarily linked to witchcraft, it demonstrates the importance of eating for the mutual 
construction of strong blood, and the similarity of blood among true people. This 
similarity allows the building of a commonality across the different domains of different 
humanities. It is ‘a device for producing identity across species’ (Fausto 2007:500). 
It is interesting to mention here one particular aspect of the nguillatun ritual. The prayer 
performed at this ceremony, the ritual where commonality is built (Course 2011), 
involves mixing the blood of a sacrificed sheep with the chavid, a drink that has been 
collectively prepared the day before the prayer. Each f mily prepares its own chavid, 
which is blended with the chavid of other families, and later on mixed with the blood of 
the sacrificial animal. This final product is offered to the deities during the prayer. The 
mixture of chavid and blood can be considered a further form of positive human 
intentionality offered to the deities as sign of unity against predatory difference (see 
Chapter Three). I suggest that it is precisely thisunity that is envied and attacked by 
witches’ beings, which seek to destroy it through unilateral vision.  
 
 
                                                
63 For an analysis of commensality as producing kinship ee Gow 1991; Lagrou 2000; McCallum 2001; 
Rival 1998; Vilaça 2002; and Viegas 2003.   
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2.5 Conclusions  
This Chapter began by pointing to a territory of ethnographic wonder in which 
multicultural technologies (in this case sleeping pills) unwittingly obscure and threaten 
Pehuenche alterity. In particular, I reflected on how certain ‘medical things’ work in 
controversial situations to configure what I called ‘ontological disorders’. These are 
based on an uncontrolled equivocation (Viveiros de Castro 2004a)—an equivocation in 
which the interlocutors are unaware that the homonyms ‘body’ and ‘sleep’ conceal 
different realities for different perspectives. I have suggested that nguken experiences, 
when considered from a multicultural approach working upon the premise of a universal 
nature, are simply reduced to Pehuenche beliefs. Therefore, by considering nguken 
experiences, I argue that it is necessary to reformulate the tradition of the comparative 
analysis of dreams as an analysis of the equivocation of sleeping. Specifically, ‘sleeping’ 
in Pehuenche cosmology unveils the evident multiplicity of Pehuenche personhood. 
Moreover, and most importantly, I have shown how during sleep people are not being 
acknowledged as real people through mutual vision, mostly due to the personal 
dislocation and the distance of the am from its corporeal support. I have argued all along 
this Chapter that the very lack of mutual vision in nguken situations can entail particular 
ontological risks in which people are not fully enacted as people. I have also tried to 
demonstrate that the am’s absence makes the sleeper a vulnerable victim who can be 
attacked by evil spirits strongly characterized by unilateral visual performances. In more 
general terms, I have presented nguken situations as ethnographical evidence of the self-
determined Pehuenche ontology particularly related to its visual configurations. I hope 
to have demonstrated that what truly characterizes nguken situations is violence 
executed through unilateral visual perception. This is caused by witches, who are not 
able to ‘look at other people on the same level,’ rsulting in the emergence of illnesses. 
In the following Chapter, I turn to the examination f the importance of vision within 






The Gift of Vision: Healing practices as cosmo-activ sm 
 
How does one escape those anti-greetings performed through unilateral vision described 
in Chapter two? What can people do to contest the prey status conferred onto them by 
particular spirits? In this Chapter, through an ethnographic account of two different 
healing practices, I argue that the restoration of the normal plane of Pehuenche visibility 
can only be achieved through particular visual performances. In the vernacular, 
Pehuenche healers are commonly referred as those who have ‘the gift of vision’ (Sp. el 
don de la vision Ch. pelontuncheve), a capacity that is not a skill, but rather a spiritual 
and relational privilege of healers. 64  In this Chapter, I explore why this is the case and
suggest that through the ‘gift of vision,’ healers reorganize the personal place of 
existence, resulting in the creation of an optimally intensive (rather than extensive) 
distance between the predator and its prey.65 Broadly speaking, my contention here is 
that practices of healing aim to generate a relation l movement within a predatory 
interaction. This Chapter also explores how this is accomplished through the assemblage 
of particular visual capacities that I call gazes for detachment. By making the unknown 
visitor visible, healers are capable of doing what p tients cannot: they can interact with 
an enemy, rendering it temporarily invisible or a-relational, and as we have seen, being 
out of sight equals being out of sociality. I conclude this Chapter by suggesting that the 
intense efforts made by the Pehuenche to keep the potential affinity of spirits out of sight 
can be conceptualized as practices of cosmo-activism. Throughout this Chapter, I 
illustrate how in Alto Bío Bío, vision plays a central role in the protection of a human 
relational field, in a world where getting sick is always related to the alteration of the 
                                                
64 For an anthropological analysis of skilled vision, see Grasseni 2008. 
65 I am using the terms intensive and extensive in the sense of Deleuze’s (1994) conceptual distinctio . 
Broadly speaking, extensive differences such as area, length or volume, are intrinsically divisible. 
Conversely, intensive differences refer to properties such as pressure or temperature that cannot be divid d 
as such. Intensive distance, then, is defined by an indivisible intensity, rather than an extensive space 
prone to being measured in Euclidian terms.   
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process of construction of similarity.  
 
3.1 Healing practices as kinship protection: a theoretical framework 
It has recently been argued that Mapuche people, whn considered through traditional 
understandings of kinship, are confined within consanguineal kin (Course 2011), and 
that the relative values of consanguinity and affinity found elsewhere in South America 
have been inverted to a certain extent, by both forced settlement on reservations as well 
as the imposition of a system of patrilineal inheritance by the Chilean State (Ibid.). In 
this Chapter, I will focus on the persisting conceptual continuities between Mapuche and 
Amerindian kinship by stressing the relevance of intensive affinity in terms of spirits, 
shamanism, and personal composition, for Pehuenche people. In particular, my aim is to 
think of Pehuenche healing practices as strongly predicated on kinship as an Amerindian 
process, and more specifically as practices of de-pot ntialization of affinity and 
protection of similarity. By focusing on the visual aspect of healing practices, I aim to 
examine the relationship between spirits and people through the lens of potential affinity.  
In a key article, Viveiros de Castro (2001) has argued that affinity is the generic mode or 
relational principle of relatedness in South America. In arguing this, the author was 
inspired by both Rivière’s (1984) work on the ‘amerindianization’ of kinship (see also 
Rivière 1993), and more importantly the accounts of Lévi-Strauss (1943) regarding the 
model of affinity and relations with strangers in South America. Viveiros de Castro 
(2001) has convincingly argued that affinity prevails over consanguinity in Amazonia, 
but also that hierarchically, the former encompasses th  latter. In a nutshell, his argument 
is that in Amazonia, while affinity as the ‘dimension of the cosmic relational matrix’ 
(Viveiros de Castro 2001:19) is a given, consanguinity eeds to be socially constructed 
through human action and intention. As Fausto (2007) has forcefully argued, within this 
ontological context of relatedness, the fundamental opposition is ‘not between being 
human or not but between being (and having) a relativ  or not’ (Fausto 2007:502). Thus, 
the main opposition is relational: kinship goes beyond the relations between humans, 
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and is related to the ‘ongoing management of relations with alterity’ (Ewart 2008:506). 
These reflections go beyond the importance of the domestic sphere in the construction of 
kinship (Carsten 2000), and question the problematic division between exotic and 
domestic spheres because this division is not ethnographically supported (Vilaça 2002). 
In order to go beyond the conceptualization of affinity as kinship ties, Viveiros de Castro 
(2001) proposed the concept of ‘potential affinity’ (later re-conceptualized as ‘virtual 
affinity’) as a given generic relational value, or a virtual dimension in ‘which kinship is 
the process of actualization’ (Viveiros de Castro 2001:22).66 This generic relational 
value, however, had already been described by Lévi-Strauss (2000) through the analogy 
of a ‘hinge’ (Fr. charnière) between two ubiquitous opposites: affinity, as a hinge, 
(dis)connects human and divine, friend and enemy, kin and outsider, and so on. 
Moreover, this hinge is strongly characterized by the metaphysics of predation (Lévi-
Strauss 2000; Viveiros de Castro 2010), which, as a result of a mythical cosmological 
background, consist of different virtualities (affines) fighting for particular actualizations 
(or consanguinity). The complex conceptualization of this intensive, or virtual hinge 
needs to be differentiated from the extensive, or actual affinity that is subordinate to 
consanguinity (Viveiros de Castro 2010).67  The former goes beyond inter-species 
borders, and involves the relations between humans and animals, plants, and spirits, 
while the latter refers to kinship as the construction of consanguinity through the de-
potentialization of affinity. The tension between these opposites emerges in societies 
‘without interior,’ in which the ‘inside is a mode of outside’ (Viveiros de Castro 
2001:26), and where the exterior ‘is a constitutive part of kinship relations (…) because 
these relations are constructed from alterity as a starting point’ (Vilaça 2002:349). The 
Other is conceived of as a constitutive relation. Among the Pehuenche, the exterior as a 
constitutive part of kinship relations is an ethnographic fact that is clearly evident when 
considering the term used to refer one’s maternal uc e, weku. Weku literally means 
                                                
66 In a recent book, Viveiros de Castro (2010), following Taylor (2000), has stated that what he had 
conceptualized as ‘potential affinity’ in his 2001 work should rather be called ‘virtual affinity,’ since this 
terminology fits better with his Deleuze-inspired philosophical framework. For other discussions of 
potential affinity, see Overing 1983-1984, Albert 1985, and Taylor 1993.   
67 For a deeper elaboration of kinship in Amazonia, see Viveiros de Castro, 1992, 2001, 2002, and 2008.  
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‘outside,’ and is a metaphor almost identical to wekuve, a generic term for ‘evil spirits,’ 
which has been literally translated as ‘outside person’ (Hernandez in Briones 2002). The 
suffix -ve is often used to refer to a subject that performs a particular action. Therefore, 
wekuve could be literally translated as ‘the one who performs the outside.’ Lienlaf (in 
Sierra 1992) has stated that wekuve can be also translated as ‘the one who is in charge of 
balance’ (Sp. equilibrador), and ‘the one who builds by destroying’ (Sp. el que compone 
echando a perder). 
In this context, kinship can be seen as a process that emerges ‘as an intensive 
stabilization of predation’ (Viveiros de Castro 2010:39, my own translation), and 
predicated on the ‘constant dialogue with non-human entities’ (Vilaça 2002:347). This 
literally enables the making of kin out of others (Ibid.). However, as Viveiros de Castro 
(2010) has himself suggested and I aim to demonstrate through my ethnography of the 
Pehuenche, this stabilization can also be thought of as the creation of a fleeting ‘plateau 
of intensity’ (Bateson 1949:85). Briefly, this can be understood as a ‘steady state’ that 
emerges as the nearest point to identity or the near-absence of schismogenesis (Bateson 
1969). Within this philosophical reasoning, the impossibility of achieving full similarity 
is due to the simple fact that difference precedes similarity (Surrallés 2000; Viveiros de 
Castro 2001; Taylor & Viveiros de Castro 2006), thelatter being a particular case of 
difference which does not exist for itself (Lévi-Strauss 1971).68  In other words, affinity 
as a particular relation ‘is virtually eclipsed by consanguinity as part of the process of 
making kinship’ (Viveiros de Castro 2001:24). Yet, as I will show in this Chapter, the 
potential affinity of spirits is never fully eclipsed for Pehuenche people, a fact that is 
strongly related to the emergence of illnesses and the subsequent need to be healed. In 
this context, vision plays a crucial role.  
 
 
                                                
68 For a philosophical analysis of this idea, see Deleuze 1994.  
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3.2 Dealing with predators through the gift of vision: the case of evangelical 
practices 
One of the first things I realized when I was living in the Pitril community was that 
healing practices and decision-making about who was the most suitable healer to go to 
had nothing, or almost nothing to do with the approaches and activities of the public 
health administration (see Chapters Four and Five). On the contrary, many people, when 
feeling sick, look for treatments and healers that are not necessarily those implemented 
by the State. Evangelical churches offer one of these healing alternatives, and will be the 
central subject of this section.69 Two kinds of people can be distinguished among the 
many adherents to Evangelical churches. A minority takes Evangelical practices very 
seriously, and considers them to be a theological project: they stop drinking, attend 
rituals, etc. Yet most people approach them in a very practical way, using pragmatic 
criteria when deciding to look for a cure at church. Evangelical practices are chosen only 
as far they are seen to be effective. 
With the exception of burials, the only regularly held collective events in the day-to-day 
life of the Pitril community were Evangelical gatherings, which were held every week, 
not only in Pitril but also in every other Pehuenche community in the Queuco Valley. 
Most of the people who attended such Evangelical events felt significantly better after 
having participated in the weekly act of worship. They came back to their homes 
describing the instantaneous therapeutic effects these Evangelical practices provided 
them with. This relief, I will suggest, was possible ecause these acts of worship helped 
temporarily rid people of the predatory dynamics that were causing their suffering.  
The problem my host Pedro was dealing with while I lived in his house is again relevant 
here. The fact that ‘that one’ had been sucking his blood periodically (according to him 
                                                
69 For a historical analysis of Evangelical Protestantism and Indigenous populations in South America, see 
Gros 1999. For a review of the surge in Protestant and Pentecostal churches in South America, see Levine 
2009. For examinations of the Christianization of native peoples from an anthropological perspective, se  
Hefner 1993 and Cannell 2006. For an analysis of the native experience of Christianity as part of the wider 
socio-cosmological context within which this religion is classified, see Vilaça & Wright 2009. For a 
deeper analysis of continuities between Mapuche cosmology and Pentecostalism, see Foerster 2003. 
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the reason why he always felt tired and weak) was a source of motivation for him to 
attend Evangelical gatherings. On the 18th of September 2009, Pedro attended the 
nocturnal act of worship (Sp. vigilia) organized by one of the two Evangelical churches 
in Pitril. He invited me to attend as well, because he knew that I had not been sleeping 
well, and he thought that I could benefit from taking part. The evening before, Pedro's 
daughter, a young woman in her thirties that I will ca l Teresa, confessed to me that her 
father did not know anything about the Bible, because he was not able to read well 
enough. A couple of months later, though, I would fin  Pedro wearing his glasses (which 
rarely happened) trying to read a bible. On that occasion, he told me he was trying to 
see, despite not being able to grasp the written religious meanings. Teresa added that 
what was really important for her father was his participation in the vigilia, despite not 
understanding its biblical meanings. What was essential was not the Evangelical 
message but the presence and participation of people known to be visually gifted (Sp. 
gente con el don de la visión). The efficacy of Evangelical practices therefore has 
something to do with visual capacities and the predatory states interfered with by 
visually gifted people.70  Why did Pedro, and many others, feel that good after attending 
those events? What happened to the evil spirits within those evangelical devices? In 
short, how is healing and being visually gifted relat d?  
 
3.2.1 La vigilia: The anointment performance and its cosmo-political 
significance 
The nocturnal act of worship started around six p.m. and lasted until after dawn. The 
Evangelical church was in Pitril Bajo, a place that in the past had been known to be 
dominated by witches. Once there, and after having given a large contribution of 
potatoes to the pastor Francisco who was welcoming the ‘sick’ (Sp. enfermos), we went 
straight into the church. Inside, a band was playing. A rusty keyboard was playing the 
main melody and an out-of-tune bassline. There were also two guitarists, some minor 
                                                
70For general reflections on efficacy and traditional medicine, see Waldram 2000. 
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percussion instruments played by young women, and a small choir. There was plenty of 
room, and the church was furnished with wooden chairs to accommodate the ‘sick 
people’ as they were arriving. While clapping and following the musical rhythm, most of 
the people in attendance sang along to the songs that were played repeatedly, each 
lasting more than half an hour. Between songs the pastor, a man in charge of delivering 
the religious speech, gave talks based on the classi  stories of the New Testament. The 
pastor shouted and spoke loudly about all the possible benefits Jesus' manifestation can 
have on sick people's lives. As he was speaking, participants spontaneously and loudly 
yelled out sentences such as ‘You are the biggest, J us,’ ‘Thank you my lord,’ ‘All the 
blessings for you,’ and so on. The whole ceremony involved alternations between 
moments in which the pastor gave his religious speech, very long songs, and moments in 
which everyone simultaneously and loudly prayed, asking for particular needs to be 
fulfilled by Jesus, the Holy Spirit, the Lord. After a couple of hours, the church was 
crowded with about forty participants. I sat beside Pedro for hours while he actively 
followed the whole ceremony, like everyone else inside the church. After four or five 
hours, he asked me if I could make it to the end, or whether I preferred to go home. I 
stayed, but once I had spent about seven hours there, P dro approached me again to ask 
if I was too tired, and I shyly said ‘A bit.’ ‘We can go home whenever you want,’ he 
said, ‘but just wait for me a bit more.’ It was then I realized he was still waiting for the 
most important moment of the vigilia. At a certain point, without any announcement, a 
few pastors stood up from the audience and headed towards the centre of the church 
where there was a very worn red carpet. This was where pastors took sick people to be 
healed, where a very crucial act was performed. Beside me, Pedro was waiting to be 
chosen to be among those who were going to take part in this performance, which was 
called ‘the anointment’ (Sp. el ungimiento). Several pastors, each in charge of healing 
one sick person, performed the ceremony at the same time. The pastors shivered and 
screamed as they placed their hands over the kneeling sick person's head and back. 
Finally, after being selected by one of the pastors, Pedro went over to the carpet, took off 
his hat, and stayed there on bended knees for a while. The pastor put his hand over 
Pedro’s head, spilling some drops of a liquid he took from his pocket on Pedro’s 
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forehead.71 After some minutes had passed, he came back to sitbe ide me, and said: ‘I 
am ready. We can leave whenever you want.’ After that night, Pedro was fine for three or 
four days. He could sleep well, and he did not mention anything about visits from evil 
spirits. But, unexpectedly, the presence of his visitor  became a problem again a few 
days later. 
After some weeks, during which time I regularly attended the Sunday act of worship, I 
realized there was a clear pattern connecting Pedro’s well-being and the moment of 
anointment performed during the act of worship (Sp. culto). In fact, every Sunday we 
left the ceremony immediately after Pedro had taken part in the anointment, because that 
act was what he was really looking for and needing. The benefits of that moment 
generally lasted for at least three or four days, with only a few exceptions. Thus, when 
the anointment effect had vanished, attending the evangelical ceremony was necessary 
once again. This happened on a regular basis; the cycl was repeated for weeks. 
It started to become clear that the Sunday anointment p rformance had an impact on the 
evil relating occurring between Pedro and the evil sp rit. Even if I was intuitively aware 
about the fact that the anointment practice had something to do with the gift of vision 
many people had spoken to me about, this only becam fully apparent to me when I met 
Ramón, a Pehuenche pastor from the Cauñikú community. That Sunday, Ramón and his 
wife Pia (another pastor from Cauñikú) had been invited to give their ‘testimonies’ (Sp. 
testimonios) at the Pitril Evangelical church. Testimonies areth  personal stories of 
people who have been healed by Evangelical practices, told publicly to the rest of the 
religious audience. These healing experiences are shared as a way of encouraging the 
Evangelical commitment of the sick people. Testimonies always refer to very difficult 
and critical personal experiences people went through before the Evangelical turning 
point in their lives. While giving his testimony, Ramón retold with precision the moment 
he had actually started to see strange things inside people's bodies: frogs, snakes nd all 
kinds of evil creatures. This had occurred when he was participating in an Evangelical 
                                                
71 The relevance of this liquid to the whole performance will not be considered here, since I will mostly 
focus on the visual aspect of the anointment.  
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event somewhere else, and another pastor had been al  to see that he was visually 
gifted. ‘When someone saw I was gifted (Sp. cuando me vieron el don), I started to be 
able to see’ (Sp. yo empecé a ver). Ramón had started to take part in evangelical 
practices while he was in prison in the Chilean city of Los Angeles, a place where he 
lived for almost four years after a mysterious killing in Cauñikú took place at the 
beginning of this century. The reason many Pehuenche ended up in prison was never 
clear. However, it was not rare to hear people calling that period the ‘curfew period’ (Sp. 
toque de queda). This expression was widely used by Chilean people during Pinochet’s 
dictatorship to refer to moments in which military repression was strongly executed. 
That day, Ramón said that he could actually see people in the church suffering: there was 
a lady in the musical band that ‘had her eyes dried,’ and someone with ‘very strong back 
pain.’ He added that God had shown him all these things ad ‘even what is very hidden, 
because God is always looking… sometimes we are clean from outside but very dirty 
from inside.’ Towards the end of the act of worship, once Ramón had already performed 
the anointment for several sick people, he came to me and invited me to go over to the 
red carpet: ‘I saw that you are suffering from back pain, come with me.’ I did not refuse 
the offer, since during the preceding week I had in fact been suffering from intense back 
pain. I found myself on my knees, eyes closed, listening to a very noisy clamor of 
screams and people praying and crying. Ramón put his hands over my head and back for 
some minutes, then he starting trembling. Only when  took some distance and left me 
alone did I come back to my seat, where Pedro was waiting for me. Once there, he asked 
me straightforwardly: ‘Are you ready? Let's go home.’ In that moment, it was fully clear 
to me that the gift of vision and the anointment performance were both strongly 
connected and were crucial elements to be considered in order to understand how the 
sick person was indeed protected (from the healer’s per pective) and healed (from the 
sick person perspective), if you will, by Evangelica  practices.  
I accidentally bumped into Ramón on the bus a couple of days after that Sunday 
worship. He asked me about my back pain, and whether or not I felt better. Then, he 
explained that he had not done anything at all when aling my back, because he was 
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‘just a healing instrument.’ With this expression, he was pointing out that the real healing 
work was not done by him, but by someone else through him. I started to realize then 
that being visually gifted did not mean pastors were the agents of a capacity that 
afforded vision beyond appearances, a point I will return to below. I asked him whether 
the relations he established (as another entity’s instrument) in order to see/heal implied 
any kind of risk to himself. I was not expecting him to be so straightforward when he 
emphatically and angrily told me that he was not a sh man (Ch. machi), ‘because 
shamans work with the enemy. In order to undo witchcraft, shamans mut know how to 
do those things! They can be witches; they are witches! I, on the other hand, fight 
against the enemy!'  
 
3.2.2 Relational spiritual safety 
Spiritual safety was a common statement of appreciation Pehuenche people made of the 
benefits of Evangelical practices. It was very rare to engage in a conversation with an 
Evangelical person who did not render explicit this benefit of participation in religious 
activities. Pastors, I was told many times, were capable of keeping a distance between 
them and the enemy when combating the latter, since the spiritual relations they created 
with their spiritual colleagues were morally clear nd distinct, so to speak. These 
relations guaranteed an intervention that was never destructive, but rather the opposite: 
their actions offered security.72 In fact, many people used to say that Evangelicals 
worked ‘only with God,’ which made Evangelical gatherings a handy and unthreatening 
healing device. However, this statement was generally made in comparison to other 
traditional healing practices such as those performed by shamans, which were, on the 
contrary, considered very risky for both shamans and patients.73 Renato, Francisco’s son 
                                                
72 I should mention that the Evangelical perspective of the Pehuenche is of course much more complex 
than this statement indicates, but I cannot develop this further in this thesis. It must be said however that 
some Pehuenche people who do not participate in Evagelical events claim that Evangelical attendants are 
becoming Chilean, a reason why those events are to some extent dangerous as well.  
73 On this tension among the Mapuche, see Bacigalupo 2001. For a reflection about this tension in 
Amazonia, see Whitehead & Wright 2004. 
 123 
who was also an Evangelical pastor also told me that their battle was ‘just against the 
enemy, the cheruve, (usually translated as ‘the Devil’) adding that they did not work 
with the cheruve ‘as shamans do.’ Thus, Francisco and Renato helped me understand 
that Evangelical healers were people capable of establi hing relations with particular 
spirits while at the same time avoiding certain kinds of spiritual relatedness. But if they 
do not work with the enemy, what is their source of vision, the spiritually secure relation 
that allows them to see/heal/fight against and not with? What kind of relating allows 
them to take part in a spiritual battle in such a protected way? What was the pastor’s 
relational singularity when performing the anointment? And last but not least, how were 
all these healing performances linked to the privileged gift of vision so intrinsically 
attributed to pastors' actions?  
 
3.2.3 Relational spiritual vision 
Once, Ramón asked me about the people who were behind my research. Unexpectedly, 
he seemed pleased when I mentioned I was working with people from England. The 
Spanish word for England is ‘Inglaterra,’ but Renato referred to this place with the word 
‘Inglatierra,’ which sounded a bit unusual, but made clear the importance that land (Sp. 
tierra, Ch. mapu) had for him. He mentioned that they had a very good friend in 
Inglatierra named Andy, who had lived in Alto Bío Bío for many years and who had 
actually helped them build their church. Andy was an English Evangelical pastor who 
had a strong relationship with the land, he said. Thus Ramón was very pleased to hear 
that I also worked with people from that land. As I will show, relations with the land's 
spirits were indeed important when performing healing practices, particularly those 
involving the püllü spirit. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, every person is in coexistence with a particular püllü that 
under normal conditions is a part of the personal composition. In this sense, every 
person could actually be, as Kracke (1987) has pointed out, in part a shaman. I argue that 
the difference between normal people and visually gifted ones is due to a relational 
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intensity (Viveiros de Castro 2007), rather than the accumulation of knowledge: Visually 
gifted people actually have their küme püllü in outstanding balance with other küme 
personal attributes (küme rakiduam, ‘good thinking,’ küme mollbüm, ‘good blood,’ küme 
dungun, ‘good words’).74 More precisely, the relational privilege of Evangelical pastors 
is their ability to work with the Holy Spirit, which is translated in Chedungun with the 
words küme püllü. The very capacity of seeing inherent to the gift of vision possessed by 
pastors is indeed due to a spiritual proximity defin d by its strong instrumental character. 
Evangelical pastors are instruments of vision used by spirits (univocally good) that are 
commonly called ‘the witnesses of the sky’ and are defined as ‘those who ork with us, 
those who can see.’75 This spiritual proximity allows visually gifted people to not only 
gain some know-how of healing through dreams. For example, Ramón learnt how to 
perform the anointment through dreams. At the same ti , pastor-instruments also need 
other kinds of objects (heuristically speaking) while performing their healing actions. At 
the most intensive part of the anointment, a perfume and/or a bible are used as healing 
instruments. In fact, every time a pastor started shaking, loosing the strength in his legs 
and knees, he put a little bit of perfume over the head, ears, and back of the sick person. 
‘God collaborates with the Holy Spirit, I put the prfume,’ I was once told by Ramón. 
It was a shared opinion among Evangelical people that e background for this 
occasional vision was the Enemy’s omnipresence. The evil spirit’s omnipresence is 
experienced by the Pehuenche as part of an ongoing predatory dynamic between people 
and possible attackers. In fact, as Ramón told me, evil spirits are  
always near people, observing. They never say goodbye to people, they are like peukos 
with chickens: when they see a little chicken, the peuko is always waiting to attack and 
eat them. That one is always interested in people, it is always beside people, they never 
say goodbye to people.  
Peukos (parabuteo unicinctus) are predatory birds that often eat the chickens people 
keep in their homes. These piritual peukos, to use Ramón’s analogy, could only attack 
when a person was alone, and tended to keep a distance when there was ‘more than just 
                                                
74 For discussions of the word küme within Indigenous moral dualism, see Briones & Oliveira 1985. For 
more epistemological discussions about language, appreciation, and words, see Mol 2012, in press. 
75 For a discussion of the spiritual relations of shamans, see Bacigalupo 2004. 
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one person.’ This is a crucial point in arguing that ealing practices can be considered 
practices of cosmo-activism, understood as the strengths stemming from being together 
in mutual visual recognition. This point will be returned to in the conclusion of the 
current Chapter.  
 
3.2.4 The gift of vision: Assembling gazes for detachment 
As I have already pointed out, the effects of the pastor's healing performance have a 
limited duration. As I will show, this duration is directly connected to the gift of vision 
and the act of seeing: healing requires as an essential precondition the capability of 
gazing at the evil visitor, bestowing upon the latter the very status of an Enemy.76 In 
short, the Enemy has to be put out of sight after having come into sight as enemy, 
through specific procedures involving particular visual capacities-intensities and actors. 
As such, this gaze is a helpful action working to ephemerally move the sick person out 
from the position of victim. Being able to see the Enemy, is not a capacity prone to being 
achieved in a definite way however, but rather a position to be transitorily inhabited and 
constructed during specific relational moments. In short, I suggest that seeing the Enemy 
enables the detachment of the ill person from their ev l relating through ‘gazes for 
detachment.’ The healing capacity has to do not only with the visual gift healers are 
endowed with, but also with the relational detachment they are capable of maintaining 
while seeing and fighting against the Enemy.  
Concretely, what the anointment action provides is an instantaneous change with respect 
to the distance evil spirits establish between themselves and their victims, having as a 
result the malignant visitors’ disappearance. In fact, for a limited time, those frightening 
‘visitors’ are kept out of sight, and in a way their very status as ‘visitors’ is successfully 
                                                
76 As demonstrated in Chapter Two, while the enemy attacks it cannot be considered an enemy since, as 
Siegel (2006) has convincingly argued, the visitor is something that cannot be truly named, and it remains 
outside the possibility of recognition. 
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contested.77 Through the gift of vision, sick people can actually move away from the 
status of food their Enemy’s interpellation confers upon them (keeping in mind that 
malignant spirits eat their victims’ blood). The anointment moment can therefore be 
thought of as predicated on radical primary dialectics ‘between seeing and eating’ 
(Mentore 1993:29). I suggest that this is achieved by creating an optimal intensive rather 
than extensive distance between the predator and its prey. I use the term ‘intensive’ 
because the spirits’ disappearance, which I am mostly concerned with here, has nothing 
to do with an Euclidean metric or an extensive space made of bounded and artificial 
extensive boundaries. To put it in De Landa’s (2005) words (inspired by Deleuze), the 
anointment performance cannot be thought of as being within ‘zones that extend in 
space up to a limit marked by a frontier’ (De Landa 2005:80). Conversely, the whole 
anointment procedure functions within a space that is indivisible and appears configured 
by zones of intensity, a space that cannot be divided without changing nature (Ibid.). In 
this logic, the change produced by the anointment is related to the degree of visual 
intensity in motion. Spirits do not go away as if they are expulsed by simple spatial 
metrical addition. Rather, they are expelled through the ‘emergence of a spontaneous 
flow or movement, which (…) tends to cancel the differences in intensity and restores 
equilibrium and average values’ (Ibid. p.81).  
Broadly speaking, the achievement of intensive disappearance in regards to these spirits 
echoes Deleuzian thinking where ‘everything which happens, and everything which 
appears is correlated with orders of difference: difference of levels, temperature, 
pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity’ (Deleuze 1994:222). Along this line 
of thinking, everything that disappears is correlated with orders of difference, with the 
enaction of particular intensive visual healing performances that I call ‘gazes for 
detachment.’ In short, I argue that seeing the Enemy allows one to frighten it away and 
to render it temporarily invisible or a-relational: being out of sight is equal to being out 
of sociality. Moreover, when thinking of the durational effects of anointment, or those 
days without visitors, it becomes clear how this optimal, intensive distance finally 
                                                
77 For the importance of visitations among Indigenous peoples, see Surrales 2003 and Chapter Two of this 
dissertation.  
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allows the creation of a non-relational coexistence between visible people and invisible 
evil spirits. These ontological tensions involving potential affine spirits in a world 
inhabited by different actants (ensu Latour) are in daily life shaped by the repetition of 
that ongoing healing cycle experienced by sick people. I argue that the days 
characterized by the temporary suspension of predatory difference through vision are the 
expression of the de-potentialization of affinity involving spirit affines. By rendering 
visible the conflictive interaction between people and spirits, the risky, possible 
actualization of potential affinity is temporarily stopped. This is achieved through the 
creation of an unstable human relational field that I call the ‘Pehuenche plateau of 
human visibility.’ This ‘Pehuenche steady state’ emerges as the nearest point to identity 
or the near-absence of schismogenesis (Bateson 1969).  
The weekly pattern involving Pedro, the anointment performance, and the evil spirit, 
helped me realize that the presence of the Enemy cannot be fully diluted nor destroyed. 
Rather, the healing practices have an impact on the relation between a person, or what I 
have called the personal composition (Chapter One), and their particular evil relatings. 
In short, the evil spirit, or in Evangelical jargon, the Enemy, is not capable of being 
killed, but rather is just moved away: through the anointment, the frightening visitor is 
itself intensely frightened. Moreover, in cases where gazes for detachment reach a 
significant intensity, the performance is called a ‘surgery’ or ‘operation’ (Sp. operación). 
This spiritual operation, in which the Holy Spirit uses the pastor as its main instrument, 
is mainly defined by its defensive effects. Seeing allows one to defend the sick person 
through an intensive spiritual gaze that is capable of creating the conditions necessary 
for throwing the Enemy out of sight. This surgery consists of activating the spirit’s 
presence through the pastor’s corporeal support, who in Ramón’s words, ‘puts his hands 
over the body while nobody can see him (the spirit): he is the only one who can see 




3.2.5 The relevance of the pastor’s corporeal support as an instrument 
The capacity to see without being seen (in the vernacular referred to as ‘power’) is not 
attributed to the healer's agency. This explains the absence of explicit ethnographical 
data about what is seen at the moment of anointment. The pastor is not the agent of 
vision, but is just a material instrument for the Holy Spirit to occupy the predatory visual 
position with respect to the Enemy. In those moments the pastor is an instrument 
precisely because ‘witnesses of the sky’ can express themselves and engage in relations 
with sick people through pastors’ corporeal supports. The point I would like to make 
here is that in order to frighten evil spirits away, nd to recreate a human relational field 
with the sick person, the presence of a human corporeal support is needed. More 
specifically, I suggest that the part of the instrument played by pastors within these 
visual performances is relevant in that it enacts the presence of achieved consanguinity, 
the physical human body. This corporeal support is necessary to momentarily and 
humanly inhabit that space in between opposite dimensions. I want to suggest that the 
unstable stability of the ‘Pehuenche plateau of human visibility’ is achieved through the 
complex relation between different virtual or spiritual intensities in assemblage with a 
pastor's corporeal support. What I am suggesting in fact, is that the achievement of 
intensive vision itself can be thought of as a fundamental action of management in 
regards to the cosmological hinge. It is the visual intensity of the personal composition 
created in the act of healing that is an essential precondition for achieving a stabilization 
of the predatory and omnipresent spirits' ‘virtual affinity.’  
Going back to the anointment ceremony, once the Enemy was made relationally visible, 
the pastor uttered two or three words aimed at forcing out the enemy’s presence. In this 
sense, it seems undeniable that, following Surrales (2003) vision is the expression of true 
people's presence, which allows (de)communication between humans and non-humans: 
intensive vision is indeed the hinge. Moreover, as I have been arguing, the fundamental 
aspect of acts of worship is the total aesthesia of the moment of anointment, which is 
based on intensive vision, itself understood as a perceptual interaction which precedes 
speech. Without vision, there is only the realm of antisocial interactions where any 
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process of conceptualization is impossible, as the experience of nguken renders apparent 
(see Chapter Two). The re-composition of the personal composition enacted by healing 
practices is possible because of this very anti-relational, protective, and intensive gaze 
that separates.78 Gazes for detachment allow the transformation of spirits’ omnipresence 
into a temporary absence, characterized by a temporary intensive distance, partly 
because the intensity of the gaze is itself ephemeral. Finally, this intensive vision is 
related to the creation of a minimal difference understood as the reproduction (or 
protection) of kinship or human physicality, or the suspension of predatory difference. In 
this way the Enemy, very often called ‘the illness’ (Sp. la enfermedad Ch. kutran) or ‘the 
Devil’, finally goes away. An intensive distance is created, a spiritual detachment known 
as ‘a cleaning’ (Sp. limpieza) of the evil relating through vision (at least in part, and as a 
preliminary move). The relational cleaning thus produces an anti-relational effect 
consisting in pushing the enemy away. I propose that t ese healing performances are 
indeed gazes for detachment that allow the sick victim to move temporarily away from 
their prey position within a wider predatory dynamic.79 
In a nutshell, I suggest that during the moment of anointment, a particular pastor’s 
personal composition is able to see more than meets the eye, both more than meets the 
sick person’s eye as well as the pastor’s own eye under normal circumstances. However, 
this performance has nothing to do with eyes as physical organs (pastors often perform 
their work with their eyes closed), but rather with intensive vision without organs. In 
fact, Pehuenche people conceive of and evince these visual performances with a visual 
bias of their own: these actions are not simply visual, but rather, to put it in very general 
terms, they refer to ontological relational differenc s. In this sense, and following Ewart 
(2008:507), I not only suggest that ‘the social signif cance of the senses is as much 
bound up with an understanding of sociality (…) as it is bound up with sensory 
experience itself,’ but also that sensory experience should itself be considered as the 
                                                
78 For the study of ‘relations that separate,’ see Strathern 1988 and Stasch 2009.  
79 As I have already shown, these therapeutic gazes have a finite duration. While performing the ‘surgery,’ 
the Holy Spirit also gives injections that last for two or three days. These injections, which were hardly 
ever fully described by my friends in detail, are strongly related to the pastor-instrument-Holy-Spirit’s 
intensive gaze.  
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materiality (sensu Keane) of sociality.80 
 
3.3 Dealing with predators through the gift of vision: The case of lawentuncheve  
Like many young women in Alto Bío Bío, Giorgina had emigrated to Santiago looking 
for a job as a maid. While working with a rich family, she fell ill. She could not work 
well, and most of the time she felt weak. Giorgina’s skin deteriorated, and she felt very 
ugly. In fact, as she told me, she desperately wanted to be normal, to look like a normal 
person. Worried about the situation, Giorgina’s boss (Sp. patrona) took her to one of the 
most expensive and prestigious private medical clinics in the city. Doctors there said she 
had acne problems, and prescribed her many pills - too many, as she said. However the 
treatment did not work at all. Every time she looked at herself in a mirror, she cried. 
Eventually she decided to go back to Alto Bío Bío. Giorgina’s oldest sister, troubled by 
her sister’s appearance, decided to take her urine to Flora, an herbalist working in 
Cauñikú. The herbalist looked at the urine and saidthat Giorgina had a blood problem. 
Her blood was very weak, she said before providing her with many liters of herbs (Ch. 
lawen). When I met Giorgina for the first time in Cauñikú, she definitely felt much 
better and she had decided to stay in Alto Bío Bío.She told me:  
Doctors could not help me at all, since they could not see what I really had, what my 
problem really was. I do not know what kind of sight doctors have. They thought in fact 
that my problem was just a skin problem. Flora, on the other hand, could see my illness. 
She could really see everything. 
Naty always wondered why doctors could not see some illn sses. When she got ill, 
doctors took X-rays and the only thing they could actu lly see, she said, ‘were 
gallbladder stones and some pneumonia problems.’ None of the medical treatments 
offered to Naty by the local health clinic were at all effective. She followed different 
treatments and she took many medications, but she did not feel better. She was going 
‘completely crazy’ when she decided to see a lawentuncheve.81 Naty took her urine to 
                                                
80 For a discussion of senses and materiality, see Keane 2008. 
81 For a definition and analysis of this word, see below. 
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Flora and she was told that her problem was witchcraft. ‘Doctors cannot see witchcraft,’ 
Naty told me. ‘You can get really sick because of that. Witchcraft exists! But only Flora 
was capable of seeing that.’ 
Herbalists’ healing practices are based on particular visual capacities, which oftentimes 
enable an intervention against evil relations. As these stories show, comparisons between 
local practices of healing-seeing and biomedical prctices are also very frequent. Here, I 
will consider these comparisons as a general way of detecting ontological differences. I 
deliberately chose to begin this Chapter by discussing evangelical performances rather 
than those of herbalists because the former could be (wrongly) considered, by 
anthropological theories of acculturation and cultural change, as less Pehuenche.82 I 
hope to counter this possibility by rendering explicit some similarities between the
performances of herbalists and Evangelical pastors related to vision and healing.83 
 
3.3.1 The gift of vision of the lawentuncheve  
The word lawentuncheve literally refers to a person (Ch. che) who knows how to work 
with medicinal plants (Ch. lawen).84 These persons have been conceptualized by some 
scholars as non-proper shamanic people and categoriz d as healers who deal mostly with 
natural illnesses (Grebe 1975; Oyarce 1988; Bacigalupo 2001; Citarell 2000). This is a 
conceptual consequence of another distinction generally made within Mapuche 
scholarship, namely, the division between spiritual and natural illnesses (the latter being 
a simplified translation of the Chedungun word rekutran) (Grebe 1975; Oyarce 1988; 
Bacigalupo 2001). For instance, physical wounds, fractures, etc. have been categorized 
as natural illnesses and have mostly been associated with the performances of herbalists. 
Even if none of my friends in Alto Bío Bío would deny that a wound, for example, has 
                                                
82 For a general reflection on how acculturation has been analyzed within traditional anthropological 
debates and how Indigenous peoples conceptualize of acculturation as simultaneously implying both a 
weakness and an improvement, see Gow 1993 and 2001;Kelly 2005, and Turner 1988. 
83 For reflections on conversion and perspectivism see Vilaça 2008. 
84 Medicinal herbs have been studied in detail by many scholars. See Gay 1852; Murillo 1889; Gusinde 
1917; Moesbach 1959; Hoffman 1990; Citarella 2000.  
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nothing to do with spiritual illnesses, in my own exp rience the distinction between 
natural and spiritual illnesses can be conceptually problematic and is not fully grounded 
on ethnographic data. Nevertheless, within the taxonomical tradition in Mapuche healing 
literature, lawentuncheve have been strongly associated with natural illnesses and have 
been categorised as laypeople (Sp. gente común y corriente, according to Bacigalupo 
2001). As a result, and probably because of the less exotic nature of their activities in 
comparison with proper shamans (Ch. machi), lawentuncheve have been shamanically 
underestimated so to speak. One of my aims in this section is to counter this trend by 
arguing that differences between herbalists and shamans have to do mostly with the 
degree of (relational) intensity these healers establi h with their püllü spirits. 
In general terms, the herbalists’ work is defined by two particular healing capacities. 
Firstly, they are people who actually know a great deal about medicinal herbs, being able 
to prepare different medicines for different illness . General knowledge about 
medicinal herbs (Sp. conocer remedios) is transmitted by old people (Ch. koiviche) to 
the new generations and is also disseminated among women. This is done through 
informal conversations (Ch. nutram) in which such knowledge (Ch. kimun) is shared. 
However, the transmission of this knowledge is progressively disappearing in Alto Bío 
Bío because of the new generations’ (Sp. gente nueva, Ch. wekeche) lack of interest in 
these matters. In fact, there are only a few herbalists left in Alto Bío Bío (and no proper 
shamans left) and all of them are seriously worried about the future of their healing 
practices. Since it involves ‘too much sacrifice,’ young people do not want to learn, they 
say. In the words of one of the herbalists I met, to learn about herbs ‘is like learning to 
read.85 You need to study, and you need a teacher. When I die, this activity will be 
finished. Nobody wants to study with me. Too complicated, they say.’ Furthermore, 
herbalists need to collect their medicinal plants in the mountains, and it is a shared 
opinion that medicines are progressively disappearing. The apparent reduction in 
medicinal herbs is thought to be due to the decision of the supreme being Ngenechen 
who is hiding the lawen away from the many new non-Pehuenche inhabitants of he 
                                                
85 For similar comparisons between the transmission of I digenous healing practices and non-Indigenous 
reading/writing practices, see Viveiros de Castro 2007 and Gow 2001.  
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valley.  
Importantly, herbalists are capable of seeing different illnesses (Ch. kutran) through 
particular visual capacities. Not surprisingly, and i  a similar way to Evangelical pastors, 
herbalists are usually known by laypeople for having the gift of vision. They are 
considered pelontucheve, which in Chedungun means that they are ‘people capable of 
really seeing.’ 
 
3.3.2 Pelontun willen 
The main method of seeing, and thus making a diagnosis, is enacted by herbalists while 
looking at a patient’s urine.86 In this section, I will focus on this particular activity, even 
though I am fully aware that the visual capacities of lawentuncheve are not limited to 
these actions and also include the special ability of seeing in dreams (Ch. peuma), which 
are an undeniable source of knowledge about the conditi s of patients and the 
availability of herbs. For instance, lawentuncheve can generally see a sick person in 
dreams when the latter is too sick (Sp. enfermedad muy cargada, muy pasada En.
rotten), as well as particular places certain herbs can be found. This method of diagnosis 
is called pelontun willen, which in the words of one herbalist’s daughter, means ‘to 
really see what is really going on, when what is goin  on can indeed be visualized in the 
urine.’87 However, few people can really see I was told, ‘beyond what you can normally 
see.’88 The word pelon can mean ‘seeing,’ ‘brightness,’ ‘prediction of the future,’ and 
also ‘diagnosis of illness,’ all of which point to extraordinary capacities of vision. 
Moreover, pelon sometimes refers to ‘light,’ but not as a range of electromagnetic 
radiation that can be detected by the human eye, as light is commonly conceived of in 
physics. In fact, if someone wants to refer to light in the sense of the light of the sun or 
the light of day, for example, the Chedungun word for ‘sun,’ which is the same word as 
                                                
86 For other diagnostic practices and a brief historical review of these, see Bacigalupo 2001. 
87 It is also very common to hear that herbalists see th  mor, an abbreviation of the Spanish word humor.  
88 As argued by Bloch (2008), within the Pehuenche world vision is not a guarantee against deceit. This is 
apparent by the fact that there are different intensi ies of vision.    
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for ‘day,’ must be added (Ch. antü pelon). Thus brightness in Pehuenche ontology is 
often not related to electromagnetic radiation, butrather has a particular Pehuenche 
intensity. A similar point has been made by Viveiros de Castro (2007:164): ‘in the 
Amazonian case, this does not involve a conception of light as a distributor of relations 
of visibility-knowability across an extensive space (I’m thinking here of certain passages 
from Les mots et les choses) but of light as pure intensity, the intense and itensive 
‘heart’ of reality which establishes inextensive distance between beings.’ In Alto Bío 
Bío, there are different ways of referring to intensive and extensive light, the former 
being associated with a particular relational capacity few people have, as I will 
demonstrate below.  
Being able to see illness is a capacity that cannot be learnt. It is a gift that even after 
years of study cannot be developed. In fact, in Alto Bío Bío it is commonly believed that 
doctors cannot see (Ch. pelolay) ‘through’ urine because they have only studied and do 
not have the gift. This gift, however, is not something that someone is (a matter of 
being), but rather, as I will try to show, it is a relational capacity herbalists have: it is the 
possibility of engaging in relations with some particular ‘seer’ spirits (a matter of 
having).89 
Camilo was the oldest son of an herbalist working i Alto Bío Bío. During his life, he 
had learnt many things about medicinal herbs and he had always wanted to be able to 
‘see’ urine. Claudia, one of his sisters, told me that he had actually been punished 
because of this forbidden pretension. One day, Camilo’s seven year-old son fell ill. That 
night, when Camilo was a little bit drunk, he publicly proclaimed that he actually had the 
capacity to see in urine. He said that he actually knew what illness his son had, but none 
of his sisters believed him. A couple of hours later, his son’s condition worsened, and he 
had to be taken in as an emergency to the nearest hospital in Santa Bárbara. The day 
after, Camilo’s wife decided to take the child’s urine sample to Camilo’s mother who 
said that the boy had an illness that doctors could not see. She then told Camilo in a firm 
                                                
89 For an accurate reflection on the crucial importance of relations between spirits and people in the 
creation of knowledge, see Cesarino 2010. 
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tone that it was not possible to see the urine without having the gift of vision. She 
suggested to him that if he did not want to be punished, he should stop trying to pretend 
to have that capacity. When Camilo’s sister told me this story, she emphatically added: 
‘You can learn something about herbs - for instance, which herbs are good for some 
abdominal pains and so on - but you cannot have the gifted capacity of knowing who 
was actually the source of that illness.’ With these words, Claudia was pointing out the 
essential shamanic imperative for the emergence of kn wledge: in order to know, to 
personify is always essential. By finding out the intentionality and the who(ness) at stake 
within a particular action, every event could in fact be seen as being an action (Viveiros 
de Castro 2010). Yet in Alto Bío Bío, access to this knowledge does not necessarily 
imply taking the Other’s perspective, as has been suggested for other Amerindian 
contexts (Viveiros de Castro 2004). However, in order to know who the evil source 
producing illnesses is, it is always necessary to engage in a particular spiritual relation.   
 
3.3.3 Spiritual relatedness  
The shamanic spirit in relation with an herbalist is generally called wenu püllü and can 
be activated every time a l wentuncheve is dealing with a sick person. Even if that 
spiritual relation is considered a given, an herbalist needs to accept this as a relational 
privilege. In this sense, the personal will and conscious decision to become an herbalist 
is a precondition for the activation of such a relationship.90 More precisely however, the 
gift (Sp. don) of vision is strongly related to the püllü spirit of a ngen (see Chapter One) 
in a relationship with a person who is characterized by their good thinking, or küme 
rakiduam. Indeed, Manuel once told me tautologically that a person needs to be very 
‘spiritual’ in order to engage in relationship with a ngen’s spirits (see Chapter One). In 
Alto Bío Bío, this relationship is considered a particular intensity of being related to 
Ngenechen, a deity that, to put it in a very reductionist Euclidian way, also shares the 
space of heightness (Ch. wenu) as its place of residence. In fact, the moment of vision 
                                                
90 This is the same spiritual relatedness shamans are involved in (See Bacigalupo 2001). 
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(Ch. pelontun) can be thought of as the result of the presence of Ngenechen as well as a 
privileged relationship with this deity. It can indeed be said that it is Ngenechen or the 
wenu püllü who can actually see in or through the urine, and is co-responsible for 
intensive vision. However, before elaborating furthe  on this relational aspect that allows 
intensive vision in the urine, some other aspects of the procedural practices of 
performing pelontun willen need to be mentioned.  
 
3.3.4 Fluid invisibilities: Procedures to make them visible 
It must be stated from the outset that this act of seeing performed by herbalists is 
possible not only because of the spiritual relation just mentioned, but also because the 
urine is a suitable diagnostic instrument. My friend Flora once told me that she could not 
really understand how some healers said that they could make a diagnosis by looking at 
an egg. She was referring to an old non-Pehuenche lady who could actually ‘read’ an 
egg. ‘How can the breath of a person go through that solid eggshell?’ she asked. This is 
probably related to the nature of fluids as materials not prone to being extensively (as 
opposed to intensively) confined. Furthermore, I have good reason to believ that there 
is a link between a person’s blood and his or her urine, or more generally, between 
contiguous personal body fluids. One particular piece of evidence for this is that one of 
the defensive strategies used to protect children and some sick people against evil spirits 
is to drink winka (non-Pehuenche) urine. Winka urine, it is said, mixes quickly with 
one’s blood, and the automatic merging of the non-Pehuenche urine and Pehuenche 
blood is thought to make the spirit run away. ‘The evil spirit won't like a blood mixed 
with winka urine, so it will leave,’ Manuel once said. It is also important to note that the 
very act of seeing in the urine is ephemeral, this bodily fluid being an instrument of 
passage by which virtualities of the invisible Pehuenche ralm can be momentarily 
screened. The fleeting nature of an image in urine became fully clear to me at a time 
when I was living near Temuco (very far away from Alto Bío Bío) with a shaman who 
also used urine samples as diagnostic tools. She had recently seen several urine samples 
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from different patients. After some days went by, the samples were still in the place 
were she had left them the day she saw her patients. I had in fact been wondering 
whether those samples were being kept there for a purpose when I heard her angrily ask 
her son to ‘Get rid of those bottles of nasty piss!’  (Sp. bota de una vez ese meao!).  
In practical terms, the act of seeing the urine is simple and not exotic, possibly a reason 
why it has been dismissed as an improper shamanic action. Patients are requested to 
collect their first urine of the day in a bottle. It is important to not have eaten anything 
before urinating, and the collection must be done before the sun starts rising. The urine 
sample is often taken to the herbalist by a friend or relative of the patient, a person who 
is usually referred to as ‘the owner of the sick person’ (Ch. ngen kutran). Once the 
herbalist has asked who the urine sample belongs to, the bodily fluid is put in another 
transparent bottle made of glass. This glass bottle is hen placed in the sun or against any 
white background (a wall or a notebook for example). The lawentuncheve holds it for a 
while, waiting until the liquid becomes completely still.91 It is not necessary for the 
patient or the patient’s relative or friend to be pr sent while the herbalist looks at the 
urine, and herbalists often see a urine sample without actually seeing the patient. What 
can really be seen in the urine by the lawentuncheve, and what laypeople cannot see, is a 
small human shape or image usually described as ‘the whole body of a person.’ One of 
the most widespread analogies used to refer this event is a comparison between the 
pelontun willen image and ‘X-rays of the whole body.’ Many times herbalists can point 
out the particular organs involved in the illness in question (such as the kidneys, bladder, 
gallbladder, and so on), as the affected organs appear visually emphasized. For instance, 
the first time I was told of the reason for the stomach pain I had been dealing with for 
many months during my fieldwork was by Flora, the herbalist in Cauñikú. When I asked 
Flora what she was seeing in my urine sample, she told me that there was ‘a little man 
with a very irritated gallbladder.’ She added that the reason I had that wound (she could 
see a wound on the gallbladder) was probably becaus I had eaten too much lamb at the 
nguillatun. After my fieldwork, I indeed needed to have a surgery to have my 
                                                
91 For different procedures for performing pelontun willen, see Gutiérrez 1987. 
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gallbladder removed.  
The moment in which the urine becomes still is very important: it is exactly at that 
moment that the ‘illness appears,’ or as some of my friends told me, the ‘illness comes 
to presence’ (Sp. se presenta la enfermedad).92 That moment was described to me by an 
herbalist as if one could see through a ‘magnifying glass.’ Yet, an essential spiritual 
presence is needed in order to see this. Flora once t ld me: 
In that moment, Chao Chao Ngenechen must be present. It is Chao Chao who gives 
everything, he shows everything, and then helps me find the most suitable herb for that 
particular illness. Ngenechen is the powerful one, I just ask him to be present. He puts 
his hands on the sick in order to help the sick person, he helps me, he gives everything.93 
Ngenechen’s presence, however, needs to be permanent during the whole healing 
process, as Renato once told me: 
Doctors can only see through X-rays, through scientific stuff, then they can know what 
the person’s problem is, but they will never ever know what the person’s problem is only 
by seeing them. The doctor asks you what you feel but he is never sure about that. So 
they send you to the hospital to take X-rays. Conversely, within Indigenous medicine, the 
person is very important. Herbalists talk to the sick person, but most importantly, there 
is always a dialogue with Chao Ngenechen. When a lawentuncheve gives you herbs, she 
prays, asking the herbs to be effective, and also when you take those herbs, you need to 
pray for Ngenechen to be present. Without Ngenechen, nothing happens. 
 
3.3.5 Screening human intentionality 
The X-ray analogy commonly used to describe pelontun willen underlines the fact that 
both technologies aim at rendering visible something that at first glance goes unnoticed 
by laypeople. However, even if both procedures allow that illness to come to visual 
presence, there is something an X-ray will never be able to screen: human intentionality. 
Until now, I have provided examples in which the human shape appears while looking at 
urine samples, an event that may be related to a screening of the am (Chapter One), the 
latter understood as the virtual, singular aspect of a person: their invisible side. However, 
                                                
92 It has been suggested by other scholars (Bacigalupo 2001) that a trance is not necessary when 
performing pelotun willen. I hesitate to support this affirmation however, since what is at stake, I argue, is 
the intensity of that ‘trance,’ rather than the trance itself. 
93 Chao Chao and Ngenechen are just different ways of referring to the same ‘owner’ of the people. 
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this ‘organic’ image of the whole body if you will, is just one of the shapes capable of 
being seen in the fluidity of urine. In many conversations with Flora, I was told that 
most of her patients arrived with the ‘devil stuck to them.’ This fact could actually be 
seen in the urine, but not only there, as the following etnhographical anecdote 
demonstrates. 
One morning, while I was helping Flora repair a very old window that had been broken 
by the wind, I saw a very young girl arriving with a woman. They came from Malla 
Malla, a Pehuenche community near the Argentine border, and they were looking for 
Flora. While I continued working, Flora helped the girl, who could not walk properly, to 
get to the kitchen where the house’s cooking fire was. This was the place where the 
lawentuncheve would spend time with her patients, sharing food, preparing medicines, 
talking, and so on. Lucia, the eleven year-old girl, had been playing alone outside her 
house. It was the beginning of the winter and the ground in Malla Malla was starting to 
be covered by the first snow of the season. While she was outside she had gone to pick 
up some apples that had fallen down from a tree. Sh also tried to collect some chicken 
eggs. When she came back inside the house however, Lucia was very different. The girl 
was behaving in a very odd way. While outside, she had been ‘caught by the devil,’ I 
was told. She could not speak properly nor walk naturally. Her gaze also seemed 
different. Lucia’s parents had already taken her to an Evangelical act of worship in Malla 
Malla, but without any encouraging results. After that event, Lucia still had a very 
strange look, and she had not been able to sleep for two days. Her legs were crooked, 
and she could not walk straight. Flora told me thatlooking in her eyes was frightening 
because she had an ‘evil spirit stuck to her blood.’  The main complaint made by Lucia’s 
mother was that they had not been able to ‘move that illness away’ (Sp. apartar la 
enfermedad). Flora told me that she had looked at her urine even if it was already clear 
that she had ‘someone’ stuck to her. She then prepared a particular lawen to protect the 
girl, medicine that she called ‘an against (Sp. contra) medicine.’ When Lucia drank the 
medicine, she started shouting and whistling, and she tried to reject such ‘against 
medicine.’ After a while however, she calmed down: the evil spirit had moved away.   
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Some months later, during one of my visits to Cauñik , I again spoke to Flora about this 
event. I was very curious about how evil relating could be seen in the urine. So while we 
were collecting some wood, I asked her about that incident. She told me that not only 
could witchraft (Ch. kalkutun) be seen in the urine, but also evidence of treventun or 
topantun moments. These were moments in which a person suddenly and literally 
bumped into a spirit while outside in the mountains. I  fact, topantun comes from the 
Spanish word topar, which means ‘to bump into.’94 In Amerindian contexts, these 
interactions have been called supernatural encounters: ‘an abnormal context wherein a 
subject is captured by another cosmologically dominant point of view,’ and consisting 
‘of suddenly finding out that the other is ‘human,’ that is, that it is the human which 
automatically dehumanizes and alienates the interlocutor and transforms him into a prey 
object’ (Viveiros de Castro 1998:483).95 
By recounting this story, I wish to make it clear that spiritual illnesses are not only 
caused by witchcraft, but also by other kinds of predatory outsiders. Moreover, what I 
would like to emphasize here is how these interactions can be screened through intensive 
vision. I recall now a brief part of a long conversation I had with Flora:  
C: Is it possible to see kalkutun or topantun in the urine? 
F: Of course. It appears. The evil spirit appears there. It presents itself (Sp. se presenta).  
C: And how does it come to presence? 
F: You can see it at the side of the person. 
C: How come? 
F: That’s the way it is. It appears there, beside th person. 
C: But never inside the person? 
                                                
94 Grebe (1975) and Oyarce (1988) have described topantun or trevuntun as sudden encounters between 
people and bad spirits. 
95 For a similar supernatural situation, see Course (2010:257): ‘The victim finds himself undergoing a 
transformation which has been affected by falling ito the perspective of another, more powerful agent. At 
the same time, the more powerful agent has not actually acted upon the victim other than to perceive him
and this makes him correspond to its own perceived reality.’ Also see Alexiades 1999, regarding similar 
situations involving edosikiana spirits. 
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F: Never, the evil spirit is next to the person, stuck over the person, sucking people’s blood. 
She added that it had not been difficult to move that spirit away, since it was stuck just 
on top of Lucia, over her. She could see this because of the wenu püllü and her contact 
with Ngenechen, she added. Ngenechen was the seer, she told me. Yet, she said, to see 
that kind of interaction was not always possible. Sometimes, when the person is too ill, 
and the illness has been ‘next to the person’ for a l ng time, nothing can be seen in the 
urine. This means that it is too late to help the person, since their ‘am has been fully 
taken,’ and therefore the human shape does not appear on the urine (Ch.willen).96 On 
such occasions, the only thing that can be seen is a very dark mark, but nothing (nobody) 
else. This had been the case when Flora had seen th urine of a very ill person who died 
four days after her visit. Even though she was alive, her am had been already taken, she 
said. On other occasions however, virtual predator ctions are sudden and devastating. 
This was the case with Flora’s brother, who died when bumping into the devil in the 
middle of the mountains, a place to which he was ‘taken away by that one.’ 
Gundermann (1981) reported in his ethnography that thirty years ago, in the same area 
where I undertook my fieldwork, a person was killed by a luminous presence. People 
explained this by saying that the cheruve caught this person’s am. 
I suggest that urine is an instrument of passage where the virtual aspect of people is 
separated from their actual side. In other words, through the performance of intensive 
vision, urine allows ‘the ordinary opacity of the human body’ (Gow 2001:135) to be put 
aside momentarily. Thus the person, as an affine, can be seen in interaction with other 
potential affines who are attempting to eat people’s human intentionality (namely, blood, 
see Chapter Two). Pelontun willen provides visual evidence of supernatural interactions 
as well as predatory dynamics and their predatory degrees. In fact, many times, these 
affectations are long-lasting processes of potential affine spirits’ nutrition. The evil 
spirits in action are usually described as ‘stuck’ or ‘attached ’ to the blood of people, an 
excessive proximity that results in the potentially fatal weakening of victims. Broadly 
speaking, what Pehuenche intensive vision is capable of doing through urine screening is 
                                                
96 This can be thought of in terms of Fausto’s (1990) ‘familiarising predation.’ 
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to translate intensive interactions into extensive images. Thus, the human shape appears 
as bounded and discretely separated from the attacker who is always on top, beside, 
and/or stuck to the person. In this sense, I suggest that herbalists can be thought of as 
extensive cartographers of the intensive conflicts of the cosmos. In fact, what they 
actually do is re-demarcate a border between the visible and the invisible, between real 
(actual) people and (virtual) Others, by interfering with the evil spirits’ constitutive 
omnipresence. As a result, the creation of a temporary absence, or a fleeting spiritual 
detachment is achieved (mostly) through specific visual capacities.  
Last but not least, in order to understand the protective nature of herbs, it is essential to 
learn something about the particular gainst-herbs medicine mentioned above. 
Unfortunately, I have no explicit ethnographic data on this topic. Yet, if I were to 
speculate about how these herbs work, I would think about possible relations between 
the owners of herbs and visual interactions. Not surprisingly, there are many stories 
asserting that the manager of herbs is indeed Ngenechen. Yet, it seems that Ngenechen 
not only keeps herbs hidden so strangers cannot find them, but also hides the very 
possibility of conceptualizing himself, always leaving final anthropological 
categorizations out of sight. 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
In Alto Bío Bío there is not a single shaman (Ch. machi). In Pitril, for instance, the last 
shaman (named Triana) died more than thirty years ago. This shamanic absence is a very 
complex subject to understand, and most people hesitat  when trying to provide reasons 
for this. I am aware that some informed readers might claim that the presence of 
shamans is very controversial within Indigenous communities and that shamans tend to 
remain invisible, even in places where they still exist, because of their ontologically 
predatory status. In my opinion, this statement is mi leading in the case of Alto Bío Bío, 
where memories involving shamans are abundant and vivi . 97 Furthermore, all the 
                                                
97 Just to give an example of this: A very old friend, remembering a time when machi were still present in 
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memories I was recounted involving shamans pointed to similar dynamics between 
shamans and püllü and herbalists and püllü, as discussed in this Chapter. Intensive vision 
was always achieved through the relation between a shaman's corporeal support and a 
püllü spirit. The outstanding fact in Alto Bío Bío is tha even if there are no shamans as 
such, shamanic functions are still alive, as is evident when considering Evangelical 
practices and lawentuncheve performances.98 What I argue here is that an essential 
element of Pehuenche healing practices is the creation of the precondition of 
signification (and social life) through intensive vision.99  Thus, following Surrales 
(2003), vision is a sensory precondition for meaning and, I would add, kinship 
reproduction. Not surprisingly, in Chedungun the verb to see (Ch. pen) points to a 
relational action of reciprocal vision between real people, implying direct and mutual 
vision (see Chapter One). 
I argue that shamanic performances in Alto Bío Bío, understood as ‘cosmic managers 
controlling the relationships of predation and exchange among different life forms and 
communities, human and non-human’ (Århem 1996:197), are held by cosmo-activists in 
the sense that they protect and work for the reaffirmation of people’s human perspectives 
from within the realm of human people. In order to do so, as Ihave tried to render 
apparent, a corporeal human support is always needed. In the case of Evangelicals, the 
Holy Spirit expresses itself through the pastor’s corporeal support (the instrument), 
                                                                                                                                     
Alto Bío Bío, told me: ‘I have seen machi in the past. I saw them when they were machis performing their 
activities… and they got into a trance, they called out to their spirit with their kultrun (shamanic drum), 
they did a wutrun (call) so the püllü arrived and started talking. It was not the person who talked, but 
rather the spirit. It was just the Ngenechen spirit. That's why another translator was needed. Have you ever 
seen a machi when she is in the püllü? Here there are no machi since all those machi spirits have left.’ 
98 For a similar argument about shamanism without shamans in another context, see Pedersen 2011. 
99 This kind of shamanism does not fit with the general Amerindian model. Amerindian shamanism has 
been conceptualized as a cosmo-political institution focused on the translation of different perspectiv s. In 
this framework, shamans are those capable of seeing other species in the way they see themselves, 
namely, as humans (Carneiro da Cunha 1998; Fausto 1999; Stolze Lima 1996; Vilaça 1999 & 2002; 
Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2004, & 2007 among many others). Thus, shamanism has essentially been 
conceived of as cosmic diplomacy devoted to the translation of ontologically disparate points of view 
(Viveiros de Castro 1998; Carneiro da Cunha 1998). Having the capacity to adopt other points of view via 
the transmutation of their bodies (Vilaça 2002) andtending to acquire the characteristics of the aggressor 
(Vilaça 1992 & 2002), shamans are in charge of a transversal communication among non-communicated 
entities (Viveiros de Castro 2010). The shaman is aspokesman for other species (Viveiros de Castro 
1986), capable of crossing ontological borders (Viveiros de Castro 2004). 
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having as a result a subject of vision that emerges from this relation between the virtual 
(Holy Spirit) and the actual (instrument). In the case of lawentuncheves, it is the wenu 
püllü, the one who sees, that is in a relation with the healer’s corporeal support. I suggest 
that the accomplishment of this act of intensive vision, which aims at the deconstruction 
of potential affinity (alterity), necessarily requires the presence of the ordinary opacity 
of the corporeal support (identity). If I am correct in framing Pehuenche healing 
practices as predicated on Amerindian kinship process, this may be due to the 
tautological fact that, within healing practices, ‘consanguinity’ (as a constructed human 
body) needs to be present in order to reassert consanguinity. The intensity of the püllü 
spirit would not be such without the presence of human corporeal support. It is the 
assemblage of the actors and the resulting intensiv vision that allows the (re)creation of 
the relational human field put into question by the evil relating. In other words, I suggest 
that the (de)communicational hinge embedded in intensiv  vision emerges through the 
relation between human (corporeal support) and non-human (spiritual intensities). What 
connects or separates the actual and the virtual is not the presence of the püllü spirits 
itself, as has been argued by Viveiros de Castro (2007) for the xapiripë spirits, but the 
assemblage of virtual and actual that I have called intensive vision. If we consider that 
healers are privileged because they can indeed establish kinship relations with spirits, 
this very capacity and force should be related, as Bacigalupo (2004) has already shown, 
to their belonging to different and multiple intensities of kinship. However, my point is 
also that there is no visual human agency whatsoever when healing practices are 
performed, but rather a kind of transcendental vision activated through the practices of 
cosmo-activism, understood as the strengths stemming from true people being together 
in mutual recognition. Notably, to be ‘accompanied’ or to be ‘together’ can be expressed 
as ‘to be one’ (Ch. kiñewün), which also means ‘to be many.’ Furthermore, this 
expression is often used within a ritual where similarity is created (Ch. kiñewünküleygün 
ngillatun mew). To be alone then (as the sick person is), might be problematic precisely 
because the person’s status as human is not being fully activated by other people through 
mutual vision. 
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Having said this, my ethnography should not be anthropologically absorbed by those 
reflections that fully relate perspectival shamanism to a practice of immanence 
(Pedersen 2001; Holbraad & Willerslev 2007).100 It should rather be thought of as a 
particular case in which a radical, non-relational ontological parallelism is at stake:101 
there is a virtual world of intensities that in a wy remains fully outside of Pehuenche 
being. In other words, within Pehuenche ontology it is impossible to deny that the 
presence of spirits is a constituve relation, and some shamanic functions embedded in 
intensive vision remain outsiders tout court. 
Finally, when taking into consideration healing practices and intensive vision (wenu 
püllü and the Holy Spirit in particular, and the presence of Ngenechen in general), it is 
clear that a post-ethnographic theoretical argument trying to categorize the Pehuenche 
within a dualist or non-dualist ontology would be totally misleading. Or, in the words of 
Strathern (2011:127), an anthropologist aspiring to provide a coherent account would be 
‘relieved of any final reckoning in terms of difference or similarity.’ Dichotomised 
categorizations such as immanent/transcendent or dualist/non-dualist would not be 
useful tools with which to grasp the ambiguous and open-ended Pehuenche 
conceptualization of being.102 Having said this, let us now explore what happens when 
Pehuenche ontologies are the subject of strong, clear, and distinct attempts at 
categorization, through an exploration of how the Chilean State is dealing with these 
spiritual health issues and by focusing on its main assumptions and practices.  
                                                
100 Stephen Hugh-Jones’ (1996) elaboration of Jonathan Hill’s (1984) distinction between ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal’ forms of shamanism would not really fit within this ethnography. Even if some similarities 
can be found between horizontal shamanism and the cosmo-activist shamanism I describe in this Chapter 
(such as the relevance of ‘doing’ as opposed to ‘saying’), horizontal shamanism has always been 
associated with the exchange of perspectives performance. However, for horizontal and vertical shamanic 
conceptualizations among the Mapuche, see Course 2012.
101 For a similar idea about this parallelism, see Rio, in press. 
102 For a similar point see Course 2012. For a critical argument about non-dualist meta-cosmological 
theory with a specific ontology see Scott 2011.  
 146 
 




The Cultural Vision of the State: Reflections on intercultural 
illuminations 
 
Relations between Pehuenche people and the Chilean State have been characterized by a 
remarkable ideological contradiction that has become increasingly apparent during the 
last few decades. Whereas the Chilean State acknowledges the collective rights of 
Indigenous peoples through the implementation of specific policies such as those 
relating to intercultural health, many of the naturl esources present in Indigenous 
territories are being exploited for the global market (see Stavenhagen 1990; Bengoa 
2000; Hernandez 2003; Mallon 2004; Pinto 2003; Latta 2004; Mella 2007; Aylwin 2007; 
Boccara 2007; Richards 2010; Di Giminiani 2011). In this Chapter, I will discuss one of 
the most important political activities performed by the Chilean State and its public 
health institutions in Alto Bío Bío during recent years: the act of ‘visualizing’ - as 
workers of the State call it - the existence of traditional healers within Indigenous 
communities.103 My aim in this Chapter will be to disentangle what the concept of 
‘visualizing’ entails for the multicultural vision of public health institutions. I begin the 
Chapter with an ethnographic description of how State actions in ‘Intercultural Health’ 
are implemented. I suggest that the visibility of public health in Pehuenche communities 
is constructed through a clear, bounded and a priori idea of what cultural difference is, 
and is based on univocal understandings of the body. I go on to explore how this 
visualization of Pehuenche practitioners implies, through the creation of ‘protocols of 
referral’ for Pehuenche patients, a system of visible transportation of people to and from 
places that were not necessarily connected before the government initiatives. I suggest 
                                                
103 For classic anthropological literature arguing for the ethnography and study of the State, see Sahlins 
(1976) and Schneider (1976). 
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that such protocols work as a matrix for the representation of the State as a single and 
bounded entity, providing us with a visible and reductionist fiction of a single and 
coherent model of the healing world in Alto Bío Bío.104  In the final section of this 
Chapter, I will describe how the emergent initiatives called ‘Intercultural Health’ are 
founded upon Western mental health practices. I conclude by providing ethnographic 
evidence of the practical consequences of this equivocated relationship between mind 
and culture which has quite a dramatic impact on the lives of Pehuenche people. 
 
4.1. ‘And where is ‘the Origin’’? 
When I first arrived in Cauñikú, the psychologist at Cesfam took me to meet Flora, the 
lawentuncheve who was associated with the public health service in Cauñikú. He had 
previously arranged this meeting from Ralco, on the radio frequency that connects all 
the rural posts to each other. He had left a messag for Flora with the local worker who 
lived in the clinic, announcing our arrival. It took us about an hour to get to Cauñikú 
from Ralco, on a very dusty road along the mountains. Once there, the first thing I 
noticed was that the rural clinic and Flora's house were very close to each other, 
separated only by a rusty iron fence. I was actually struck by this proximity, since in 
Alto Bío Bío large distances between places of residence are very common and almost a 
rule. The psychologist mentioned that Flora and her family used to live in Rahueco, a 
place far away from the road, up in the mountains, but they had moved their residence 
closer to the road a few years before. Now both the rural clinic and Flora's house were 
easily reachable and visible from the road, and all the movements going on along the 
road were also fully visible from Flora's house. I was told that this rendered 
communication with the lawentuncheve easier, which had not been the case when her 
family lived in Rahueco.  
Flora was the youngest sister of Greta. They both belonged to a family in Cauñikú that is 
                                                
104 For further analysis of the magical, spiritual and religious mechanisms through which the image and 
the strengths of the State are created, see Taussig 1997.   
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well-known for their expertise in healing and their knowledge (Ch. kimun) of healing 
herbs (Ch. lawen) (see Chapter Three). Greta had died some years before, when they 
were already living near the road. Until then, Flora had not been the person in charge of 
making a diagnosis using urine or preparing medicines for patients - Greta was. The 
latter was indeed very well-known for taking care of patients throughout the Queuco 
Valley. Nowadays however, Flora is the lawentuncheve of Cauñikú, and she collaborates 
with the State’s public health services. She is one f the three herbalists in Alto Bío Bío 
considered to be a link to the public health program called the ‘Intercultural Health 
Program.’ 
When we arrived, the first question she asked us was regarding a person she called ‘ l 
Orígen,’ someone who had not been around for ages, she said. ‘¿Y el Orígen?’ And 
where is el Orígen? I did not understand the question, and I did not k w the person she 
was referring to. The psychologist told me that el Orígen was his boss, and that they 
usually came to visit Flora together to help her with practical needs. A couple of weeks 
later, I went to visit another lawentuncheve in Alto Bío Bío named María, in the 
community of Callaqui. At the entrance to her house, I was asked if I knew el Orígen. 
This repetition appeared to be more than just a coincidence. Orígenes is a Spanish word 
that means ‘beginnings,’ or ‘origins’ and the phrase el orígen means ‘the beginning,’ or 
‘the Origin.’ In Flora's utterance, the word orígen is being used as a proper noun to refer 
to a particular person - it is the nickname of a person associated with both the 
psychologist and the public health service workers. Within the public health service 
however, Orígenes is the name of a well-known national program based on Chilean 
Indigenous policies, as I will explain below. Later on in my fieldwork, I found out that 
the first time Flora had met el Orígen was at her former house in Rahueco. It was not 
fully clear how and when Greta, Flora, and one of their brothers, Jerman, moved to live 
near the road. What is clear, however, is that this program and el Orígen had influenced 
that move. 
That meeting between el Orígen and Flora’s family had taken place at the beginning of 
this century, when Greta was still alive and Flora was not yet fully dedicated to working 
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for her community, but was simply helping her sister. Then, el Orígen, who was working 
for the Orígenes program, had arrived with the idea of filming a documentary about 
traditional healers, accompanied by a Pehuenche person who nowadays occupies an 
important role within the local government. Unfortunately, I did not meet Greta 
personally since she had died before I started withmy fieldwork. However, I did see her 
face in the documentary filmed by el Orígen entitled Los Curanderos de Alto Bío Bío, 
‘The Healers of Alto Bío Bío.’ As I was told by el Orígen himself, the goal of this film 
was to ‘visualize’ local agents of healing in Alto Bío Bío. 
Orígenes is the name of a national program launched by the C ilean president Ricardo 
Lagos in 2001, funded using credit from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
and further economic collaboration from the State. The Orígenes program is framed by 
Chilean Indigenous policies called the N w Deal for Indigenous Peoples. The program 
was run with IDB credit of US$80 million provided to he Chilean government, plus an 
investment of US$53 million from the Chilean government itself. This program was 
aimed at improving the capacities and opportunities of rural Indigenous communities in 
Chile, focusing on fostering the Areas of Indigenous Development (Sp. Areas de 
Desarrollo Indígena or ADI) established by the Indigenous Law in the nineties. 
Orígenes intervention was made with the collaboration of public services working in 
areas such as education, health, and economic developm nt. Among this program’s 
initiatives was a focus on what was called ‘intercultural health,’ specifically aimed at 
improving the quality of and access to public health services by incorporating traditional 
practices into public health policies. 105 For Flora however, the program Orígenes was a 
person, the current chief of the department of the district’s Ministry of Health, who had 
been an Orígenes employee in Alto Bío Bío in the past. In several conversations I had 
with Flora during my fieldwork, she used the word Orígenes in different ways – it was 
                                                
105 As Bendel (2002) has suggested, the notion of intercultural health is formed on the understanding of 
the difference between traditional and Western healt  systems. Western healthcare is based on 
scientific/modern/progressive concepts, in contrast to the idea of traditional medicine as magico-
religious/traditional/static. For a further critical nalysis of this program in terms of governance and the 
governmentality of Indigenous peoples, see Boccara 2007, Boccara et al. 2008, and Cetti 2009. These 
scholars consider the Orígenes program to be a key tool of Chilean new-indigenism framed by neoliberal 
multicultural policies that encourage participation in such programs as a key strategy of governance. 
 151 
not understood as an abstract program, but rather ref rred to a particular person who had 
arrived, some years ago, at her house and into her life. In Flora's words:  
I was very sad when my sister died. I took care of her while she was ill. When she died, I 
did not want to do anything, even if my sister had asked me to keep on working - I was 
too sad. After one or two months, el Orígen came, and he tried to cheer me up. Before 
dying, my sister told me that el Orígen had helped us a lot. 
When the Orígenes program arrived in Alto Bío Bío, it did so with explicit intervention 
purposes, one of them being to focus on the development, empowerment, and 
reinforcement of Indigenous medicine. The proximity of the rural clinic to Flora's house, 
for instance, can be seen as a pragmatic result of this. However, it is extremely important 
to note that the Orígenes program arrived in Alto Bío Bío (and in Southern Chile in 
general) at a time when there were many political problems between Indigenous people 
and the State (see Aylwin & Yanez 2007). Furthermore, there was a general atmosphere 
of increasing political instability within the country. In this national scenario, Alto Bío 
Bío had already been affected by the controversial construction of hydroelectric dams, 
which had mobilized different actors within the political scene. During this period, 
communities in the Queuco valley had also begun to organize the autonomous re-
appropriation of lands - an action that was highly controversial and ended with two 
Pehuenche people being killed in Cauñikú. Jose Bengoa (2009) has argued that this 
conflict can be understood as an expected result of Mapuche conflicts, which tend to end 
in internal killings framed by an alleged ‘Mapuche sacrificial platform.’ This view was 
considered completely erroneous by all Pehuenche people I met in the field however, 
who clearly recognized the involvement of non-Pehuench  people in this controversial 
event. To better understand the historical context of this event, see the brief historical 
summary in the introduction of this thesis. These contextual aspects need to be kept in 
mind when analyzing the emergence of ‘intercultural health’ programs in Alto Bío Bío. 
 
4.2 The invention of an intercultural visibility 
The main problem people working for Orígenes faced when trying to implement 
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initiatives that involved traditional healers was the difficulty in knowing who the ‘local 
agents’ working in health issues actually were. One of the most striking things these 
workers of the State noticed was that no one within Indigenous communities spoke 
about traditional healers. The person in charge of running this program once told me in 
an interview:  
Local agents were not visible, their actions were in some way hidden in the territory. But 
this does not mean that there were no healing practices, because there have always been 
practices of healing in the territory - lawentuncheve, midwives, etc.  
It is worthwhile mentioning that during the Pinochet dictatorship, Pehuenche midwives 
were violently persecuted, arrested, and discriminated gainst, so any attempts on behalf 
of the State to work on health issues within these communities were seen, in the view of 
this program leader, as highly dangerous for Pehuenche people. For the moment, I will 
leave aside the question of whether or not this truly eflects the point of view of 
Pehuenche people. I met a couple of women who used to do the work of midwives when 
there was no access to Chilean hospitals. One of them ad been jailed for many years 
because of her work, and the other was not working as much nowadays since this 
activity, she told me, was privada by the State. This is a Spanish word used in a 
particular way in Alto Bío Bío to refer to what has been forbidden, or literally, taken 
away (its antonym in daily use is permitido, ‘authorized’). Judith, a Pehuenche woman 
who used to work as both a l wentuncheve and as a midwife within her community told 
me that she had to give up her work as a midwife since it was privado. Orígenes 
considered the persecution of midwives to be a coherent and sufficient explanation for 
the alleged invisibility of ‘local agents’ of healing. In its implementation, the national 
Orígenes program had to overcome a complex situation therefore - namely, the apparent 
absence of people willing to speak about local agents of healing and the invisibility of 
these actors.106 In the words of the person in charge of the Orígenes program:  
                                                
106 In Chapter Two I have discussed how complex and difficult the speech acts related to witchcraft and 
healing practices are from a native perspective. Here I am interested in emphasizing the State’s logic f 
action. In this sense, I am aware that the argument tha  lawentucheve disappeared because of 
discrimination under Pinochet is typical of those arguments which assume that the ‘object’ is out there but 
 153 
No one spoke about these people within Indigenous cmmunities, and for people like me 
who just arrived it was not easy at all because Pehuenche people could not tell you who 
was or was not a herbalist, this is a lawentuncheve, this is not.  
Within this context, people working for Orígenes had to design strategies aimed at 
making Indigenous medicine visible. In their own words, above all they had to carry out 
a process of ‘visualizing’ traditional healers, a process that was one of the first and 
biggest efforts the Orígenes program, undertaken in order to improve the public health 
system and to fulfill their own goals. As is usual within developmental projects of this 
kind, the functionaries of Orígenes had to find a quick way to invest the money coming 
from the Chilean State and the International Bank. I  short, ‘visualizing local agents’ 
consisted of focusing on finding and validating interlocutors within the communities 
who could collaborate with the State program. This process was carried out through the 
organization of collective gatherings called ‘meetings in intercultural health,’ where 
people from Indigenous communities came together to share food offered by State 
workers. These meetings aimed at rendering visible local agents of healing, since the 
Orígenes program had to quickly demonstrate results for its ole in intercultural health. 
Concretely, the actions of workers involved in this program were mainly focused on 
making contact with the three herbalists in the area, because, as the person in charge of 
this told me, ‘as the State, you cannot have political dialogues if you do not have 
actors.’107 In this context, the invisibility of traditional healers, or the difficulties in 
rendering them visible was seen as a local tendency that would not be helpful for the 
eventual success of the government program. The aim of Orígenes was then ‘to visualize 
valid interlocutors’ and to generate what they called the ‘cultural validation’ of the 
people who were going to take part in the process of conversation/negotiation with the 
State. Thus, el Orígen initially spoke to different people who were retained as ‘agents of 
medicine,’ even if many of the people initially identified as such did not participate in 
this process in the end. El Orígen met Greta when she was living in Rahueco, where 
                                                                                                                                     
has been obscured by external rather than internal forces, i.e. the nature of the ‘object’ itself is never in 
doubt and Pehuenche healing appears as isomorphic to Chilean healing. 
107 The very concept of dialogue is problematic since it implies firstly that Pehuenche people have already 
‘recognized’ the Chilean State as an interlocutor, and secondly, that they want to enter into a dialogue with 
it. This will be discussed further in Chapter Five.  
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they had several conversations and friendly exchanges while drinking mate tea around 
the fogón (fire). The purpose of Orígenes was to assess how to negotiate a process of 
‘collocation’ of these ‘agents of medicine’ that would ensure positive results for the 
people involved; what in the words of the chief of the program was seen as ‘a sort of 
indirect recognition.’ This kind of recognition has been conceptualized by Povinelli 
(2002:6) as a multicultural form of recognition that works to inspire ‘subaltern and 
minority subjects to identify with the impossible object of an authentic self-identity, i.e. 
a domesticated, non-conflictual traditional form of s ciality and (inter)subjectivity.’ 
The challenge for the national Orígenes program laid in the following premises: 
Pehuenche medicine is important; there are local agents of healing; they are not visible; 
Indigenous health is not recognized within Indigenous communities; Orígenes action 
should aim to make these agents of healing visible. In order to do so, the State offered 
certain benefits to the new visible ‘agents.’ As el Orígen told me, a ‘narrative’ about this 
process of ‘recognition’ of local agents was constructed, and new, visible Centers for 
Pehuenche Medicine were created and fostered. These new ‘intercultural’ performances 
mainly consisted of making some visible signs and posters with the words Centre for 
Pehuenche Medicine that were placed outside the houses of the people involved. 
Our biggest task has been to render them visible.108 So they can negotiate with the State, 
because there is intervention, but our intervention is about having more culture, if there 
is more culture, there is more health. To strengthen cultural systems always produces 
positive effects in the lifestyles of people. That's why you need to base your work on the 
Center for Pehuenche Medicine, within their territories - what makes their medicine 
Pehuenche. 
I was told this in an interview with el Orígen. These Centres for Pehuenche Medicine 
then were one of the new ways in which the State presented itself to the Pehuenche 
communities. Through these specific and localized images, the State and its public 
health policies aimed to be ‘discursively imagined as something greater than simply its 
local manifestations’ (Sharma & Gupta 2006:19). The general assumption behind this 
was to advertise among Pehuenche people - through this process of rendering visible – 
                                                
108 These practices can be framed by what Ecks (2009) has called Colonial Enlightenment, an ongoing 
attempt to ‘enlighten’ or ‘illuminate' bodies without really succeeding. 
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the fact that there were lawentuncheves working in their communities, having as a point 
of departure the assumption that people did not know about their existence, or at least 
that people did not talk about them because they did not know about them. In order to 
engage with ‘local agents,’ what the State offered the herbalists was an improvement of 
the places where they saw their patients, to provide them with beds for patients who 
needed to stay overnight, to build some toilets, as well as other kinds of material 
benefits. After a year of work, the State workers considered these actions very successful 
and remarkable since ‘Lawentuncheves became more visible within their communities.’ 
For State workers, this meant that they had indeed reinforced more culture, and 
therefore, more health. Having said this, the location of the rural clinic in relation to 
Flora’s house cannot be seen as a random coincidence, but rather as the result of a 
national political strategy coordinated in conjunction with international capital. In a way, 
and at least in its external manifestations, Flora's world was remade under the impress of 
economic pressures (Biehl 2005). 
On the other hand, this process of visualization also implied the transportation of people 
to places that were considered to be more strategic for the implementation of the 
Intercultural Health Program. As far as the ‘collocation’ of these newly recognized 
agents of healing was concerned, state workers used their own time to help Indigenous 
healers move. For instance, l Orígen told me that he had helped Greta take their 
belongings down the hill when they moved from Rahueco to their new house beside the 
Cauñikú post. However, soon after having moved to her new house, Greta died. This 
death was a concern for el Orígen, since without Greta it was not clear what would 
happen to the intercultural program in Cauñikú. At her funeral, el Orígen himself had 
asked the people there if they knew what was going to happen. He told me:  
We do not intervene within cultural territories, even if I am an expert in intervention. At 
her funeral I was given the opportunity to talk and I just asked what was going to 
happen then, because when Greta died no one thought Flora could have assumed her 
role.  
Thus, el Orígen was very concerned about loosing one of the interlocutors that had been 
involved in the implementation of these so-called Centres for Pehuenche Medicine. His 
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concern is not surprising at all, since el Orígen himself had been the origin of this new 
trend of intercultural visibility.109 
If we look carefully at the State’s practices described above and focus on the steps 
involved in the implementation of the ‘Intercultural Health Program,’ some of the 
univocal assumptions of the State come to the fore. First of all, the clear and distinct 
visibility of practitioners of healing is necessary as this visible status is seen as an 
essential requirement for the application of this program locally. The kinds of relations 
Pehuenche people might establish with these ‘local agents’ is taken for granted however, 
since for the State, it does not really matter what t ese traditional healers do, what 
healing is for them, and what their practices are. Furthermore, there is no real 
consideration of how Pehuenche people behave and what they really do when needing 
the help of a person capable of healing. Healing, i this sense, is taken for granted, and it 
is assumed from the outset that people in these communities refer to healing 
practitioners in a similar way people from a big Chilean city may seek a doctor’s 
consultation for a cure. In sum, the State’s actions focused on what was considered a 
priority - namely, to identify the bounded and single bodies of traditional healers, based 
on the assumption that practices of healing needed to be visible for Indigenous 
communities. State practices, in this sense, do not accept the antonym of visibility. Let's 
advance this idea a bit further: invisibility, and the possibility of dealing with forces, 
beings, or non-humans that are not fully visible, is outside of the State’s ontological 
repertoire. In other words, the Chilean State is truly Rousseauian, since the installation 
of the State also involves acceding to reason, which guarantees proper visible 
procedures. The State, as Rousseau conceived of it,is opposed to invisibility as an 
ontological possibility for being. To put it differntly, the intercultural program is 
designed for univocal visible humans (whose visible humanity is taken for granted) as 
the unique ontological possibility - the unique possibility of existence. Thus, the 
implementation of the intercultural health program is a work of purification: the 
hygienic construction of a nature separated off from society (Latour 1993), of a visible 
                                                
109 For further analysis of the invention of ‘Intercultural Health’ in Southern Chile see Cetti (2009).  
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realm separated from an invisible one. The general assumption embedded into the 
practices of the State is that these traditional heers were already out there and they just 
needed to be ‘illuminated,’ or, as functionaries of the State prefer, ‘visualized,’ and 
rendered public in order to be ready for use. Public policies need public bodies. 
Moreover, intercultural public policies need the existence of different cultures that are 
defined by and through the State’s actions as a matter of fact and not as a ‘'matter of 
concern’ (Latour 2005). In other words, although the existence of lawentuncheves before 
the arrival of the intercultural program is not in question, they were (re)enacted by the 
State’s actions and were brought into being in particular ways and through particular 
scenarios. Moreover, the ‘culture’ that the State was defining through its local actions 
was a ‘culture’ that should in some way respond to similar logics of care stemming from 
Western tradition. Here, I use the word ‘culture’ in a similar manner as Carneiro da 
Cunha (2009). She has argued that  
To speak about the invention of culture is not to speak about culture, but about ‘culture’, 
namely, a reflexive meta-discourse about culture. The coexistence between ‘culture’ (as 
a resource or weapon to make up identities in front of ational states or the international 
community) and culture (that invisible network of which we take part) produces specific 
result (Carneiro da Cunha 2009:372, my own translation). 
What I am trying to emphasize here is that these traditional healers were not just 
‘discovered’ by the State, but rather were enacted by its practices. This process of 
enacting consists of giving shape to a particular re lity, now called ‘intercultural,’ that 
involves the alleged preexistence of these lawentuncheve. However, it is worthwhile 
mentioning that the way I met the lawentuncheve during my fieldwork was through 
information I received from state workers. For example, I met Flora for the first time 
because of the local psychologist. Ethnographies of scientific practices have discussed in 
depth the question of how different ontologies are b ought into being, rendering it 
apparent that ‘reality does not precede the mundane practices in which we interact with 
it, but is rather shaped in these practices’ (Mol 1999:75). ‘What exists,’ in this case (l 
Orígen, Flora, the psychologist, myself, and so on) is always the ongoing effect of 
historically situated practices, including their mutual interactions (Haraway 1997; Law 
& Hassard 1999; Mol 2002). However, my point here is that the enacting of these 
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traditional healers, under the frame of the intercultural program, was based on a 
particular assumption of what humans and bodies are all about, without questioning 
what ‘humanity’ might be for Pehuenche people living in these communities (see 
Chapters One, Two and Three). In other words, and to say it bluntly, in enacting these 
local agents, what we might call intercultural illuminations, or local understandings 
about how particular practices of healing were taking shape, were not considered. But if 
this is the case, how did the implementation of this program proceed? 
 
4.2.1 From visible bodies to visible paths  
Protocols. I heard this word many times during my formal and informal conversations 
with professionals working in the public health services: ‘We work with clear protocols 
when we have patients that need a shaman.’ ‘We organize our work in intercultural 
health very well, through very well-designed protocls we have for that purpose.’ ‘We 
avoid working just by using our intuitive ideas, that's why we have protocols.’ Doctors, 
psychologists, intercultural facilitators, administrative staff, and so on, all pointed out 
the existence of protocols as a key element in dealing with Pehuenche patients who 
presented with problems that could not be healed by medical doctors. I should make 
clear that intercultural facilitators are a role crated by the government of Eduardo Frei 
(1994-2000). They consist in the incorporation of a local Indigenous person into teams 
of public health workers. In short, their role in practice is to act as translators from 
Mapudungun to Spanish when this is needed, as well as to collaborate in the 
bureaucratic activities of the public health institutions (see Cetti 2009). However, during 
my conversations, it was not fully clear to me what this word ‘protocol’ might mean in 
practice, nor how this way of working was being performed in daily life. My curiosity 
about these protocols increased progressively and I insisted on gaining more information 
about them. I had the impression that this word refer d to a very concrete set of 
procedures, that (I wrongly expected) would have ben carefully defined and written 
down. However, the most elaborate and explicit information I received about these 
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protocols was the image below. Carefully examining this diagram brings to the fore the 
assumptions related to the intercultural initiatives of the public services. The image 
depicts the routes or paths a particular patient is expected to take, under the supervision 
of public health workers, before gaining access to a shaman (Ch. machi). There is a 
sequence of relations and contacts patients should go through, to be followed in a linear 
fashion, according to particular steps on the route. 
 
 
Figure 4. Protocols of referral 
 
The lines that define the transportation of people from one point to another are the 
following: first, a person who lives in a Pehuenche ommunity is expected to go to the 
local post. It is here that a functionary of the State, who only once a week is a 
professional doctor, establishes the first contact with the patient. Then, if the patient’s 
condition is not fully clear and understandable to the public health workers, the person is 
given a check-up by one of the lawentuncheve who collaborates with the post. In the 
words of the chief of the intercultural program in Alto Bío Bío: Pehuenche people must 
see a lawentuncheve and follow these protocols if they ‘really love their culture’:  
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The protocols define the procedures to follow when the intervention of a shaman is 
needed […]. The first step that must be followed in case a person needs to be seen by a 
shaman involves the lawentuncheve. If you are Pehuenche, and respect your territory 
and love your culture, you must respect the role that a lawentuncheve has. 
The diagram, in this sense, represents not only particular understandings of what respect, 
love, and culture are, but also the definition of what it is ‘to be a Pehuenche.’ The 
negative implication here is that if you do not go to a lawentuncheve you are not 
Pehuenche, which means that all those Pehuenche people attending Evangelical 
worships (see Chapter Three), are not Pehuenche. Thus, practices defined by the State 
bring into being a particular understanding about what ‘culture’ is. This is considered a 
political strategy (Cetti 2009) involving the politic zation of culture (Wright 1998). 
Thus, protocols of referral are enacting what has been described as the stereotype of a 
hyper-real Indian (Ramos 1992), which takes shape according to the particular 
assumptions of the State. According to Hale (1998), the so-called hyper-real Indian 
would correspond to a perfect image of the expectations of the State: being unable to act, 
except for reflecting upon the imposed preconceptions f the State. Furthermore, the 
State can only work with a particular Indio, namely, the Indio Permitido, the ‘authorized 
Indian’ (Hale 2004), who does not imply any sort of threat to the State. According to 
Hale (2004), in the context of Latin American neoliberal cultural projects the model of 
unitary citizenship is promoted by policies of assimilation, precluding any cultural 
specificity. This leads to the creation of contradictory identity frames in which to fit 
Indigenous people. In contrast to a ‘modern’ I dio Permitido, who has ‘substituted 
protest with proposal, and learned to be both authentic and fully conversant with the 
dominant milieu,’ the Other is ‘unruly, vindictive and conflict prone’ (Hale 2004:19). 
The ‘authorized Indian’ is invited to transit throughout a social space hegemonically 
constructed or composed, as has been argued by Ramos (2005), of places of mobility 
and places of immobility. Consequently, if we consider carefully what people do in order 
to be healed (Chapter Three) and at the same time take seriously the words of the 
administrative health worker and his definition of ‘culture,’ we would be forced to 
conclude that most of the Pehuenche people do not love their culture. What is interesting 
to stress for the moment is how the State, through its local ‘intercultural health’ 
 161 
practices, is undertaking its activities with a particular understanding of ‘culture’: 
Culture is an abstraction and has a bounded meaning. 
The diagram also shows how the lawentuncheve’s house is next to the rural post; a fact 
that we have already mentioned and analyzed as a result of wider administrative, 
political, and economical procedures. At this point  the referral protocol, the 
lawentuncheve talks with the patient and decides whether the intrvention of a shaman is 
needed or not. If this is the decision the lawentuncheve comes to, the ‘intercultural 
health’ team of the clinic in Ralco, with the ‘cultral’ advice and collaboration of 
Pehuenche people working within this institution, then makes the final call in deciding if 
the intervention of a shaman is in fact needed. If this is the case, the Ralco clinic 
provides a van to transport the person to the house f a particular shaman who lives very 
far away (at least 400 kilometers away) from Ralco. Even though the shaman involved 
in this protocol is a Mapuche healer, she belongs to a community that is far away from 
Alto Bío Bío, both geographically and culturally. It is worth pointing out that there is 
also a hierarchical aspect to the roles of Indigenous healers. Implicitly, the role of the 
shaman is seen by the State as superior to that of the lawentuncheve. This does not 
necessarily reflect Pehuenche understandings of the differences between these two types 
of healers however (see Chapter Three).  It is the intercultural health team that schedules 
this visit with the shaman. Thus, we have a clear squence of steps that a person in need 
(and who loves his or her ‘culture’) should follow in order to be transported to a 
shaman’s residence by the clinic’s driver. This transportation is free of charge for the 
patient, who travels with other patients and (generally) the intercultural facilitator, and 
this is very often used by public health workers as a key argument to highlight the 
benevolence of the intercultural health program. It is apparent however that all kinds of 
inequalities between the Chilean State and Pehuenche people remain ideologically 
invisible (Žižek 2009) and hidden by this cynical economic argument. 
What is missing from this diagram is that many times, if a patient is out of control and 
his or her violent behavior implies a risk for other people, a further step in between the 
clinic and the shaman is needed. In these cases patients are taken to the nearest hospital, 
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the Hospital of Santa Bárbara, to be treated with pharmaceuticals in order to help them 
‘calm down.’ When dealing with patients who are outf control, the hospital is where, 
according to the psychologist of the clinic, patients are sedated until they can follow the 
route toward the shaman. Moreover, another issue that is not apparent from this diagram 
was summarized during my first week in the field by a Pehuenche woman who used to 
be my neighbour: 
The Ralco clinic takes us to the shaman, they help us with the transport, we do not need 
to pay, and they take us to the South, far away from here. Recently, however, they have 
not made any trips, since the situation in the South wi h the Mapuche is hot, so they do 
not want to go. There are many conflicts there, so they have stopped going.  
The conflicts mentioned here by María refer to land conflicts between the State and 
Indigenous populations, and demonstrations by Mapuche people in the South.110 For 
María, and for the public health services conflicts are somewhere else, in the South, not 
here in Alto Bío Bío. It is interesting that the image illustrating these health service 
protocols has been drawn over a very simple green, mpty area of land that does not 
depict the existence of hydroelectric dams, forest industries, and so on, that have been, 
sources of intense conflict in Alto Bío Bío. These ar  of course ethnographically less 
visible (Farmer 2004) local history and the global political economy are not part of the 
protocolscape, so to speak, enacted by the State through the impostion of practices 
concerned with the transportation of people. In other words, protocols of referral appear 
as being enacted over a non-violent zero level (Žižek 2009), an a priori peaceful state of 
affairs in Alto Bío Bío. This state of affairs is possible because of ideological regulations 
and should not be thought of as a social dimension that is taken for granted. Following 
Žižek (2009), protocols of referral themselves help to maintain the status quo of the 
inherent and objective violence of the system.111 This fact is what Žižek (2009:87) calls 
a ‘fetishistic disavowal’ present in totalitarian systems and neoliberal societies, and is 
expressed in Octave Mannoni’s (1963) well-known saying ‘Je sais bien, mais quand 
même’: I know very well, but nevertheless. We know very well what the State has done 
                                                
110 For a current analysis of land conflicts, see Bengoa 1999; Richards 2004; Mallon 2004; Bacigalupo 
2007; Di Giminiani 2011. 
111 For particular ways of exercising power sovereignty through repeated acts of violence over human 
bodies and populations, see Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2005. 
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with Pehuenche lands and what it represents, but we nev rtheless accept its procedures 
when dealing with ‘intercultural health,’ a concept created by the State itself. I use the 
word ‘we’ here to refer to all those people in Alto Bío Bío who are taking part in this 
process of transportation and are part of a wider process that has been called, using 
Foucauldian reasoning, ‘ethnogovernmentality’ (Boccara 2007): 
‘Intercultural Health represents a new social engineering within a new diagram of 
knowing/power. It can be thought of as a new type of governmentality that produces emergent, 
collective or individual, ethnic subjects through a double dynamic of ethnicization and 
responsibilization. Through the implementation of intercultural health programs, the relations 
between social and individual bodies, public and private spheres, individual and population and 
the State and its citizen are modified and rethought’ (Boccara 2007:186, my translation).112  
Having said this, what can we learn from the State’s protocols of referral in intercultural 
health? What kinds of bodies are being enacted by the State, and how? The visual 
artifact representing State practices discussed above renders explicit how the State 
operates in people’s daily lives, and allows us to approach the State not as an abstract 
entity, but through its daily practices (Rose 2006; Mitchell 2006). Furthermore, these 
protocols actually show us how the State presents itself to people in their communities, 
transporting bodies through paths or lines that, even if they are deliberately constructed, 
are taken for granted as a priori realities. It seems to me that the transportation of people 
from one point to another is the final aim of the intercultural program.113 By doing so, 
people can be counted, and results can be provided to the central administrative offices 
of the Ministry of Health, a trend that fits perfectly with what Hacking (1991) calls our 
growing ‘fetishism for numbers,’ a trend that defins worlds in very particular ways. 
These protocols of referral can be understood as mundane bureaucratic procedures or 
stereotyped practices that allow us to understand the micro-politics of the State. These 
micro-politics need clear and distinct actors in order to function; actors who in this case, 
                                                
112  For a foundational discussion about the concept of governmentality, see Foucault 1991, 2004a & 
2004b and Ferguson & Gupta 2002. A more accurate review of Foucault’s conceptualizations of 
governmentality and biopower would goes beyond the possibilities and targets of this thesis.  
113  As Boccara (2007) argues, as much as this program is intended to facilitate intercultural 
communication, it reaffirms the ultimate domination f Indigenous knowledge in several ways: the 
incorporation of traditional Indigenous medicine into a frame predetermined and dictated by the Western 
healthcare system, the de-politicization of the Indigenous historical identity, and the refusal to recognize 
the actual social and political context of Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations.  
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correspond to clear and distinct bodies that are considered to be bounded, singular, and 
in the unique shape of what ‘humanity’ is: they are universal bodies.  
In short: one state, one nature. In this sense, the visualizing process of the State does not 
end with the ‘discovery’ of ‘local agents’ of healing, which is nothing more than a new 
version of colonial practices, but also necessarily implies the creation of lines for the 
transportation of people, or bodies, who actually refer to these actors of healing. Thus, 
the practices of the State create paths that can be followed again and again by different 
people. Furthermore, these protocols of referral are the creation of a bureaucratic 
authority structure (Sharma & Gupta 2006) that is repeatedly enacted through 
performative practices (Butler 1990). This bureaucrti  authority structure gives the 
illusion of a fully coherent outside created through and with an ideological scale. Latour 
(2005) has theorized this aspanoramas: 
Panoramas, as etymology suggests, see everything: But they also see nothing since they 
simply show an image painted (or projected) on the tiny wall of a room fully closed to 
the outside […]. They design a picture which has no gap in it, giving the spectator the 
powerful impression of being fully immersed in the real world without any artificial 
mediations or costly flows of information leading from the outside […] Panoramas give 
the impression of complete control over what is being surveyed, even though they are 
partially blind and that nothing enters or leaves their walls except interested or baffled 
spectators (Latour 2005:187-188). 
Protocols of referral, seen as a panorama, can be locally disentangled by looking at those 
sets of practices that allow them to exist as coherent representations of reality. In other 
words, these sets of practices (visualizing bodies, d lineating paths, transporting bodies 
and so on) are not a reflection of a coherent and bounded pre-existent core of the State, 
but rather, they actually ‘constitute that very core’ (Sharma & Gupta 2006:13). The State 
is, in this sense, a set of practices that define procedures of healing relations that are 
taken for granted in a very simplified way, resulting in many other relevant 
aspects/practices of Pehuenche healing processes and health being dismissed. A very 
well-known Foucauldian reasoning is embedded here in the ‘cultural’ aspect of the 
State’s practices: health and medicine (a technology f the former) assume an 
increasingly significant place in the administrative system and the machinery of power, 
which extends beyond the service to the sick and populations cures (Foucault 1978). 
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What is striking about this trend is how in Alto Bío Bío, health issues appear as ‘the 
object of an intense political struggle’ (Foucault 1974[2004]:7): protocols of referral 
must always be conceived of as a political phenomenon related to population 
governance, control, and power. In other words protoc ls, seen as panoramas, apparently 
mean social control, and this was something even th doctor of the Ralco post openly 
admitted. When I asked him what he would improve if he was in complete control of the 
health system, he responded: 
I would improve the way we deal with the referral of patients to a shaman. I would try to 
render those procedures more flexible. Right now, everything depends on us. We decide 
whether or not someone needs to go to the shaman. You, as a patient might not want to 
say what is going on with you and your hallucinations. Maybe you want to keep those 
stories secret and just say that you need a shaman. But here it works in a different way: 
we are in charge of keeping an eye on patients that according to us need the intervention 
of a shaman. We also decide the date and the time they can go, as we are in charge of 
the transport and we arrange the day with the shaman. It could be more flexible, this 
system, more comfortable for the people, but unfortunately it is always the health system 
that is in control, because the health system is the boss.  
Through these protocols, and by enacting ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault 1977), the State 
makes up a social landscape that ‘will never be flattened enough for the cost of 
connecting vehicles to be made fully visible’ (Latour 2005:184). These visible and 
docile bodies are caught by the panoptic medical gaze (in its cultural version), so they 
can be surveyed, used and transformed through surveillance, regulation and control 
(Williams & Bendelow 1998). I should emphasize that the mechanisms described here 
are good tools with which to examine different State performances. Yet my ethnography 
clearly shows that Pehuenche bodies are highly indocile (see Chapters One, Two, and 
Three). However, these bio-political actions of theState are ‘the historical outcome of a 
technology of power centres on life’ (Foucault 1978:144).114 In this case, what is at stake 
are the lives of Pehuenche people. When analyzing these protocols in a world where 
health has become ‘the political symbol that is most subject to manipulation’ (Scheper-
Hughes 1992:202), it is obvious how general social issues surrounding Indigenous 
people dealing with Western healthcare systems havean inherently political aspect. In 
                                                
114 For a general discussion of the limits of the concept of life in Foucault, see Agamben (1998) for his 
concept of bare life. For an analysis of the politics of life as not only a question of governmentality and 
technologies, but also of meaning and values, see Fassin 2009.   
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the case of these protocols of referral however, th ideological aspects related to health 
and governance are, in a way, invisible. Indeed, they are seen as ‘normal abnormality’ 
(Scheper-Hughes 1992), and are constituted through practices that (re)produce the State 
in daily routines of ‘proceduralism’ that can also be seen as settings for the production 
and continuity of social inequalities. In other words, the State is ‘produced through 
everyday practices and encounters and through public cultural representations and 
performances’ (Sharma & Gupta 2006:27). However, a possible question is then the 
following: How is the unity of the State, as a single reality ‘out there,’ achieved in spite 
of its multiple performances?  
I believe that the State’s ‘proceduralism,’ embedded in protocols of referral, has the role 
of coordination and distribution (Mol 2002): different practices are either made to hold 
together as a single entity or are kept apart to avid mutual interference. Briefly, 
coordination works by accumulating performances as if they were manifold perspectives 
on a single object and by dismissing discordant ones. On the other hand, distribution 
works by keeping different practices separate so that inconsistencies between them do 
not collide, allowing the establishment of a ‘truth’ necessary to safeguard the unity of a 
given object. I suggest that, following Blaser (2009) who in turn follows Mol’s (1999) 
work, the inclusion of Pehuenche people in intercultura  health programs, as well as the 
multiculturalist premise these are based on, have ‘coordination and distribution effects’ 
(Blaser, 2009:17) that contribute to guaranteeing the unity of the State, and more 
generally to protecting the modern constitution:  
The Internal Great Divide [between Nature and Culture] accounts for the External Great 
Divide [between Us and Them]: we [moderns] are the only ones who differentiate 
absolutely between Nature and Culture, between Science and Society, whereas in our 
eyes all the others—whether they are Chinese or Amerindians, Azande or Barouya—
cannot really separate what is knowledge from what is society, what is sign from what is 
thing, what comes from Nature as it is from what their cultures require (Latour 
1993:99).  
I suggest that the modern constitution is representd by the State as a single entity that is 
capable of differentiating what culture is as if it were something outside (something 
outside that can actually be loved), beyond the State i self, which is representative of 
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Nature. In sum, after rendering visible and individualizing these ‘local agents,’ the 
performance of coordination and distribution is deployed through the creation of 
protocols of referral. Patients are referred by doctors to ‘local agents’ when medical 
treatments do not work or the results of medical tests do not reveal any medical problem. 
If this is the case, public health workers maintain that this is because of cultural reasons. 
In short, for the State, the whole issue concerning Pehuenche people corresponds to an 
epistemological problem, and not an ontological one. 
 
4.3 Culture as Mind: Risky abstractions of intercultural illuminations. 
At the beginning of my fieldwork I was told that there was an intercultural team also 
working in the Santa Bárbara Hospital (which forms part of the protocol discussed 
above), a hospital situated 50 kilometers from Ralco. It did not take me very long to 
realize that this team did not really exist however. It was suggested to me that I get in 
touch with the psychologist of the hospital there, so I called him and asked for a meeting 
with the team. He agreed, but asked me to meet themafter their working hours. Once 
there, the psychologist and the former intercultura facilitator of the hospital were 
waiting for me. They explained to me that their intercultural work was not fully 
recognized by local authorities within the health system. They both apologized for the 
fact that other members of the team could not attend he meeting, and finally explained 
that the team was not working as such, since the doctor interested in ‘cultural issues’ had 
left the hospital. They mentioned that the role of intercultural facilitator was currently in 
the hands of a woman, and that Luis, the one I had t ought to be the facilitator, had been 
removed from his position because he was considered to be too ‘controversial.’ 
However, they told me that when the doctor with cultural interests was working at the 
hospital, it was easier to work using an intercultural approach. In addition, carrying out 
long-term initiatives was almost impossible since th  high turnover of doctors was 
always a problem. In sum, intercultural activities depended on one doctor’s will, and 
there was no such will at that time. However, as wathe case in Alto Bío Bío, they told 
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me that they had developed clear protocols of referral for patients, in order to avoid 
acting solely on ‘intuition.’ Their work consisted of making decisions about whether the 
intervention of a shaman was needed or not. If it was, they transported the patient to a 
shaman who was thought to be very effective in her tr atments. Both the hospital 
workers emphasized that the activities of the intercultural health program were strictly 
related to mental health, ‘since dealing with patients that are going through a 
schizophrenic episode is obviously a fact related to mental health problems,’ the 
psychologist told me. The protocols mentioned were us d to differentiate what is a 
Pehuenche illness and what is not: a distinction that was never fully clear to me. 
However, generally speaking, in cases where medical assessment (including 
neurological exams) could not determine the source of the patient’s problems and the 
person was still sick, the intervention of a shaman w s deemed necessary and the illness 
was considered to be a Pehuenche illness. Culture was in this way defined at the same 
level as mental illness - an emergent reality that stems from the physical universal body. 
The doctor at the Ralco clinic had made this clear when trying to explain to me what the 
intercultural team was all about: ‘We reinforce what is cultural, especially what is related 
to mental health illnesses.’ According to this view, the concept of culture responds to the 
general question of multiculturalism - namely, What can a mind do? As has already been 
argued,  
We are accustomed to worrying about our minds because we assume that even if our 
mental powers are ultimately generated by our brains (bodily parts we have in common 
with others), it is what we can do with our minds – the ideas we come up with, our way 
of thinking about things – that makes us different from others (other people, other 
cultures, or even other species or spirits) (Holbraad & Willerslev 2007:329). 
Thus, rather than raising a more interesting question (in my view) concerning what a 
body can do, multiculturalism, through the so-called intercultural health program, 
proposes practices that respond to the question of what a mind can actually do. The 
question What can a body do? therefore appears as totally irrelevant in this context, 
since for multiculturalism in general and intercultural health in particular, bodies do the 
same kinds of things everywhere. It is worth mentioning Deleuze and Gattari’s (1987) 
point of view here: 
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We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its 
affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the 
affects of another body, either to destroy that body r to be destroyed by it, either to 
exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful 
body (Deleuze & Guattari 1987:257).  
It is clear then that the relationship between culture and mind implicit in the work of the 
public health workers is a good example of how multic lturalism works in daily life: 
through an allegedly universal naturalism consisting of - following Descola (2005, 2006, 
& 2009) – a dissimilar interiority plus similarity in physicality. In this case, dissimilar 
interiority would be equal to mind/culture and what they can actually do, whereas 
similar physicality would correspond to a taken forgranted and universally shared 
coherent physicality. The general assumption of the State lies in the multiculturalist 
premise that conceives of the singularity of Nature as a univocal shared mode of 
existence, or as a hegemonic language game (Wittgens ein 1953). The premise of this 
language game presupposes the existence of one body (physical continuity), and many 
cultures (metaphysical discontinuities). This has been clearly explained by Viveiros de 
Castro (2004a), who claims that this is the main proposal of Western cosmology: one 
human nature and many cultures.  
As has already been shown, this assumption takes shape through the very concrete 
performance of ‘visualizing’ traditional healers, adopted in the implementation of the 
intercultural program. In fact, the discontinuity enacted by the State when ‘visualizing’ 
local practitioners of healing was indeed metaphysical. ‘If Pehuenche people love their 
culture, they must be seen by their healers.’ Differences among Pehuenche and non-
Pehuenche people were seen as defined by cultural matter. In other words, this 
visualization also implied other kinds of coordinaton framed under the Western logic of 
understanding culture as the emergent part of the more grounded plane of the physical 
body. In fact, the program itself is called ‘intercultural’ rather than for instance ‘inter-
natural,’ as perspectival ontologies would suggest. Indeed, a sort of inter-natural 
program in health would be a very odd artifact for the government, since the main 
premise of the State’s actions is based on the Latouri n Internal Great Divide between 
(one) nature/body and (many) cultures/minds. In other words, if we are faced with many 
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cultures and just one nature that maintains all the particular cultures together, it is not 
difficult to understand why in practice, the intercultural program was a very close 
relative (or perhaps just the same artifact) of what in Western tradition is known as 
‘mental health.’ 
As I have already pointed out, another way to deal with the multicultural assumption of 
one body (physical continuity) and many cultures (metaphysical discontinuities) is to 
think through what has been the most typical question of multiculturalism, namely, What 
can a mind do? When the question of the performances is framed within the variety of 
cultures, differences between people can only be ‘cultural differences,’ since it is taken 
for granted that their bodies are actually the same. In this sense, any problem related to 
Pehuenche people that does not correspond to the univ rsal body is immediately seen as 
a problem related to the other side of the dichotomy: if is not physical, it is mental, since 
what is not physical is cultural. Culture, in this sense, is something that a mind can do. In 
Western contexts, the people who know what to do with actions of the mind are 
professionals of the psy-mind. What I suggest and will make apparent is that inking in 
these multicultural terms, the health of the Indigenous population has ontological 
consequences, and by ‘ontological’ I mean the kinds of consequences that can put 
people’s lives at risk. 
Nica was a young woman who had twice attempted suicide near her house in Cauñikú. 
People working at the Ralco clinic were very worried about this situation, and started to 
investigate the details of this woman’s story. She did not speak much with any of the 
Ralco workers, so they decided to speak to her relativ s. In her family, three other 
people had already committed suicide. Besides this,e workers were also told that 
many of the family members actually saw things, andNica finally confessed that she 
was very scared of these presences. Every night there w re hands coming out from the 
wall, and spirits had asked her to kill herself and to attack other people. She had already 
assaulted her mother, who also experienced apparitions and heard voices that told her 
negative things, inviting her to harm herself and others. The medical team started a 
treatment that consisted in providing them both with anxiolytics such as benzodiazepines 
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so they could rest and sleep better. The doctor and the psychologist had also asked for 
the intercultural facilitator’s opinion, and togethr they decided that the lawentuncheve 
should be consulted. The lawentuncheve saw the woman and said that the problem was 
witchcraft, without offering any further details. Since the woman still suffered from 
suicidal thoughts, the team decided to take her to a shaman in Chol Chol. As previosuly 
mentioned, this place is both geographically and culturally very distant from Alto Bío 
Bío, and Pehuenche people are being transported across large distances to see a shaman 
there. The shaman said that the family’s house, which was full of soil from the nearby 
graveyard, had been affected by witchcraft. In thisca e, the shaman had to actually go to 
the house in order to do ‘the job’ (Sp. el trabajo). The team, the shaman and the patient 
scheduled a visit and coordinated the transport of the shaman, who would travel with 
one of the drivers from the post.  
The day the shaman came to Cauñikú, Flora woke up feeling very weak. She could not 
really understand what was going on, but she had str nge feelings and was not able to do 
what she had to do that day. The shaman’s patient lived near Flora, who saw the clinic’s 
vehicle arriving with some strangers. After a while, the psychologist came to greet Flora, 
while the shaman proceeded with her duties. Once in Nica's house, the shaman said that 
the witchcraft was too intense and that the only option was to move the family out of the 
house. Also, the family needed to burn their mattresses and throw out the clothes they 
used to wear. After this intervention, Flora did not want to talk to the team for a long 
time, and she was very upset with the whole performance. Many people in Cauñikú also 
started to wonder what kind of person the health team had brought to their community. 
People in Cauñikú were not sure whether the shaman that had been there was really a 
shaman or a kalku, a witch. After a few days had passed, a relative of Nica’s died in a 
very strange way, suffocated in his own bed. According to the public health workers, it 
had been an epileptic attack, even though the doctor was not able to find any sign of 
injuries on his tongue. Most of the people in Cauñikú assumed that this death was due to 
the visit of a witch, and the previous actions of the health clinic were strongly 
questioned. In other words, people believed that Nica’s relative had been murdered. 
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The conflict just mentioned deserves to be taken seriously as it clearly shows how the 
State’s actions, based on the multiculturalist approach, regard the participation of 
Indigenous people in health services as responding to mere epistemological issues. 
Starting from the assumption that there are many views of a single and unitary world, 
culture is nothing other than differences on a metaphysical plane. However, what the 
dramatic situation just mentioned provides evidence for is that conflicts that emerge and 
are based on this equivocal assumption can lead to fatal consequences for the people 
involved. This situation makes it clear that the intercultural encounter does not merely 
consist of dialogues between different epistemologies or knowledges. Rather, we are 
faced with a situation where two different ontologies or modes of existence clash 
dramatically, having as a result the death of a person. This kind of conflict is configured 
within what has been called a ‘political ontology’: conflicts that emerge 
as being about the continuous enactment, stabilization, and protection of different and 
asymmetrically connected ontologies […], the power-laden negotiations involved in 
bringing into being the entities that make up a particular world or ontology. It refers to a 
field of study that focuses on these negotiations but also on the conflicts that ensue as 
different worlds or ontologies strive to sustain their own existence as they interact and 
mingle each other (Blaser 2009:10-11). 
Having said this, the proceduralism in intercultural health is based on a sort of 
multicultural tolerance, understood as the condescending attitude by secular modernists 
in general and state bureaucrats in particular, that make allowances for other worldviews 
that nonetheless are not taken seriously (Stengers 2010). Other worlds are just 
‘tolerated.’ In this way, multiculturalists neutralize the possibility of any opposition or of 
being contested, since all people are already considered and included in ‘their’ 
difference. In the particular ethnographic situation presented here, related to the 
implementation of a local program in intercultural health, it is clear how multicultural 
actions transform radically different worlds into abstract, mental entities. This tolerance 
makes a contrast between Indigenous ontologies and modern ontology (sensu Latour) 
irrelevant, and implicitly considers personhood and gency as universal facts. As many 
scholars have stated (Bird-David 1999; Descola1996a, 1996b, 2005; Descola & Palsson 
1996; Grim 2001; Ingold 2000; Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2004a, 2004b), this tolerance 
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does not put into question the basic assumption of a nature-culture divide. In this sense, 
the intercultural program is in fact an intracultural program based on internal 
comparisons: the Strathernian ‘analogies between domains’ (Strathern 1992) inherent to 
this nature-culture divide. In other words the tolerance just mentioned, embedded in the 
form of this mentalization, is grounded in a physical ontinuity that works as a way of 
making commensurable what is not: different modes of existence that do not share the 
stability and individuality of the coherent body and the performative mind of 
multiculturalism. The claim that cultural differences are equally valid perspectives on 
one world only works, as Elizabeth Povinelli (2001) has argued, if Indigenous people act 
within the limits of what is reasonable and conceivable. These limits are defined by 
reality ‘out there,’ which in this case is the universal body that was brought into being by 
bureaucrats and public health workers in the context of the intercultural program.  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In this Chapter I have described state practices related to intercultural health and 
emphasized how these practices focus on the definition of visible agents of healing in 
order to create a system of transporting people from one point to another. I have shown 
how the intercultural program in Alto Bío Bío operates through the design of visible 
paths for the transportation of people who are and have clear and distinct visible bodies. 
In this sense, I have tried to disentangle how the State's workers understand the 
‘visualization’ of local health practitioners, pointi g out how visible, public paths are 
needed to transport people who are the target of (cultural) health interventions. These 
interventions are put into effect with a particular understanding of culture and cultural 
difference that does not really consider, and it is very distant from, local 
conceptualizations and practices related to illness and healing. Moreover, I have shown 
that the body the State works with has to be bounded, single, visible, a priori and 
universally shared, ignoring the fact that what could be called ‘Pehuenche suffering’ 
responds to particular ontological configurations ad coexistences between humans and 
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hardly visible non-human bodies (see Chapters One, Two and Three). 
In general terms, my aim here has been to reflect on how the premise of multiculturalism 
(one nature/many cultures) helps to create the illusion of the unity and homogeneity of 
the State, which is considered to be an artifact whose reality precedes the daily life 
practices of people in interaction. In reflecting upon this, I have argued against Western 
commonsense, which tends to conceive of the State as a unitary and autonomous object - 
as a clear, bounded institution that is different from society (Sharma & Gupta 2006). In 
contrast, and in line with many scholars who have critically questioned the idea that the 
State is an a priori conceptual or empirical object (Mitchell 1991 & 1999; Radcliffe-
Brown 1940; Sharma & Gupta 2006; Trouillot 2003), my aim up to now has been to 
understand how the State’s ‘Intercultural Health Program’ is implemented and what this 
implies for Pehuenche people. Having said this, I now turn to an analysis of local 




The Unproductive and Blind Sociality of the State and its Local 
Contentions 
 
In the following Chapter, I analyze how Indigenous people both react to and 
conceptualize the State’s attempts at ‘visualizing’ Indigenous actors (Chapter Four) 
within the realm of intercultural health. In particular, I suggest that Pehuenche people’s 
complaints against state functionaries can be thougt of as a response to a certain kind of 
paradigmatic sociality enacted by the functionaries themselves. I suggest that the 
interaction between health workers and local people a pears as highly determined by an 
unproductive sociality, paradoxically characterized by the proposal of an exchange 
without exchange and a kind of sociality that denies itself. If we take into account the 
significance of the relation of mutual vision needed for the emergence of a person 
(Chapters One, Two and Three), I suggest that this type of sociality can be also thought 
of as a particular type of blind sociality. In short, I suggest that the paradigmatic 
sociality determining intercultural relations takes shape through the creation of a web of 
relationships that, paradoxically, do not allow theemergence of real relationships among 
real people through mutual vision. Moreover, this analysis of how people experience 
state activities also aims at rendering apparent the taken-for-granted illusion of the 
cohesiveness of the State and its contested and fragile existence (Sharma & Gupta 2006). 
This Chapter considers two disruptive ethnographical events in which native 
conceptualizations of intercultural relations come to the fore. I consider particular 
activities carried out by the health workers of theRalco clinic outside the clinic and 
analyze how functionaries of the State engage in relations with Pehuenche people when 
the latter spend their summers in the Andean highlands, far away from Chilean 
settlements. I also reflect upon the vernacular label ‘functionaries’ as a key local term 
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pointing out the contested ontological status of peopl  working for the State, and recount 
how a machi collaborating with public health services questions her own collaborative 
performance when the Chilean earthquake of 2010 occurs. I conclude the Chapter by 
suggesting that fleeting Indigenous contentions against the State respond to the 
transcendental way functionaries of the State visually interpellate (sensu Althusser) 
Indigenous peoples.  
 
5.1 Veranadas 
The natural characteristics of the Alto Bío Bío landscape create a system of altitudinal 
zones which allow for the development of distinct agricultural ecosystems, such as 
mallín prairies, lowland plains, native forests, pine forests (araucaria forests) and 
highland plains. These zones are in turn divided into two different regions known as the 
invernada and the veranada, which not only have economic importance to Pehuench 
people, but also have socio-cultural connotations. The invernadas are the winter stations 
in the low valleys, while the veranadas are the summer stations in the high pastures. 
Residence in winter and summer stations is dictated by seasonal weather changes, and 
being dependent upon the presence or absence of snow, are thus part of transhumant 
practices in the rearing of cattle and the harvesting of crops and pine nuts. The 
predominant subsistence economy of the winter stations nvolves corrals, domesticated 
animals, prairies and part of the native forest. In the lowland region, the low snowfall 
enables families to inhabit the area during the months of May to December. The 
migration to the summer stations in the highlands starts in the spring when the last 
snows have finally melted away and the animals have gi n birth. Herds are transported 
to new grazing pastures and the harvesting of pine nuts (from the pewen or araucaria 
araucana) that were not collected during the previous harvest takes place. Moreover, in 
contrast to the permanent housing found in the winter s ations (Sp. caserados), the 
housing in the summer stations consists of makeshift constructions of planks of wood 
(Sp. puestos). 
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For the past ten years, workers at the Ralco clinic have been visiting veranadas in order 
to undertake preventive health campaigns. I was invited to go along on one of these trips 
to the veranadas, as they performed one of the ‘intercultural’ initiat ves Ralco public 
health workers engage in. Since every community throughout Alto Bío Bío spends their 
summer in a different place, the team organizes their calendar in order to visit the 
majority of communities. I accompanied them on their journey to the veranada of 
Cochico, which is where the communities of Trapa Trpa and Butalelbun spend their 
summers. Getting to the veranadas is quite difficult, and most of the places can only be 
reached by several hours on horseback. 
The day before going to the veranada I attended a preparation meeting for this journey 
at the Ralco clinic and met Sonia, one of the clini’s intercultural facilitators, who was in 
charge of the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was simply to ask each of the 
participants, consisting of a doctor, a psychologist, the intercultural facilitators, a nurse, 
a social worker, a midwife, and the chief of the municipality’s health service, to 
contribute some money towards the purchase of tomatoes and bread to take with us (Sp. 
hacer una vaca). The next day, I got to the Ralco clinic at 8am, as previously agreed 
with the team. No one apart from myself had arrived, so I chatted with one of the drivers 
of the clinic. He explained to me that we needed to get to the rural post of Trapa Trapa 
by car, as this was where we were going to rent the horses. It takes about an hour and a 
half to get to Trapa Trapa, and from that point to Cochico, it takes about another five 
hours. He also told me that he had arrived in Ralco in the eighties, hired as one of the 
supervisors for the construction of the road that connects Ralco with the Pehuenche 
communities. Workers like him built the road in collaboration with Pehuenche people, 
and it took about ten years to complete the project. As a supervisor, he had met most of 
the people of the valley. Yet, he added, he never participated in politics, since he prefers 
to be a friend of the people, rather than being a functionary. 
Once in the Trapa Trapa rural post, I noticed that e local medical worker had already 
arranged the rental of horses with local people. In fact, outside the post there were a 
couple of Pehuenche people waiting with their horses while the team and I were inside 
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the clinic. From the post, I could see other people arriving with more horses. Finally, 
after about an hour, there were seventeen horses waiting for us. The doctor, the 
psychologist, the nurse, and other men on the team had started drinking beers, and cans 
covered the white medical desk in the office. The intercultural facilitator, who was 
originally from Trapa Trapa and was in charge of negotiating the rental price for the 
horses, went outside to talk to the group of Pehuench  people. When it seemed that they 
had reached an agreement, Patricio, the facilitator, came back inside to say that twenty 
thousand pesos (about 25 pounds) per day and per horse was a good price. Mauricio, the 
chief of the health service, who was in possession of the cash for the horses, rejected the 
offer: ‘That's too much! Patricio, you have to be on our side and try to bargain properly!’ 
The tone of his voice indicated that this was an order. Patricio went back outside, and the 
psychologist said ‘Patricio does not want to bargain like a winka (non-Pehuenche 
person), he is never going to bargain like a winka. We need a facilitator who can 
negotiate as a winka, otherwise the price is going to be too high.’ The Pehuenche woman 
who worked daily at the Trapa Trapa post replied that e people outside deserved to be 
paid properly, since they had brought their horses from far away. Some of them had even 
come from Butalelbun, the most distant Pehuenche community in the Queuco Valley. 
Patricio came back with the final price: sixteen thousand pesos for each horse, per day. 
The chief asked to talk directly with three of the owners, to pay them personally. His 
negotiations with the horse owners took the form of an ultimatum. They talked for a 
while, while the rest of the men from the team were in the other room of the post 
drinking beer. The women, on the other hand, were outside choosing the horses they 
wanted. Suddenly, I saw the nurse (a man) going outside, laughing. The psychologist 
said ‘He cannot be that drunk. We have not drunk that much! He must be pretending!’ I 
watched him get on a horse, and after a few seconds, he fell off. The people inside the 
post laughed. I decided to stay silent and continue my participant observation: I drank a 
beer. Finally, after an hour or so, we were ready to go. In addition to the team, there were 
three Pehuenche guides who, besides being in charge of showing us the way, were also 
taking some of the functionaries’ luggage on special horses rented for this purpose. No 
one uttered a word to them.  
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After a couple of hours, we arrived at the first ‘puesto,’ which is the name of the rustic 
houses Pehuenche people build in the mountains during the summer. Most of the time, 
the puestos are very close to fenced enclosures where animals st y during the night. 
Each family has its own place, each located a few kilometers from the next. To my 
surprise, the first Pehuenche family to notice our presence started walking in the 
opposite direction, avoiding talking to us. When the midwife tried to ask them where 
Edwin’s puesto was (Edwin was the name of our host and his puesto was where we were 
going to set up camp), they walked away without answering at all. We continued on for a 
while, and eventually found the place where we were going to stay. The area was 
astonishingly beautiful: clean air, big spaces, forests of araucarias on the mountaintops 
creating a nice contrast between the outlines of the trees and the clear blue sky. 
 
 
Figure 5. Veranadas Cochico 
 
Edwin arrived at the camp later, accompanied by a friend of his. Both of them had spent 
the whole day taking care of their animals (Sp. campeando). When Edwin saw us, he 
said straightforwardly:  
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So you have arrived […] I hope you are not coming with Piñera115 […] Piñera has still 
not come to this place, that's why this year it was not a good year for the pine nuts. Not 
all years are good, and we don’t have many pine nuts ow […]. If we had good years for 
pine nuts all the time, we would be even bigger than Piñera […] but in some way it is 
good not to have pine nuts all the time, as we can st y here without having Piñera 
coming to bother us.  
When he arrived, everyone was busy setting up the camp. I saw Patricio struggling with 
a big tent, and he asked me to help. After a while, e left me alone and went away. A 
little later I realized I was trying to set up the Chief of Health’s tent, who had ordered 
Patricio to do the job for him. The chief spoke to Edwin about buying a goat to eat that 
night. Edwin said he would be happy to sell us a got, and added ‘Well, yes, that's my 
job, to feed them, not like yours that is just pencil […] Yes, you are just a pencil. Not 
me, I take care of animals the whole day.’ I thought about being ‘just a pencil,’ and the 
anthropological writing that was waiting for me after my fieldwork. Edwin left, and after 
a while he came back with a very nice white goat. It was getting dark. ‘How do you 
want it? Alive or dead?’ Edwin asked. ‘Dead,’ said the chief. Edwin killed the goat using 
his knife, twisting it in the animal's neck for a quick death. I was the only one helping 
him, providing light for the whole procedure with my lamp. While the goat was bleeding 
from its neck, Edwin worried about the animal’s blood being wasted. ‘No one wants to 
eat niachi?’ No one responded.  ‘We lost the niachi’ he said.116 In the meantime, Patricio 
arrived with a beer and offered it to us. Edwin kept on ‘carneando’ (En. butchering) the 
animal, asking for more beer. When the animal was re dy, we mounted it onto a long 
steel rod. The whole team was around the bonfire, waiting and chatting. The Pehuenche 
guides were apart, but were also around the fire. Edwin continuously rotated the steel 
rod. The goat took about half an hour or so to cook. Once it was ready, Edwin offered his 
knife to the health workers in order for us to take turns slicing off our own pieces of 
meat. Some of us used the knife but the rest of the team did not respond to Edwin’s 
offer, so Edwin took his knife and started offering pieces of meat, all the while making 
fun of the health workers’ attitude with sarcastic comments. At this point, his sarcasm 
was not just my own interpretation of the situation. It was apparent to everyone that the 
                                                
115 Sebastian Piñera was the Chilean president who had been elected a few weeks previously. 
116 Niachi is the animal’s blood eaten immediately after an anim l has been killed.  
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atmosphere was getting tense. 
The men were drinking wine now, and Patricio was in charge of distributing the glasses 
of wine. There was not much interaction between the health workers and the Pehuenche 
people. The only one who interacted with everybody was Patricio. The atmosphere 
became increasingly tense, and after we had finished eating the goat and it was getting 
late, I opted to go to my tent. After a while, I realized that almost everyone had also gone 
to sleep, and there was a nice deep silence in Cochico. This silence did not last long 
however. I soon heard the voices of Edwin and his friend in the camp. I could hear that 
Edwin was very upset, and his friend was trying to calm him down. 
What the hell are these functionaries (Sp. funcionarios) doing here? […] The doctor has 
nothing to do here, whenever I want I go to the doctor, but I do not need the doctor 
coming to see me. What the hell are they doing here? Now, it won’t take me very long to 
bring my gun and to throw out all these functionaries. […] because no one represents 
my self! Who is going to respond on behalf of me? Nobody! They are rich, I am poor, 
they should not be here. Now they are going to understand what I mean. Just let me go 
for my gun and I will start kicking out all these functionaries. 
At that point I realized that I might be in trouble, and I tried to find some objects inside 
my tent that could be helpful in protecting myself. I could hear that his friend was trying 
to convince him to go away, but Edwin was too upset to take his friend’s advice. Finally, 
after a long while, I heard their voices moving away. I tried to sleep, without success 
however, as I was anticipating Edwin’s return. He did not come back. Before finally 
succumbing to sleep, I wrote a few words in my field notes: functionaries, just pencil. 
I awoke to a beautiful day. To my surprise, I saw Edwin near my tent. He was smiling 
and looking for his horse that had escaped night before. The rest of the team came 
together near the bonfire for breakfast and made comments about the situation the night 
before. All of them had been scared, I found out. The midwife was furious, and blamed 
her chief, who she said should not have been drinking alcohol with Pehuenche people. 
However, there was a general agreement that the responsibility for taking any action last 
night had been Patricio’s, and he was extensively questioned by his colleagues. He 
responded by saying that he had tried to find a big stick to defend the team. Everyone 
mocked him, not believing what he was saying. The psychologist angrily and 
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sarcastically said: ‘Very good Patricio, you have very good friends here. Very good.’ 
 
5.2 A shaman visualized  
 
Figure 6. Machi Juana in a Chilean newspaper 
 
The first time I saw this picture, in the most important Chilean newspaper, El Mercurio, 
was in September 2010. Its Sunday edition is read by millions of Chileans and this photo 
appeared in the main national news section. The picture was taken during one of the 
most difficult moments the Chilean government went through with regards to the 
Mapuche people in 2010: a hunger strike held by almost forty Mapuche people who 
were being tried with the anti-terrorist law created during the Pinochet dictatorship.117 
The government attempted to stop the hunger strike du to pressure from the 
international media and other organizations. This photo is of the shaman (Ch. machi) 
Juana, who was called to represent the Mapuche in a public meeting of negotiation 
between Indigenous people and the State. 118  
I found this picture surprising for two reasons, the first of which is simply because I 
personally know machi Juana. Indeed, I was living with her when the earthquake 
occurred, seven months before this photo was taken. S condly, I think this photo is an 
                                                
117 For a deeper analysis of this hunger strike, see Aylwin 2010. 
118 For general accounts about machi, see Bacigalupo 2001 and 2007.   
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incredibly good summary of the relations the State is establishing with Mapuche 
people.119 Land conflicts, military repression, and unfair legal judgments are being 
publicly presented as issues that are related to health. In relation to this, it is noteworthy 
that the first representative of the government to engage in a dialogue with the hunger-
strikers, once they had endured almost three months of fasting and were already very 
weak, was the Minister of Health, who was a doctor. During this time, shamans and 
doctors were both under the limelight in the public domain. Let's take a closer look at 
this picture. Which actions characterize this scene? The State is observing (visualizing) 
the machi (the functionaries of the State are looking in her direction), as well as making 
her visible to the public through the newspaper. But what would happen if, in the same 
photo, the machi were not there? Who would be the public interlocutor of the 
government?  Who would be the passive object of the S ate’s gaze?  
 
 
Figure 7. Machi Juana at her home 
 
Here is machi Juana, again. This time, I was the photographer. This p oto was taken at 
                                                
119 For a discussion of gendered uses of female achi, the State, and governance, see Bacigalupo 2007. 
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her home in Chol Chol, a little rural town close to the Chilean city of Temuco, where I 
spent some time living with her and her patients. Machi Juana is well known to the 
public health workers of Santa Bárbara Hospital and the Ralco clinic, places from where 
she gets many patient referrals (see Chapter Four). Administratively speaking, the 
hospital does not work directly with Pehuenche people living in the mountains, since 
that population seeks healthcare in the Alto Bío Bí district. However, when the 
hydroelectric dams were built, several Pehuenche families had to abandon their 
communities and were relocated to a place known as La Peña, just ten kilometers away 
from Santa Bárbara. For this reason, there are many Pehuenche people who refer to the 
Santa Bárbara Hospital for healthcare without any mediation from the Ralco clinic. 
Sometimes their illnesses cannot be treated by Chilean doctors since they cannot see. In 
those cases, a link between machi Juana and people from La Peña is created by public 
health workers, and more specifically by Ana, the hospital’s intercultural facilitator. She 
invited me to take part in the monthly trips she organizes to Chol Chol, when she takes 
Pehuenche people from La Peña to the machi’s house. After about four hours in a van, 
we arrived in Chol Chol where I was introduced to machi Juana and her husband 
Magno. All the visitors were invited into the machi’s house, and to sit down around a 
table. The travelling party included Matias, the president of the Pehuenche community 
of Ayin Mapu, his wife Carmen, and their daughter Katia. There was also another family 
from La Peña, plus a worker from the hospital who had come to visit the machi as a 
patient. After a very informal conversation about the rip and about certain patients who 
could not attend that day, Juana went outside the house, where she sees each patient 
individually. 
I am not interested here in providing details or exotic descriptions about how this machi 
works. Rather, I am interested in describing how public health workers have been 
involved in the creation of this intercultural performance. After the machi finished a 
short prayer in front of the rewe, she asked who was going to be the first patient to be 
seen. 120 Ana decided who would go first, and she approached t  rewe with him. The 
                                                
120 Rewe is a polysemic term that literally means the ‘pure place.’ In this context, it refers to an altar 
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machi asked everyone to go inside the house, but Ana stayed outside nevertheless. Each 
patient had been requested to take a urine sample with him or her before coming to Chol 
Chol; a sample that is carefully examined by machi Juana and is used as her main tool 
for diagnosis (see Chapter Three). Time flew, and after  couple of hours, Juana had seen 
all her patients. She came back inside the house as everyong was seated around the table 
drinking mate tea and eating. She asked her husband to write down a brief summary of 
each patient’s diagnosis, outlining the treatments and the amount of lawen needed. 
Before he could do this however, Ana took the notebok and started writing. Ana wrote 
down the amount of lawen each patient was going to take at home, a brief summary of 
how to drink it, and the specific details of each trea ment. When it was Matias’ turn, he 
was told that he needed to come back to stay a few days with the machi. He immediately 
agreed, telling me that he was very impressed with the things the machi told him while 
looking at his urine sample. Neither the Chilean doctors, nor popular Chilean médicas 
(non-Mapuche healers) had been able to see what he was suffering from. After a while, 
when everyone had paid for the general check-up (3000 pesos, or about five pounds) and 
the lawen (2500 pesos per liter, or almost four pounds), we said our goodbyes and 
walked to the van that would take us back to Santa Bárbara. We had arranged to come 
back in a month’s time. 
A week later, I was invited to visit La Peña with Ana. In tears, she told me that she had 
gotten 200 000 pesos (about 300 pounds) from the hospital to do ‘something’ in La 
Peña, and she needed some advice from me as a professional. I accepted the invitation. 
The day we were leaving for La Peña, I went to the hospital and found out that there was 
also another intercultural facilitator who would becoming with us for the visit. This 
person was a Pehuenche woman who was ‘learning’ how to work in intercultural health. 
When I arrived, they were both working on a very structured questionnaire to take with 
us, as a method of general diagnosis of La Peña. I suggested that perhaps it was not 
                                                                                                                                     
composed of a step-notched tree trunk. For a deeper analysis of the polysemic nature of this term, see 
Course 2011, Di Giminiani 2011, Dillehay 2007, Faron 1963, and Foerster 1993. Juana's rewe, I was told, 
must be changed every four years. In dreams, Juana gets clear instructions about how and when to change 
it. The one time she forgot to do it on the date stipulated, she got very sick, and needed the intervention of 
another machi who came to treat her.  
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necessary to do a questionnaire, and it might be worth hile to just speak with people. 
My comment was clearly not welcome, and I understood that my collaboration, or 
rather, my participant observation, was just going to be ‘strategic.’ Strangely enough, I 
got a call from Ana a couple of weeks after our trip during which I was told that a 
company called ENDESA was wanting to pay a psychologist for a professional opinion 
of the psychological well-being of the communities. An offer that I of course declined.  
The day we went to La Peña, we first went to Matias’ house, since he was the president 
of the community and Ana wanted his authorization before doing the survey. When we 
arrived, many people were undertaking the harvest of wheat (Sp. la cosecha de trigo). 
There was a very big barbecue (Sp. asado) being prepared to feed the workers and 
celebrate the harvest, and I found some friends of mine from Ralco who had come to 
help their relatives in La Peña. They invited me to stay, but I was with Ana, and I noticed 
that Matias was very upset by her presence. He told me that the other intercultural 
facilitator who was with us was a very bad person who did not help at all when her sister 
was in the hospital. The atmosphere became tense, ad Ana's colleague was forced to go 
back to the hospital’s vehicle and wait there. Unexpectedly, a young man I did not know 
asked me straightforwardly whether it was possible for me to help him with his legal 
papers (Sp. papeles) which were dirty, and as a result of that he could not find a job. I 
told him that I was just a visitor and that I did not really work at the hospital. He then 
told me ‘I thought you were a functionary.’  
After a month, back in Chol Chol once again, machi Juana and Magno were very 
concerned about a young patient from Alto Bío Bío named Cristian who had arrived at 
her house on his own two weeks ago and did not wantto leave. Machi Juana said that 
she was very worried because Cristian did not speak at all, and spent the whole day 
outside, not moving, like a statue. Yet, machi Juana added, Cristian was aware of social 
interactions around him, and therefore she did not think he was mad (Ch. wei wei). Also, 
when it was time to eat, he put up no resistance, and actually ate everything, criteria that 
for Juana was enough to declare that someone is not insane. But the shaman and her 
family were worried because he did not seem to be improving, and they did not want to 
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be witnesses to a tragedy. In short, Juana did not wan Cristian committing suicide in her 
house, or harming one of her relatives. I was told hat Cristian had actually been one of 
Juana's patients in the past and had been recovering well from his mal (witchcraft). The 
problem, the machi said, was that Cristian had begun treatments prescrib d by another 
machi while she was treating him. One of Cristian’s relatives, supported by a well-
known person from Alto Bío Bío who was against the work in ‘intercultural health’ 
undertaken by the public health workers, had taken Cristian to see another machi who 
did not collaborate with the public services. According to Juana, this other machi was a 
witch and had destroyed all the improvements he had m e.  
The machi saw her patients in front of the r we, as usual. Ana again stayed close to her. I 
heard some of the patients complaining about this amongst themselves. After every 
patient had been seen, machi Juana proceeded with the distribution of lawen inside the 
house. Ana again took the notebook and started writing. After a while, the functionaries 
left, but I stayed back and lived with Juana for a month as her helper. During that time, I 
shared a very small room with Matias and his wife, who slept on a thin bed besides a 
bunk bed. Their small daughter was sleeping in the bunk under mine. Cristian slept in 
the next room, and two other patients shared the third room in this shamanic ward. One 
morning, while I was helping Juana with the preparation of lawen for her patients, she 
confessed that she was very upset with Ana. The nots Ana had written down were not 
helpful at all, and all she could read were the prices each person had paid for the lawen. 
Juana did not know exactly how to proceed since she could not really remember all the 
details of the diagnoses she had made. Besides this, she had gotten many complaints 
from patients about Ana, as she should not be in fro t of the rewe talking to patients 
during the prayer. She also mentioned that there was a very big inauguration for the Chol 
Chol marathon on Sunday, and that she had been invited by the local administration to 
publicly open the event. She invited me to go along, adding that a very nice event had 
taken place the week before when the municipality had inaugurated a sculpture of a 
Mapuche icon at the main entrance of Chol Chol and she had given the initial blessings. 
Machi Juana and her husband were very worried about Cristian, a concern that I shared 
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since I was sleeping in the same shamanic ward, so to peak, and his behavior scared 
both me and the machi’s patients. Juana decided to go to the police office in Chol Chol 
and asked me to go with her. Once there, the policeman said that he could not help, since 
Cristian had initially been accepted as a guest and had not done anything that justified 
police action. Machi Juana seemed very upset and softly complained that the police do 
not fulfil their proper roles, but that they are just ‘journalists,’ people who arrive when 
the worst has already happened. Journalists. Functionaries. Pencils. I started to 
understand that these words shared something in common. 
Once, in the middle of the night, I woke up to screams. Matias and Carmen were 
screaming desperately. Matias was shouting out my name very loudly, moving towards 
my bed, telling me to wake up. I could not see much in the darkness, but I realized that 
the room was shaking like a ship in the middle of a very turbulent storm. I jumped off 
my bed and tried to open the door to get out, withou  success. Behind me, Carmen was 
crying, praying and begging to not be punished. Once we managed to get out of the 
house, the night sky was completely darkened by clouds. The earth was moving 
violently and none of us could keep our balance. When the ground stopped shaking, we 
all entered the machi's house and sat down around the table with a few candles. Machi 
Juana seemed extremely shocked. She started praying in Mapudungun, and the first 
words I understood of her prayer were against white domination, against the winka. She 
spoke to Ngenechen, begging not to be destroyed. She said that she was guilty, that all of 
us were guilty, that the winka domination involved all of us in one way or another. I 
found a very small radio with batteries and managed to find the only signal available. 
The broadcaster said that this earthquake was one of th  biggest in all of Chilean history. 
Machi Juana was horrified, and started telling me how this was also her fault, that this 
happened because of the winka, but not solely because of them; she was also guilty 
because she had been participating in things that were not related to machi issues. She 
told me in a serious tone that she should not have been involved in the public events of 
the municipality and that she was not going to go to the marathon inauguration. This 
destruction was due to winka destruction, she kept on saying, and Ngenechen had given 
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us a clear message of this.  
 
5.3 Blind sociality 
The ethnographic description of these two events allows one to reflect upon the 
particular kind of sociality dominating relations within intercultural health 
performances. In particular, I would like to examine the type of sociality that is 
generated within the relational space denominated as ‘intercultural’ by state policies. 
Broadly speaking, I think this data corroborates a more theoretical and epistemological 
reasoning premised upon the following statement which considers relationships as the 
truly constituent part of what is human: 
If we are to produce adequate theories of social reality, then the first step is to apprehend 
persons as simultaneously containing the potential for relationships and always 
embedded in a matrix of relations with others (Strathern, in Ingold 1996:66).  
Relationships are primordial, not secondary. Said otherwise: every practice implies a 
relationship. I suggest that when practices or sets of practices performed by functionaries 
of the State are examined, a paradigmatic kind of sociality comes to the fore, as these 
state workers engage in relationships with subjects visualized within the State’s 
intercultural logic in very peculiar ways. What interests me here is the predominant 
mode of relating within this matrix of relationships labelled as ‘intercultural’ (see 
Chapter Four). For this reason, what I would like to highlight here are the relational 
consequences of certain types of sociality (or modes of relating) that are inherent to, or 
at least paradigmatic of, the State’s intercultural pr ctices. My aim here is to present an 
analytical critique of the specific intercultural practices narrated above, in order to 
suggest plausible generalizations about relationships between institutional and non-
institutional subjects. It is necessary however, to briefly render it explicit that the 
concept of sociality as it is used here stems from the British anthropological tradition, 
the seeds of which can be found in the work of Edmund Leach (1961). 
Generally speaking, Leach (1961:304-305) declares with an anti-Durkheimian argument 
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that society is not a thing, but rather ‘a way of ordering experience.’ In other words, 
society cannot be thought of as a social entity that is transcendental to social 
relationships; it is not possible to think about what is social from outside social 
interactions. Social practices are always social experiences and c not be separated from 
human behaviour. Nor can they be conceived of from outside the relational experience. 
In the words of Marilyn Strathern (1996:60), who refe s to Leach’s work, ‘there is not an 
autonomous realm of social existence to be pitted against the material facts of property 
or locality.’ It is with reference to this tradition of thought that avoids using abstractions 
to refer to what is social, that I would like to reflect on the ethnographical data just 
introduced, emphasizing the predominant mode of relating between public health 
workers and Pehuenche people. What these ethnographical events show is a set of 
relational consequences for the way the State visualizes Indigenous people (see Chapter 
Four). I believe that this set of consequences can only be thought of as a product of 
relationships, or more precisely of a web of relationships, and that it responds to a 
particular mode of relating (in this case motivated by functionaries of the State). The 
focus of my reflection then, will be on the type of sociality configuring these events, a 
sociality understood not only as ‘the relational matrix which constitutes the life of 
persons’ (Strathern 1996:64), but also, following the work of Course (2011), as the 
particular mode of relating that constitutes this relational matrix. It should be self-
evident that my objective here is not to propose absolute generalizations about the 
relationships that exist among all the people who work for the State and all Pehuenche 
people. However, I believe that these ethnographic situations clearly demonstrate a 
hegemonic type of sociality that characterizes relationships institutionally shaped in the 
realm of public health.  
The first situation, taking place at the v ranada, involves several interactions that can 
easily be identified as both hierarchical and typical of a certain type of ‘effective action 
of power relationship’ (Clastres 1976:115, my transl tion). I suggest that these 
interactions can be considered characteristic of the mode of relating proposed by the 
State’s functionaries. My own position inside those relationships is not exempt from this 
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type of power relationship. Furthermore, it is precis ly from my own feelings of 
perplexity and annoyance as a participant in these r lationships that I write these 
reflections. My participant observation is just a fleeting anecdote inside an extremely 
complex history of relationships. 
It should be self evident that during the trip to the veranada, the way in which the chief 
of Public Health executes his power does not consider the significance of relations. What 
is really striking is the types of relationships that this leader and the other functionaries 
form (or not) with the Pehuenche - relationships that in both events clearly appear as 
highly conflictual. My point here is that the mode of relating, or the sociality that 
characterizes workers of the State was based, to put it in Edwin’s terminology, on 
pencils. Edwin renders it evident that the most significant difference between him and 
the functionaries was based on what he was capable of doing and what the functionaries 
were not. While the functionaries’ main concern was about representational meanings 
(functionaries are ‘just pencils’), Edwin's concern was mainly about daily practices. In 
other words: in the same way ‘the Aché are what they do’ (Clastres 1972:209), Edwin 
seems to say ‘I am what I do, not what you mean.’ Edwin uses the metaphor of the 
pencil as a key image for the definition of public health workers. I would like to suggest 
that Edwin’s speech points out that the practices of functionaries are always mediated by 
representations. That is, they are symbolic practices. To put it differently, functionaries 
establish a type of relationship based on meanings a d abstractions, a mode of relating 
that is just pencil - merely a matter of symbolic meaning. Yet Edwin is not interested in 
the representational meanings of things and he doesn t engage in relations with the 
functionaries that are predetermined by a role or function to be performed. On the 
contrary, Edwin, with a Clastrean spirit (1972), is motivated by a pragmatic interest 
closer to the question ‘How does this work?’ rather than ‘What does it mean?’ Edwin's 
concern is about how to take care of his animals. The way he is related to his world is 
pragmatically based: through his angry rant against the functionaries, Edwin criticizes 
the abstract and ‘out of context’ role played by the workers of the State. What I suggest 
is that through his words, Edwin questions the type of sociality proposed by the team of 
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public health workers. Let us then analyze more closely the practices of these 
functionaries, focusing mainly on the way people engage (or not) in relationships.  
There were several different moments of negotiation between the chief of Public Health 
and Pehuenche people during the trip to the veranada (the rental of the horses, the 
purchasing of the goat). None of them, however, can be understood as configured by a 
productive exchange: those moments of interaction merely correspond to monetary 
transactions that do not imply any exchange beyond these economic transactions.121 In 
fact, what is striking here is that the exchange of w rds between public health workers 
and locals is very rare and almost non-existent. Raher, one could say that there is no 
true exchange in the mode of relating between functio aries and Pehuenche people. In 
the renting of horses for example, it was the intercultural facilitator who had the task of 
negotiating and speaking with the locals. Besides Patricio, nobody else interacted with 
the local people. I find that the role of the facilitator is quite conflicting. What the 
functionaries request of him as a functionary is to interact with Pehuenche people 
through a certain type of logic of power characteris ic of the relationships that they 
themselves denominate aswinka. Indeed, the facilitator should negotiate, according to 
the psychologist, as a winka. Specifically, he should engage in relations with o ers 
starting from a particular mode of relating: he should defend the interests of the 
institution. 
Generally speaking, the performance carried out by the team of functionaries at the rural 
post also renders apparent the way in which the State is enacted, and the particular type 
of ‘effective action of power relation’ executed by its functionaries. For the 
functionaries, it is not important to engage in relations with the owners of the horses - 
what really matters to them are their horses. Likewise, it is not even necessary to talk to 
                                                
121 This Chapter might evoke in the reader Sahlins’ (1972) classic notion of negative reciprocity, 
understood as the unsociable extreme embracing theft, barter and gambling, which are impersonal and 
entail opposed interests. However, my aim in this Chapter is to reflect upon the types of sociality within 
intercultural relations, mostly by considering mutual vision as a prerequisite for social relations. In this 
sense, even if there are some resemblances with Sahlins’s concept of negative reciprocity, my argument is 
built upon ethnographic evidence of visual transactions. This is why later in this Chapter I will propose the 
concept of blind sociality, which I think is a better tool with which to consider these intercultural relations.  
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the Pehuenche guides who accompany them to the veranadas. They simply execute their 
function. There is no real exchange within this institutionalized type of symbolic 
sociality.  
At this point, it may be helpful to refer to some Althusserian reflections about the 
relation between the configuration of a subject andthe State. According to Althusser 
(1971), institutions of the State teach particular knowhow specific to the practices that 
each ideology embodies. What the institutions of the State teach, which in this case is 
reflected in the relationships of power worked out by the functionaries, is a ‘subjection 
to the ruling ideology or the mastery of its ‘practice’ (the practice of that ideology)’ 
(Althusser 1971:135). In this sense, it seems interes ing to note that Althusser himself, 
without having had the pleasure of knowing Edwin, defined functionaries of the State as 
‘the high priest of the ruling ideology’ (Ibid. p.145). In this sense, the effective action of 
power relation (Clastres’ State) carried out by thefunctionaries can be seen as a 
relational version of Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatus, which operates through 
distinct and specialized institutions. This Ideological State Apparatus, in the Althusserian 
logic, functions mostly by ideology and non-repression. The Althusserian idea that is 
important to highlight when considering this ethnographic data is that ‘Ideology 
interpellates individuals as subjects’ (Ibid. p.147).  
I suggest that when the interactions between functio ar es and Pehuenche people are 
examined, the predominant mode of relatedness that appears is strongly characterized by 
an unproductive sociality dictated by the functionaries. The latter, as actors of the State’s 
ideology, ‘hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects’ (Ibid.). In this 
context, it seems interesting to underline the facttha  the functionaries carried out the 
interpellation in a slightly different way from Althusser’s concept of interpellation. 
Perhaps Althusser himself was mistaken (or Althusser himself was strongly interpellated 
by Western ideologies) when assuming the individual as a priori: in Alto Bío Bío, 
functionaries interpellate subjects as individuals, nd this is carried out through a certain 
effective action of power relation. In this sense, relationships between functionaries and 
natives can be seen as a clear example of what operates as a de-substantialization of the 
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State (Barbosa 2004): the State ‘is not its ministrie , neither Eliseo, neither White House, 
neither Kremlim (…) The State is an exercise of political power (Clastres, 1978:166).’ It 
is an ‘effective action of power relation’ (Ibid. p.115). In this sense, and following 
Barbosa (2004), I believe that Edwin, through his night time monologue, proposes to us 
a certain type of sociality, rather than society, against the (de-substantialized) State. The 
latter is enacted through a particular kind of relationship, local and material as Strathern 
(1996) wanted, and based on an effective action of power relation. Edwin's anger 
strongly questions the functionaries’ particular mode of relating, characterized by a type 
of sociality that I have called unproductive. Therefore, what Clastres proposes and 
Edwin performs are not societies against the State, but rather socialities against the State, 
or ‘social machines without any external aspect rega ding the subjectivation forms that 
they produce and through which they operate’ (Barbosa 2004:561, my own translation).  
Having said this, Edwin's greeting is also illustrative. When the functionaries arrived, his 
main concern was related to the presence of a particular person: Piñera. Edwin refers to 
the Chilean president with his name rather than with his (abstract) symbolic institutional 
role (Edwin does not say, ‘Thank god you have not br ught the ministries,’ or ‘Thank 
god the President of Chile did not come,’ for example). This mode of relating against a 
depersonalizing abstraction is also present in Edwin’s expression ‘just pencils.’ To say 
that functionaries are ‘just pencils’ is another way of saying that those people are very 
distant from the significant practices taking place in veranadas (related to caring for the 
animals that are a main source of subsistence). According to this logic, I suggest that the 
relation proposed by a functionary is determined by an unproductive mode of relating 
for which individuals both exist a priori beyond their contexts, and precede 
relationships. This unproductive sociality is based on the transaction of meanings and 
abstract currencies, and is characterized by the apparent indifference of functionaries to 
the pragmatic function of veranadas. Thus, the functionaries appear as symbols of the 
State, as symbols of a symbol. In this sense, Edwin’s yelling is a particular reaction to a 
type of fully unproductive sociality, paradoxically characterized by the proposal of an 
exchange without exchange and a kind of sociality that denies itself. In other words, 
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Edwin does not accept the functionaries’ interpellation, and he denounces it by shouting 
out in the middle of the night the name of an interaction without persons but with 
functions: functionaries. His threat can also be seen as a reaction to an unproductive 
sociality that does not facilitate the recognition of people as people and in which mutual 
vision is not possible. This unproductive sociality, which can be called blind sociality, 
renders subjects strongly subjected and powerfully determined by their roles. In other 
words, what the yelling against the functionaries (sociality against the State) denounces 
is the depersonalizing function inherent in the interpellation by the functionaries. As I 
have just mentioned, the unproductive blind sociality surfaces as an attempt to determine 
the subject by interpellating it as an individual: Edwin, in this case, would not be 
allowed to appear as a subject becoming a subject (in the Deleuzian sense) through 
mutual vision. Likewise, the utterance ‘just pencil’ appears as a mode of questioning a 
relationship that is established from the outside of practices. This type of relationship 
remains caught in a kind of semantics without a loclity, it is de-localized. It is this trap, 
evidenced by Edwin’s late night tirade, that transforms the work of the intercultural 
facilitator into an impossible task. In fact, there is nothing to facilitate, since the 
facilitator has already been interpellated by the State and its ‘double bind’ (Bateson 
1972) relational proposal so to speak, concerning a exchange without exchange and 
sociality without sociality, what I have called unproductive sociality.122  
Indexical relationships, not symbolic abstractions, seem to be Edwin’s invitation to the 
State's functionaries. Flora also resisted institutional abstraction when conferring the 
name el Orígen onto a state worker (Chapter Four). It is important to keep in mind that 
in Mapuche history, there was never a tributary surplus that allowed the appearance of 
the institution, and therefore the existence of functionaries. The Mapuche ‘never 
institutionalized power in a way of producing functionaries and representatives in charge 
paid by a system of tributes imposed to the population’ (Marimán 2006:61, my own 
translation). In Chile, functionaries are paid with the ‘kullin’ (money) that comes from a 
system of tributes, rather than the ‘kullin’ (animals) that Edwin takes care of in the 
                                                
122 For a discussion of ‘double bind’ within intercultural relations, see Foerster & Montecino 2007. 
 196 
mountains. The word ‘kullin’ in Alto Bío Bío is used to refer to both animals nd money, 
because for many Pehuenche, money comes from the sale of animals. One of the 
facilitator’s functions (negotiating the rental price for horses) was therefore to establish 
the symbolic kullin (money) of the indexical kullin (animal), if you will.  
Institutional abstractions that mediate relationship  are not welcomed by either Edwin or 
Flora (as discussed in Chapter Four). ‘El Orígen’ and ‘Piñera’ refer to people with 
personal nouns: the sociality against the State here appears as an insistence on 
personalizing institutions (or de-institutionalizing persons). This insistence tends to 
consider institutions within relations rather than e tities of power separated from 
relationships: El Orígen is not a representative of the State, but rather a person who 
assumes his or her own name, el Orígen. In this way, I suggest that sociality against the 
State appears as a critique of the abstract mediation that generates a transcendental 
alterity at the moment of its interpellation. In other words, Flora and Edwin push us to 
think of the necessity (and prerogative) of persons when establishing relationships. El
Orígen and Piñera are not institutions separated from people, but rather, they form a part 
of relationships. It is perhaps for this reason that Edwin claims that nobody represents 
him and that nobody can speak for him. Immediate and local relationships are those that 
really matter to Edwin, as opposed to those relations that have turned into an objectified 
representation through the functionaries’ pencils. Edwin simply reminds us that 
‘relationships reduced to ‘command-obedience’ as ways of understanding the political, 
in America do not work’ (Clastres 1969:10-11). In other words, Edwin and Flora are 
against the State, to use Clastres’ (1974a) classic title, but against a State understood as 
the imposition of a certain blind sociality based on de-personalizing abstractions and on 
the power that abstraction and its hierarchy implies.  
The second ethnographic situation recounted above might be understood as an instance 
of shamanistic transparency, because it implies an over-codification and over-exposition 
of a subject (the machi) in relation to a certain type of effective action f power relation: 
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nothing remains hidden.123 This shamanistic transparency can also be thought of as a 
specific result of the ‘culture’ (sensu Carneiro de Cunha (2009), see Chapter Four) 
enacted by functionaries and the State’s programs in intercultural health, which, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, need actors to be able to negotiate. It is also apparent that the 
way the State interpellates the machi is clearly based on an individualistic ideology of 
the person. This ideology determines the very possibility of ‘intercultural negotiation,’ 
even though local conceptualizations of personhood in general, and mutual vision in 
particular (Chapter One), are not considered whatsoever. In other words, this 
shamanistic transparency can be thought of as being the result of an exchange without 
sociality of exchange (see Course 2011), the latter being premised upon the equality, 
autonomy, and perceived difference of the participants. In contrast, and this is the main 
argument I would like to put forward in this Chapter, the paradigmatic sociality 
determining intercultural relations takes shape through the creation of a web of 
relationships that paradoxically do not allow the emergence of real relationships among 
real people through mutual vision. In short, the int raction between health workers and 
local people appears as highly determined by an unproductive sociality which, if we 
consider the very significance of the relations of mutual vision needed for the emergence 
of a person, could also be thought of as a particular type of blind sociality. The machi 
being enacted by the media appears as such precisely through the activation of an 
interpellation that is not based on the visual mutuality of the participants. The subject of 
the State’s interpellation appears (at least temporarily) as configured within a situation 
with no exit. To continue with Althusser: the moment there is a ‘you’ (in this case, the 
machi of this shamanistic transparency), there is immediat ly an ‘I,’ namely, the State as 
subject. This interpellation does not escape the ‘logics of the pencil’ inherent to the 
relational style of the State’s intercultural health program. This blind sociality is 
premised upon symbolic meanings rather than indexical practices. The metaphor of the 
                                                
123 I am using the concept of transparency based on Vattimo’s (1992) work on transparent society, mass 
media and postmodernism. He proposes ‘(a) that the mass media play a decisive role in the birth of a 
postmodern society, (b) that they do not make this society more transparent, but more complex, even 
chaotic, and finally, (c) that it is in precisely this relative ‘chaos’ that our hopes for emancipation lie’ 
(Vattimo 1992:4). For a critical reflection on the ideology of transparency, see Strathern 2000. 
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State subject as being just a pencil is illustrative of this type of sociality, and not nly 
when Edwins’s utterances are considered: in Chol Chol, t e intercultural facilitator 
intervenes in the machi’s performance with her pencil, without understanding the 
functions of that particular machi in practice.   
In a more general sense, the connection created between the machi and people from La 
Peña is clearly embedded in a scenario of structural violence (Farmer 1996, 2004) 
involving people that had been resettled from Ralco Lepoy in the Andean mountains to 
La Peña on Santa Bárbara's rural-urban fringe. These r ettled Pehuenche people are 
living in situations of great inequality (Gonzalez-Parra & Simon 2009). In this place, the 
pencil appears once again as a metaphor for the functions of functionaries, this time with 
its inseparable kin, the paper: I was seen as a functionary, somebody who has the pow r 
to manipulate meanings written on paper. In that par icular context, I am part of an 
effective action of power relation defined from outside the relationship itself.  
The case of Cristian obeys the same logic of power relation, but it is even more delicate. 
In a certain sense, Cristian, as a patient, embodies th  specific consequences of 
intercultural health initiatives. Cristian appears in the crossroad that is generated 
between the intercultural health initiatives of the State, the Indigenous people who 
participate in that intercultural network and those who oppose these kinds of initiatives. 
The change in machi and the change in treatment is in fact triggered precisely because 
machi Juana, being in connection with the public services, is perceived by some in the 
community to be a witch bound to the State. It is known that machi are generally seen as 
radically different people inside their communities, feared for their radical alterity and 
their healing/destructive capacities (see Bacigalupo 2001 & 2007). In this case however, 
the situation implies a different complexity: the machi is rejected by part of the 
community because of her relatedness to the State. Wi hin the State’s interpellation, the 
machi recognizes the State as subject, and by doing so she becomes part of it, part of that 
effective action of power relation. This dynamic, however, is what really matters for the 
self-reflection machi Juana goes through while Nüyün, the earthquake, occurs. Nüyün, 
without necessarily being an institution (the earthquake here appears as a subject rather 
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than as a force of nature) strongly interpellates the machi, but from a different subject 
position. It is a cultural interpellation (in a multi-naturalistic sense) that falls upon the 
machi, forcing her to critically think about her own position within a certain effective 
action of power relation. Nüyün thus appears as being against the State, the latter 
understood as a certain type of winka sociality, blind and unproductive. 
What is striking here, and needs to be highlighted, is that when the machi criticizes 
‘winka domination,’ she does not do so as if there was an external or transcendental 
dominance: it is in her. In other words, she is guilty because she cannot escape from the 
interpellation that the State imposes on her, a reltionship based on an unproductive 
blind sociality. If what is winka is understood as being involved in a power relationship 
or a certain type of sociality, the machi recognized herself inside that winka relationship 
when Nüyün interpellated her. It is for this reason that the category ‘functionary’ is not 
related to a dilemma of identity but rather to one of self-difference. Edwins’s 
condemnation of ‘functionaries’ denounces a way of treatment of difference. It is a 
contestation of the way difference is being conceived of. In the same way the machi 
critically reflects on her own practices after Nüyün, Edwin criticizes a certain type of 
effective action of power relation. What is being criti ized, I would like to suggest, is a 
transcendental power that gains force precisely because it has been conceived of as 
separated from relationships. In other words, for the State, intercultural health 
relationships are secondary, mediated, and paradoxical: they are relations that do not 
allow and are not based on a productive sociality, the latter characterized by 
‘autonomous thought, agency, and social interaction based on language and exchange’ 
(Course 2011:30). If it is true that in Mapuche ontologies ‘personhood is necessarily 
predicated on relations with others (…) and a privileged mode of these relations with 
others is that of exchange’ (Ibid. p.25), the type of unproductive blind sociality that I 
have described here does not allow the emergence of relationships in which the 
recognition of people as people is possible (through mutual vision). According to Course 
(2011), others recognize the state of personhood only when the capacity for productive 
sociality (human sociality, action) converges with human physicality (human body, 
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form). Considering this line of argument in general, and mutual vision in particular, I 
want to suggest that what characterizes the unproductive blind sociality of the 
functionaries is in fact a lack of human sociality. My point is that what configures 
relations proposed by functionaries is an incapacity for productive sociality, or phrased 
in a more positive way, a capacity for unproductive blind sociality. If both the mode of 
sociality of exchange proposed by Course (2011), and my claim about mutual vision as a 
precondition for the emergence of a real person, imply the equal and autonomous nature 
of the participants as well as an act of visual recognition, the unproductive blind 
sociality present in the relationships between functionaries and natives implies, in fact, 
the opposite. Unproductive blind sociality is characterized by an unequal and 
heteronymous mode of relating that derives from the impossibility of the recognition of 
personhood within these relatings. It is this type of sociality that is being criticized by 
Edwin’s rage against the functionaries, and what the machi questions in her reflection 
regarding her own role in connection with the functionaries. However, both reactions are 
ephemeral: they appear as moments of accusation that cannot really change the general 
State of the situation (Badiou 2001).124 Thus, these moments of contention carried out by 
Edwin and machi Juana against the hegemonic interpellation by functio aries of the 
State, although violently excluding the Other, demarcating an external politics (‘you 
functionaries!’), and at the same time affirming a homogeneous unit from within (what 
impedes the division between dominant and dominated) (Clastres 1977), disappear 
quickly: the day after his tirade, I awakened to a smiling Edwin looking for his horse, 
and the machi appeared in the newspaper only months after her critical reflection. It is 
apparent then that the effective action of power relationship inherent to the practices of 
the state functionaries is indeed effective. 
 
 
                                                
124 For Badiou (2001), the State of the situation is a position that governs the situation's terms, a meta-
structural doubling of the situation itself and what assures the stability of any situation's presentation. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, starting from the description of two disruptive ethnographic situations, I 
have attempted to show the paradigmatically conflicting character of the daily 
relationships between state functionaries and non-functionary Indigenous people. I have 
demonstrated how these relationships are based on a certain type of sociality that I have 
called an unproductive blind sociality, since it does not facilitate the recognition of the 
people involved as real people through mutual vision. I have also suggested that the 
label ‘functionaries,’ commonly used by Indigenous people to refer to those who work 
for state institutions, points to particular kinds of relations that are not premised on 
mutual vision. ‘Functionary,’ thus, is a concept refe ring to the particular ontological 
status of subjects that are not locally conceived as re l people. 
In general terms, using these specific ethnographic situations as a base, I have 
questioned institutions as unique and unavoidable princi les of social organization, and 
have shown how the unproductive blind sociality proposed by the functionaries does not 
allow for the emergence of a true dialogue between r al people. Instead of real 
dialogues, intercultural relationships are merely based upon symbolic abstractions and 
do not consider people's real indexical practices. I have also tried to provide relational 
evidence against the State/society divide that claims that culture is produced by the State 
but not the other way round (Steinmetz 1999). What is really at stake within these 
relationships is in fact the type of sociality that configures relationships between 
functionaries and Indigenous people. I suggest thatese relations are symbolically 
conceived of from outside relationships themselves, operating through an interpellation 
of individuals that is always transcendental. I believe that this is in fact the problem at 
stake when considering local reactions against thisunproductive blind sociality, 
exemplified by the words of Edwin and machi Juana, people who in this Chapter have 
been considered as embedding a more paradigmatic type of ‘intercultural’ relationship. 
This Chapter has tried to provide an answer as to how it is that ‘the objectivity of the 
sociality can operate through the ‘subjectivity’ ofpeople in interaction’ (Barbosa 
2004:535, my own translation). I have suggested that Edwin and machi Juana’s local 
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contentions against the unproductive blind sociality can be summarized as responding to 
the following question: ‘How to let oneself be invest d with alterity without this 
becoming a seed of transcendence, a basis of power, a symbol of the state, a symbol, that 
is, of a symbol?’ (Viveiros de Castro 2012:38). Finally, I have tried to show that the 
transcendent ‘visualization’ by functionaries of the state is contested precisely because it 
contains the seed of transcendence, which leads to local reactions that attempt to contest 





‘The sowing of potatoes must be done when the moon is waning (Ch. chenkülakuyen). If 
you plant them when the moon is waxing (Ch. c encherikuyen), those potatoes will not 
grow.’ Pedro taught me this on one of the spring mornings we spent together in Pitril. 
Since the waning moon of that October was nearing, we were selecting the best seed 
potatoes from several sacks he had put aside the previous year. We had been discussing 
the land, earlier cultivations, the best time to castrate animals and so on, when he 
unexpectedly began to reflect about the past and the many transformations that had 
occurred in Pitril in recent years: ‘Too many things have changed with all this mess of 
people around! (Sp. Muchas cosas han cambiado con todo este trajino de gente!) Most 
of all, there are much fewer appearances (Sp. apariencias) around than there used to 
be.’ He spoke about the different beings that had decided to go away because of the 
massive trajino, such as the water cow (Ch. wacaco), a very big snake, and a dangerous 
predator bird called piuchen, but also many other (not always malevolent) beings that 
used to live and could be seen near the river. ‘Allthose beings have not been seen 
around here in recent years,’ he added meditatively, before becoming silent. That 
calming silence lasted until Pedro’s daughter arrived to say good morning: ‘Did you 
sleep well, Daddy?’ Pedro replied with a laid-back ‘Yes,’ adding that, fortunately, ‘that 
one did not come to visit me last night.’ Then Teresa stared at me, and in a voice 
dripping with sarcasm said that it was much better when her father was very tired before 
going to sleep, because then, the witranalwe did not bother him at all. Her cynical tone 
was no surprise to me at all, since Teresa had already demonstrated her attitude towards 
the ‘strange things’ her parents believed in. Such beliefs, however, were not merely 
ideas, she once emphasized: ‘For them, witchcraft issues are tangible things,’ she had 
said.  
Bearing in mind the reflections in this thesis, Teresa’s attitude could be considered a 
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multicultural stance, in the sense that she was reducing particular realities into systems 
of belief (Chapter Four). However, that particular attitude was not consistent in Teresa’s 
way of dealing with the world. Many times, for instance, when she had an important 
decision to make, she would go to the mountains to lis en to the chucao, a bird who 
provided advice through its songs. Also, when someone had died, she would not hesitate 
in attributing the death to witchcraft. However on that October day in Pitril, as sunset 
approached and we were all sitting together drinking mate tea, Pedro returned to our 
conversation regarding the many changes that had occurred in Pitril. Once again he 
emphasized the strange phenomenon of the ‘appearances’ disappearance.’ He told me he 
could not fully understand why the witranalwe did not visit the younger generations (Ch. 
wekeche Sp. gente nueva) very often. After some minutes of reflection, he said that one 
of the likely reasons for this was the many changes biomedical injections have induced 
in the blood of the wekeche. In a very literal sense, he said that with ‘all this mess’ (Sp. 
trajino), and with all the new things the construction of the road had brought to their 
communities, the blood of the youth was no longer enticing to the witranalwe. ‘The 
witranalwe does not like that mixed blood!’ he added with conviction. At that point his 
oldest son who was in his forties said in a very friendly tone ‘The witranalwe is an 
ecological bad spirit; he wants to be in shape!’ Everyone laughed, and we continued 
drinking our mate tea. ‘The wekeche are changing very fast’, Pedro told me that night 
before going to sleep. 
This anecdote provides ethnographic relevance of the vernacular distinction between 
‘new people’ (Ch. wekeche) and ‘old people’ (Ch. koiviche) that my host Pedro and 
many others used to make. I heard many people in different communities claiming that 
the construction of the road connecting the communities of the Queuco Valley with the 
town of Ralco had created a noticeable difference between wekeche and koiviche. The 
former were often said to be more adapted to the way of life of Chilean people. In fact, 
those generations were very often described as being in winkarakiduam (non-Pehuenche 
thought), speaking winkadungun (non-Pehuenche language), and using winkanütram 
(non-Pehuenche ways of talking). As shown in the introduction, the history of contact 
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between Pehuenche people and Chileans in the last century is a matter of fact. However, 
most of the people in Alto Bío Bío claim that daily contact between them and the 
Chilean public services only became significant about thirty years ago, because of the 
road built under Pinochet’s dictatorship.  
 
 
Figure 8. The former enü or the Pinochet Stone (Photo: Cristian Castro)  
 
On this road in the middle of Pitril, there is a very famous large boulder all the 
inhabitants use as a landmark when describing where t y live. This boulder is widely 
thought to have been a renü, a sacred place imbued with particular force (Ch. newen), 
and in the past was used by people as a place where people could foresee the future. 
Today this place is known as the Pinochet Stone, and its power to bestow visions of the 
future is now gone. The future is, at least temporarily, gone, so to speak: part of the 




Figure. 9 The former enü or the Pinochet Stone (Photo: Cristian Castro) 
 
It must be stressed here that Pehuenche life, Pehuenc e vision, and Pehuenche divisions 
are far more complex than the partition between Pehuenche and non-Pehuenche 
ontology I have focused on in order to build up my overall argument. Nevertheless, even 
if intergenerational and intra-cultural contradictions and divisions are both complex and 
multiple, young people in Alto Bío Bío still inhabit, to a great extent, a Pehuenche 
cosmo-politic. Teresa, like many other wekeche, still accepts the truth of witchcraft, and 
cannot help referring to the chucao when dealing with her existential dilemmas.   
Having said this, this thesis has examined two contrasting analytical inventions (sensu 
Wagner 1982). First, I illustrated a system of vision I have called ‘Pehuenche vision’ 
(Part I). I suggested that this can only be understood as being part of a wider multi-
natural Pehuenche cosmo-politic, understood as a politic where ‘cosmos refers to the 
unknown constituted by multiple, divergent worlds and (…) the articulation of which 
they would eventually be capable’ (Stengers 2010:995). Secondly, I have analyzed 
particular actions of political vision strongly determined by multicultural thinking and 
practices (Part II). By ‘political,’ in contrast to‘cosmo-political,’ I mean the focus of the 
State’s practices (executed by functionaries) on ‘an exclusive human club (…) with a 
finite list of entities that must be taken into account’ (Latour 2004:454).  
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On the one hand, with vision as the key ontological operator, Part I focused on what 
Viveiros de Castro (1998) has pointed out as the main problem for Amerindian 
perspectivism, namely, how to separate and particularize within a world where relations 
are given and substances must be defined. Part II on the other hand, focused on what has 
been described (Viveiros de Castro 1998) as constituting the main problem for Western 
cosmology: how to connect and universalize within a world where individual substances 
are given and relations have to be made. I have demonstrated that whereas a multi-
natural world entails the risk of becoming sick because of the excess of eyes, a 
multicultural one implies the risk of becoming sick because of the excess activity of 
one’s own neurono (to say it in the words of the healer quoted at the beginning of this 
work). For the most part, I have made these ontological contrasts by considering 
intercultural relations, however intra-cultural distinctions between koiviche and wekeche 
might be constituted, to a certain extent, by similar but unexplored tensions.  
The structuring of these sections was based strictly on ethnographical data about what 
organizes the lives of Pehuenche people. In this sense, this thesis has taken shape 
through a particular invention aiming to avoid the risk of reducing the Pehuenche 
account to arbitrary personal choices (see Strathern 1987). In order to demonstrate the 
relevance of Pehuenche thought to the critical evaluation of predominantly multicultural 
ontologies, I have described not only a visual system hat appears in all its ontological 
splendour when koiviche (the old people) conceptualizations of being are examined, but 
also a visual system that is still relevant in the daily lives of many wekeche. Nowadays 
however, the younger generations rarely live in their communities since they often have 
to migrate to Chilean cities looking for jobs and/or t  study. Not only have ngen spirits 
been withdrawing from Alto Bío Bío, but wekeche are also dwindling in number. 
Within this extremely complex ethnographical scenario dominated by ‘ontological 
disorders’ (Bonelli, forthcoming), what has largely guided my account of Pehuenche 
people is what all the koiviche and many of the wekeche I met in Alto Bío Bío openly 
declared as their main concern: in Alto Bío Bío, something is slowly disappearing. I 
have exposed some of the intricacies of this Pehuenche world by focusing on Pehuenche 
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vision. I have shown how the relational visible ground between people requires the 
convergence of the personal composition (through mutual vision) within a dynamic 
space that I call the ‘singular dynamic composition’ (Chapter One). I have also examined 
particular situations of nocturnal predation in which seeing (unilaterally) equals eating. 
Through the consideration of unilateral vision and witchcraft and illness, I have 
demonstrated that Pehuenche ontologies are predicat on a radical primary dialectics 
‘between seeing and eating’ (Mentore 1993:29) (Chapter Two). Moreover, I have 
described the relevance of the gift of vision in restoring direct and mutual vision 
between people, arguing that an essential preconditi  for the contingent recognition that 
discriminates between real people and non-real people is the creation of shared ground 
of human visibility (Chapter Three). I have also explored how liberal premises are 
enacted through multiculturalist practices of the State (Chapter Four), and how these 
practices, determined by a blind sociality, lead to particular local reactions (Chapter 
Five). In a nutshell, I have not only examined the rol  of vision in both a multi-natural 
and a multicultural world, but I have also reflected on the consequences a non-reflexive 
encounter between these entails. By underlining radical ifferences between both non-
commensurable systems of vision and these vision of systems, I hope to have made a 
contribution to intercultural relations, broadly con eived. Within the political arena of 
States, these intercultural relations are often under-conceptualized and are frequently 
premised on the taken for granted and equivocal configuration of discrete and bounded 
worlds in interaction that allegedly exist out-there. With this thesis I hope to have 
demonstrated that, as I said in the introduction, there is more to Pehuenche vision than 
meets the individualistic, liberal eye.  
Last but not least, considering that perspectivism, which has been a major source of 
inspiration throughout this thesis, ‘should not be regarded as a simple category, but 
rather as a bomb with the potential to explode the whole implicit philosophy so 
dominant in most ethnographers’ interpretations of their material’ (Latour 2009b: 2), I 
hope this thesis can also be a bomb with the potential to explode the daily liberal and 
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